City of Wilmington Operation Weed & Seed 1992 to 1996: An Evaluation

Delaware Statistical Analysis Center

March 1998



This report is supported under Award #96DDBX0010, Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice.

This report is supported in part by the City of Wilmington, Comprehensive Communities Program Phase II.

Points of view expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.

State of Delaware Document 10-07-03-980303

City of Wilmington
Operation Weed & Seed
1992 to 1996: An Evaluation

March 1998

STATE OF DELAWARE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER
60 THE PLAZA
DOVER, DELAWARE 19901

Authors:

Richard J. Harris, Research Specialist
John P. O'Connell, Director
Delaware Statistical Analysis Center

Mary J. Mande, Ph.D.
MJM Consulting

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction **1**

Overview of the Problem - The Illicit Drug Trade in Wilmington, Delaware 2

Program Overview **5**

Weed & Seed Components and Implementation 6

Assessment of Weeding Activities **11**

Measuring the Impact of Weeding Activities on Area Drug Markets 13

Summary of Research Findings 14

Illicit Drug Trends in the Weed & Seed Target Area 15

Weed & Seed Area Hot Spots 22

Calls for Police Service from the Weed & Seed Area 26

Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests 30

Journey to Crime 34

Weed & Seed Area Shootings Incidents 38

Illicit Drug Trends in Wilmington 48

Summary of Interviews with Key Weed & Seed Program Participants 59

Assessment of Seeding Activities **61**

Juvenile Crime in the Weed & Seed Area 70

1996 Weed & Seed Opinion Survey 74

The Eight Year War Against Drugs in Wilmington, Delaware - Introduction **83**

Background: Growth in the Sale and Use of Illicit Drugs: 84

Panel Interviews: The Research Design 84

Approach of the Fifth Panel Study 85

The Wilmington Police Department and the War on Drugs **86**

Illicit Drug Markets and the "Pure" Community Policing Approach 86

The New Hot Spots: Westside/Hilltop and West Center City Neighborhoods 87

The "Quadrant" System (1993-1995) 88

The Era of "Shootings," (1996-1997) 89

The Fight Against Drugs 1997 90

Wilmington Police Department: A New Regime and Reorganization 90

The Community: People, Problems and Solutions 94

The Communities in 1997 ..... **97**

Prospects for the Future: WPD and Community Leaders **107**

Findings and Conclusions **109**

Appendix **117**

References **135**

Executive Summary

1996 represents the second year of "fighting back". This follows the 1994 reversal where significant manpower reductions in the Wilmington Police Department and stretching of Weed & Seed funds to cover a larger target area resulted in a 43 percent increase of drug related calls for police service.

In 1996, progress in the Weed & Seed area is evident when it is observed that drug related calls for service decreased from 2,039 in 1995 to 1,659 in 1996, a reduction of 19 percent. Likewise, calls relating to burglary decreased by 19 percent.

1996 was characterized by "saturation police efforts" that emphasized increased police presence and special investigative activities. For example, the Delaware State Police maintained Operation Joint Venture in the summer of 1996. Through the use of $200,000 of Weed & Seed Asset Forfeiture Funds the Wilmington Police Department was able to create a task force with federal agency participation. The Reactionary Drug Enforcement Team focuses on vice activity and the Warrant Execution team focuses on the identification and arresting of offenders with outstanding warrants. During this period the city also received a special $75,000 Weed & Seed grant for gun abatement where the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms assisted the Wilmington Police Department at reducing the availability of guns in the neighborhoods. Two community police officers also worked in the Weed & Seed area during this period.

Despite the signs of progress, the in-depth interviews of community and police showed a high level of frustration and concern about the level of success. Citizens recognize the efforts of the police but they also report that the intense law enforcement activities have not resulted in the level of communication and confidence that they had in 1993 and 1994 when there was a heavier community policing orientation. They also report from the neighborhoods that there is still a high level of addiction which continues to create a demand for illicit drugs. The immigration of more people from out of state who become involved in the illicit drug trade, the beginnings of gang activity, and a continued high level of violence are viewed as danger signs.

As has been the case over the years, the observations and worries of citizens point to a particular truth. Where drug activity and burglary showed a significant decrease, calls related to assault and robbery decreased by a much smaller extent. Assault related calls decreased by nine percent and robbery decreased by two percent. What was paramount in citizen's concern, however, was the record number of shootings. Of the 108 Wilmington shootings in 1996, about one-third occurred in the Weed & Seed area. Citizen comments focused intently on the youthfulness and impulsiveness of the shooters. In-depth analysis supports these observations. Special activities such as the joint project with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Operation Safe Streets which started in the summer of 1997 have not been able, yet, to reduce the level of shootings as the toll for 1997 is 108.

Seeing the Issues in More Detail

Operation Weed & Seed in 1996 might be best described as "holding the line", which presents a picture of frustration. Part of the problem is knowing what to do next.

Three types of new analysis are provided in this report which might help us to understand and deal with the community crime problem more effectively.

An Annotated History of Illicit Drug Crime in Our Communities

Mary Mande, in addition to the 1997 in-depth interview results, has provided an annotated history of interview results since 1990 relating to Weed & Seed and community policing. This is a rare opportunity to examine the ebb and flow of community crime issues as seen through the eyes of the people who live and work in the Weed & Seed area. The open sharing over the years has provided a rich context that enhances the analytical work we prepare. In fact, our understanding and our reactions to unfolding situations is greatly aided by this "Qualitative" approach.

Illicit Drug Hot Spots are HOT

Second, we conducted a special analysis relating to illicit drug events for each year between 1992 and 1996. This study of five full years of arrests portrays a discouraging picture. Hot spots are proving to be geographically well defined and persistent. When increased police activity reduces illicit drug activity at the main hot spot it is usually displaced a block or two aweay or at most three or four blocks. When things return to normal, activity at the old hot spot picks up again.

In the Weed & Seed area, there are three main hot spots. The corner of 7th & Jefferson in West Center City, only a city block away from the William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center (aka the Safe Haven) has ranked as the number one hot spot for three of the past five years. The second and third most active hot spots are located in the Westside/Hilltop area—N. Franklin Street between 3rd & 4th and Delamore Place between 3rd & 4th.

Journey to Crime—People Don't Just Trade Drugs in Their Own neighborhood

This new mapping analysis documents the extent that people come to the Weed & Seed site to trade in illicit drugs. The Weed & Seed area is not having difficulty just because the perpetrators come only from within the neighborhood. At least 45 percent of the persons arrested in the Weed & Seed area for illicit drug sales and possession of drugs reside outside the neighborhoods. Twenty percent of those arrested live elsewhere in the City of Wilmington, 16 percent live in suburban New Castle County or other Delaware counties and 6.5 percent reside out of state. The reported level of outside illicit drug traffic is an underestimation. The police tell us that arresting buyers is only a by product because they do not have sufficient resources to routinely pursue "outsiders" in the neighborhood buying drugs. Likewise, citizens report that some of the people we count as residents have only recently moved in from out of state.

Taking into account the amount of crime that is brought into the "at risk" neighborhoods by outsiders provides a new policy issue. How would the quality of life in a neighborhood improve if people from outside areas were somehow dissuaded from coming into the neighborhood?

Jack O'Connell
Director
Delaware Statistical Analysis Center

Introduction

Operation Weed & Seed is a federally funded initiative to reduce illicit drugs and violent crime in targeted inner-city neighborhoods. The intent of the Weed & Seed strategy is to "Weed" out the negative elements in the targeted neighborhood (crime, drugs) through increased drug suppression and community policing efforts while "Seeding" the neighborhood with an array programs in the areas of prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration.

The Weed & Seed program consists of four elements. **Law Enforcement** constitutes the "weeding" aspect of Weed & Seed. The focus of the law enforcement element is the suppression of illicit drug activity and crime through increased enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, and supervision of offenders.

Community-Oriented Policing serves as a bridge between "weeding" and "seeding". Walking patrols, bicycle patrols, and other implementations of community policing increase the level of police visibility and presence, which in itself can have a deterrent effect on criminal activity. Perhaps the most important role of community policing is that it can help foster cooperative relationships between the police and area residents.

The **Prevention, Intervention, and Treatment** element involves "seeding" the target neighborhoods with programs and services geared towards preventing problem behaviors from occurring, eliminating harmful behaviors before they become entrenched, and reducing involvement for those who partake in behaviors that adversely impact the community.

The fourth element of the Weed & Seed strategy is **Neighborhood Restoration**. According to the Weed & Seed Implementation Manual (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992), the neighborhood restoration element "is designed to revitalize distressed neighborhoods and improve the quality of life in the target communities. The neighborhood restoration element will focus on economic development activities designed to strengthen legitimate community institutions. Resources should be dedicated to economic development, provision of economic opportunities for residents, improved housing conditions, enhanced social services, and improved public services in the target area".

Wilmington's Weed & Seed program was implemented in July 1992 with an initial $1.1 million award from the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Funding for the program continues under the auspices of the Executive Office of Weed & Seed (EOWS). Three Wilmington neighborhoods have been officially designated by EOWS as Weed & Seed sites—Westside/Hilltop, West Center City, and Browntown/Hedgeville. The West Center City and Westside/Hilltop neighborhoods have historically been two of city's most crime and drug-infested neighborhoods, based on the number of calls for police service. Browntown/Hedgeville, while not considered a high-crime area, was designated as a Weed & Seed site in 1995 because of the its close proximity to the West Center City and Westside/Hilltop neighborhoods and the likelihood that it would be adversely affected by the displacement of drug activity from these areas.

Overview of the Problem - The Illicit Drug Trade in Wilmington, Delaware

Over the past decade many cities throughout the nation have had to cope with problems associated with the illicit drug trade such as increased fear of crime and victimization, disruptive living environments, and physical decay. Since the late 1980's, the City of Wilmington, Delaware has been struggling with the adverse impact that open-air drug sales have had on the quality of life in many of the city's neighborhoods. With a residential population of just over 72,000, Wilmington is a small city with big city drug problems. Located midway between New York City and Washington D.C., and 30 miles south of Philadelphia, Wilmington is ideally located for interstate drug traffic. Easily accessible by both train and automobile, Wilmington is located on Amtrak's northeast corridor, and I-95, one of northeast and mid-atlantic region's major north-south thoroughfares, cuts a swath directly through the center of town and is bounded on both sides by the Weed & Seed target area.

Wilmington's central location and ease of access lie at the core of the city's drug problem. Residents and police officials agree that Wilmington's proximity to larger drug markets in Philadelphia and New York City are to blame for much of the city's illicit drug problem. Drug traffickers from larger metropolitan areas view Wilmington as an "easy" location to establish their narcotic operations because the city's drug markets are less organized (MJM Consulting, 1997). Much of the drug related violence that began in the early 1990's is related to the influx of out of state drug traffickers that occurred during that period. Profits from drug sales are also higher in Wilmington than in larger cities. An ounce of cocaine that wholesales for $400 in New York would sell for $1,000 in Wilmington (News Journal, May 16, 1996).

Chart 1

City of Wilmington - Drug Related Calls for Police Service



While the use and sale of illicit drugs is certainly not new to certain neighborhoods in Wilmington, the magnitude of the problem as it exists today *is* relatively new. Chart 1 shows that prior to 1989, there were comparably few drug related calls for service. In the 3rd quarter of 1989, Wilmington reached a new milestone in terms of drug related calls for service—for the first time more than 500 drug related calls for service were received in a single quarter. With the exception of the seasonal dip in the 4th quarter of 1989, drug related calls haven't dropped below the 500 per quarter threshold since 1989.

The escalation in drug activity during this period is not unique to Wilmington. Many jurisdictions in the region experienced a similar increase in reported open-air drug sales during roughly the same period. The most likely explanation for the increase is that crack cocaine was introduced to the region at this time, and it's low cost and popularity among users led to an increase in open-air drug sales. The increase in reported drug activity was mostly confined to six neighborhoods in Wilmington. Most affected were the Eastside, Westside/Hilltop, and West Center City neighborhoods. Reported drug activity also escalated in the Price's Run, Boulevard, and Riverside neighborhoods during this period, but to a much lesser degree. Police officials have also expressed concerns that the illicit drug problem in the Weed & Seed area has been compounded by an influx of Caribbean international drug traffickers, which has added a new dimension to the city's drug trade (MJM Consulting, 1997).

Recently, Wilmington has seen a rise in drug related violence. In 1996, there were 108 shooting incidents in Wilmington that resulted in injury or death, more than double the 1995 total of 47 shootings and the highest yearly number of shootings on record. Thirty-seven of the 108 shooting incidents occurred in the Weed & Seed neighborhoods (34 percent). Police department statistics estimate that illicit drugs were definitely involved in at least 21 of the 108 shootings and were most likely involved in another 14 cases. A report released jointly by the Delaware Statistical Analysis Center and the Criminal Justice Council found that 44 percent of the shooting victims and 49 percent of the suspects had at least one drug related arrest on their criminal records. In 1997, the number of shootings in Wilmington continues at a pace which may equal the previous year's record (DELSAC/CJC, 1997).

Illegal handgun sales is another growing problem in Wilmington. According to officials from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, "straw purchases" are responsible for much of the increase in the number of illegally procured handguns on the street. A straw purchases refers to instances where an individual without a criminal record purchases a firearm for someone who because of their criminal background probably wouldn't be able to buy it themselves. The firearm is then sold on the street to anyone who is willing to pay for it, in many cases to drug dealers or juveniles.

The two pictures above were taken in West Center City. On the left is a dilapidated structure at 7th & Jefferson Streets, the Weed & Seed area's most active drug corner. The William"Hicks" Anderson Community Center, located at 6th & Madison Streets, is shown on the right.

One of the Westside/Hilltop area's most persistent drug corners, 4th & Franklin Streets, is shown in the photo on the left. The photo on the right shows Read Street between S. Harrison and S. Franklin Streets, the most active drug area in Browntown/Hedgeville.

The two photos above were taken along the Westside/Hilltop area's W. 3rd Street corridor. The photo on the left shows N. Connell Street between W. 3rd & W. 4th Streets. The photo on the right was taken at 3rd Street & Delamore Place, one of the Westside/Hilltop area's most notorious drug hot spots.

Program Overview

The goal of the Weed & Seed program is to reduce the incidence of violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug related crime in the targeted neighborhood, thus providing a safe environment for law-abiding citizens to live, work, and raise families. To realize this goal, the Weed & Seed strategy emphasizes interagency collaboration, integration of multiple resources, and community mobilization. The three primary objectives of Weed & Seed are:

Objective 1. To develop a comprehensive, multi-agency strategy to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug related crime in the target neighborhood.

Objective 2. To coordinate and integrate existing and new Federal, State, local, and private sector initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human services, and to concentrate those resources in the targeted neighborhoods.

Objective 3. To mobilize residents of the targeted sites to assist law enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and drug traffickers from the neighborhood, and to assist human service agencies in identifying and responding to the service needs of the area (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992).

The Wilmington Weed & Seed program was established in July 1992, with an initial award of $1.1 million from the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The program was continued with a $500,000 award in 1994 and 1995, a $200,000 award in 1996, and a $175,000 award in 1997. Two working committees guide the overall development and implementation of the program and provide direct oversight and management of program goals and objectives. The Joint Law Enforcement Committee plans and implements narcotics enforcement strategies in the targeted area. The committee's membership includes representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Department of Corrections, the Wilmington Police Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other Federal and State criminal justice agencies. The Weed & Seed Executive Steering Committee is responsible coordinating policy, management, and implementation activities. The Executive Committee is chaired by the U.S. Attorney for Delaware and includes representatives from the Wilmington, Police Department, State and local government agencies, local human service providers, and community leaders. A Weed & Seed program coordinator provides staff support to the committees and performs other related administrative duties as required.

In general, the initial "Weeding" activities funded by Weed & Seed were in the areas of law enforcement (community policing and traditional narcotics enforcement), prosecution, and corrections, while the "Seeding" activities focused on victim services, substance abuse education and treatment, recreation, tutoring programs, and parent training. Administering agencies for the "Weeding" programs include the Wilmington Police Department, the state Department of Justice, and the state Department of Corrections. Most of the "Seeding" programs are administered by the area's four community centers—West End Neighborhood House, William"Hicks" Anderson Community Center, Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center, and the Latin American Community Center.

Table 1 provides a summary of the programs that were established in the Westside/Hilltop, West Center City, and Browntown/Hedgeville neighborhoods with Weed & Seed funds. The table also shows how the programs relate to the four Weed & Seed elements. Funding for the Community Policing and Law Enforcement components was reduced significantly in second funding cycle. However, federal assistance in the form of Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF) monies were awarded to Wilmington's Weed & Seed program in April 1995. These funds were subsequently used to pay overtime for Weed & Seed area vice operations and to fund two additional law enforcement initiatives, the Warrant Execution Team (WET) and Reactionary Drug Enforcement Team (RDET). Wilmington's Weed & Seed program was also awarded a $75,000 supplemental grant in 1996 to implement a gun abatement program.

Weed & Seed Components and Implementation

Paramount to the Weed & Seed strategy is the linking and integration Federal, State and local law enforcement efforts with Federal, State, and local social services, private sector, and community efforts to maximize the impact of existing programs and resources. According to the federal Operation Weed & Seed Implementation Manual (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992), the three primary components of the Weed & Seed program are:

1. **Coordination and Concentration of Resources in a Specific Geographic Area** - Services provided to target neighborhoods are often fragmented, inadequate, an inconsistent. Weed & Seed is designed to focus existing resources on a well defined geographic area that is experiencing high levels of violence and drug trafficking. This requires the coordination of existing criminal justice and human services to ensure that they are consistent and provide a comprehensive approach to meeting the neighborhood's needs. These services should be concentrated intensively in the selected neighborhood and then maintained at a level sufficient to ensure that the residents can live, work, and raise their families in a safe environment.

2. **Private Sector Investment** - Private sector investment is essential to ensuring the success of the Weed & Seed Strategy. Representatives from the private sector should work closely with public agencies to design, develop, and implement "weeding" and "seeding" activities. Weed & Seed will directly affect the private sector by improving the economic conditions of the neighborhood and the economic status of the residents, creating jobs and more skilled potential employees, and providing safer areas more conductive to business operations. In return for such benefits, the private sector should dedicate resources that will expand and enhance entrepreneurial opportunities, job training, recreation, and health services.

3. **Community Involvement** - Apathy, fear, and hopelessness keep many neighborhood residents from becoming involved in community life. An integral part of Weed & Seed is the mobilization of neighborhood residents to assist in designing, developing, and implementing Weed & Seed activities. Residents need to be empowered to take responsibility for the neighborhood. Resident involvement can be encouraged through activities such as neighborhood watches, marches and rallies, and neighborhood "cleanup" parties to remove graffiti.

The Wilmington Weed & Seed program has been plagued by two persistent problems as they relate to the program's three components. First, coordination among various government agencies has been most effective in the law enforcement area, less so in the social services area. Social service agency involvement is mostly limited to agencies who receive Weed & Seed funds for programming. Participation from agencies who do not receive Weed & Seed funds is very limited.

Secondly, not much has been done in economic development/private sector investment area. Representatives from a few local businesses attend Weed & Seed steering committee meetings intermittently, yet economic or business development issues are seldom discussed at these meetings. Weed & Seed funds were used to establish a program that would have provided assistance for small businesses via "loan peer groups", however this program was discontinued because the program's coordinator wasn't able to recruit enough participants. Also, there has been little collaboration between Weed & Seed and another federally funded economic development initiative, the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community program. In 1994, a large section of Wilmington was designated by the federal government as an Enterprise Community. As a result, the city received federal grants to provide residents of the area with services such as job training, job search assistance, and family support programs. Below market rate bond financing and a 5-year corporate employee tax abatement is available for businesses which locate in the area, provided that at least 35 percent of their hires live in the area. Most of the Weed & Seed area lies within Enterprise Community boundaries. Still, while both programs have similar objectives, there is essentially no collaboration between the two.

Police report that community involvement in some of the more troubled sections of the Weed & Seed area has waned, possibly in reaction to the increase in shootings that started in 1996. Attendance at Westside Neighborhood Coalition meetings, once the most well attended meetings in the Weed & Seed area, is down. Meanwhile, attendance has increased at meetings held in Cool Springs, a more affluent section of the Wetside/Hilltop neighborhood located north of the high-crime area. Many of the Weed & Seed area residents and community leaders who participated in panel interviews believed that the reduced police presence in the neighborhood which resulted from cutbacks in community policing had allowed conditions in the neighborhood to deteriorate. At best, most of those interviewed conceded that the area hadn't improved in the past year. When told that drug related calls for service from the Weed & Seed area were down in 1996, some of those interviewed explained that reduced reporting of drug activity did not necessarily indicate that drug activity was decreasing. Instead, they believed that residents had become discouraged because of a lack of police response to their calls and therefore had stopped reporting drug activity to the police.

Despite the disheartened outlook displayed by those interviewed, residents of the area continued to take steps to rid their neighborhood of drug dealers and street crime. A series of highly publicized drug marches organized by the area's city council representative were held during the summer of 1996. Churches Take A Corner (CTAC), a coalition of 40 area churches, held several vigils in some of the area's most active drug corners. City government also took a more aggressive stance towards the area's drug problem by targeting the landlords of four rental properties which were the source of numerous citizen complaints about drug activity for prosecution under Delaware's nuisance abatement statute.

Table 1

Summary of Weed & Seed Programs, Objectives, and Funding

Weed & Seed Element	Objectives	Program	Administering Agency	7/92 - 12/93	1/94 - 6/95	7/95 - 6/95	7/96 - 12/96
Law Enforcement	Arrest a minimum of 200 drug dealers during the project. Target 7 specific corners where illicit drug activity drastically affects neighborhood life. Forfeit all property utilized by drug traffickers in the delineated area and return 75% for community policing.	Weed & Seed Law Enforcement	Wilmington Police Department	$157,900	$29,100	$6,000	$72,000
	Provide intensive supervision to 50 probation/parole clients who live in the Weed & Seed area.	Weed & Seed Probation/Parole Officer	Delaware Department of Corrections	$34,300	$0	$0	$0
	A 95 percent conviction rate from Weed & Seed drug arrests. A minimum of 100 individuals will be convicted of trafficking drugs.	Weed & Seed Prosecutor	Delaware Department of Justice	$75,000	$0	$0	$0
Community-Oriented Policing	Provide at least 3 community policing officers for at least 120 hours per week in the Weed & Seed target area. Community police will attend 2 neighborhood meetings per month.	Weed & Seed Community Policing	Wilmington Police Department	$446,700	$42,900	$10,900	$55,000
Prevention, Intervention, and Treatment	Provide a minimum of 500 youths with recreational/cultural activities during the summer months. Provide recreational/cultural programs for 300 area residents between the ages of 18 and 22 years old.	Hilltop Summer Camp	Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center	$0	$0	$7,500	$0
		St. Paul's Prevention Program	St. Paul's School	$0	$0	$220	$0
		UMOJA/UJIMA Homegirl Basketball League	William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center	$0	$0	$20,000	$0

Summary of Weed & Seed Programs, Objectives, and Funding

Weed & Seed Element	Objectives	Program	Administering Agency	7/92 - 12/93	1/94 - 6/95	7/95 - 6/95	7/96 - 12/96
Prevention, Intervention, and Treatment	Provide a minimum of 500 youths with recreational/cultural activities during the summer months.	Weed & Seed Area Community Center Recreation Programs	William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center	$33,700	$32,100	$28,800	$13,000
	Provide recreational/cultural programs for 300 area residents between the ages of 18 and 22 years old.		West End Neighborhood House	$30,600	$33,700	$17,700	$0
			Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center	$0	$20,000	$11,600	$0
			Latin American Community Center	$32,200	$15,500	$20,900	$5,000
	Provide a minimum of 200 youths with individualized tutoring/GED preparation.	Education Enhancement Program	Jackson St. Boy's and Girl's Club	$0	$14,400	$0	$0
		Youth Outreach Ministry	Tabernacle Baptist Church	$0	$10,000	$0	$0
		St. Paul's Resource Room	St. Paul's School	$0	$0	$10,000	$0
		Weed & Seed Area Community Center Tutorial Programs	Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center	$10,000	$16,600	$12,400	$4,500
			West End Neighborhood House	$11,300	$20,900	$10,800	$0
			Latin American Community Center	$10,000	$31,200	$12,400	$6,000
			William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center	$9,900	$11,600	$11,600	$5,000

Table 1

Summary of Weed & Seed Programs, Objectives, and Funding

Weed & Seed Element	Objectives	Program	Administering Agency	7/92 - 12/93	1/94 - 6/95	7/95 - 6/95	7/96 - 12/96
Prevention, Intervention, and Treatment	Provide 15 teenage mothers and 50 pregnant teenagers with parenting classes.	Parents for Success	T.A.L.K. Associates	$0	$7,500	$0	$0
	Provide 200 additional parents with parenting education.	Weed & Seed Parenting Project	West End Neighborhood House	$24,200	$0	$0	$0
	Provide parenting education to at least 40% of the parents of children enrolled at Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center.	Parent Partnership	Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center	$0	$0	$10,000	$0
	Provide 100 kindergarten children with Head Start or after school day care programs.	Early Computer Whiz Program	West Center City Day Care Center	$7,200	$11,200	$6,600	$3,000
	Implement a mini-grant process through which additional risk-focused prevention programming can be provided to adolescents, and through which a neighborhood beautification project can be implemented.	Weed & Seed Mini-Grant Program	Criminal Justice Council	$0	$16,700	$8,500	$0
	Provide 100 victims of crime with crisis intervention services.	Weed & Seed Victim Counselor	Criminal Justice Council	$30,700	$35,200	$16,600	$6,300
	Provide a minimum of 25 youths between the ages of 13 and 25 years with life skills development training.	Community Organizational Training	Criminal Justice Council	$22,500	$16,000	$7,300	$0
	Provide at least 500 community members with increased opportunities to obtain health screenings and drug rehabilitation services. Provide 500 adult citizens with drug education.	BCI Street Anti-Drug Outreach	Brandywine Counseling	$10,000	$25,000	$20,000	$15,000
Neighborhood Restoration	Provide the impetus for the community to carry on as a revitalized neighborhood.	Working Capital Delaware	First State Community Loan Fund	$0	$0	$17,700	$0

Assessment of Weeding Activities

The Weed & Seed program's "weeding" strategy combines increased law enforcement efforts with community policing to target and eradicate open-air drug sales. The Law Enforcement Steering Committee is responsible for planning and implementing narcotics enforcement strategies for the Weed & Seed area. This committee includes representatives from the Office of the U.S. Attorney, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshall Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Department of Corrections, the Division of Probation of Parole, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Wilmington Police Department.

During the first 18-month funding cycle, Weed & Seed monies were used to pay for an overtime contingent of undercover officers in the Wilmington Police Department's Drug, Organized Crime and Vice Division, who serve as the primary unit responsible for the investigation and apprehension of drug dealers. Among the strategies utilized in this effort are video surveillance of known drug hot spots and suspected dealers, undercover purchases of drugs from low-level dealers, establishing an informant pool of low-level dealers, and targeting the upper-eschelon traffickers for arrest based on intelligence information obtained from the informants. Federal agencies, including the FBI and ATF, may either participate directly in investigations or provide support to investigating officers in the form of equipment or technical assistance.

After funding for Weed & Seed area vice operations was reduced in 1995, funds slated for Weed & Seed enforcement were only used for buy money. In 1995, Delaware received $200,000 in Weed & Seed asset forfeiture funds which were used to pay for more overtime and investigative equipment. Asset forfeiture funds were also used to create the Reactionary Drug Enforcement Team (RDET), a new unit of the police department formed to supplant the Weed & Seed vice contingent.

Another law enforcement initiative that resulted from Weed & Seed is the Warrant Execution Team (WET). This unit of the Wilmington Police Department is responsible for identifying, locating, and arresting offender with outstanding warrants. The WET was also established using Weed & Seed asset forfeiture monies, however, unlike RDET, the WET doesn't restrict its activities to the Weed & Seed area.

Between 7/1/92 and 12/31/96, 2,388 drug related arrests were made in the Weed & Seed area. One of the largest drug busts in the area was made on 11/16/95, when Weed & Seed officers made a record 3.5 kilogram crack cocaine bust at an apartment on Lancaster Avenue. This was the largest cocaine seizure on record in Wilmington. Overall, fewer drug arrests were made in the Weed & Seed area in 1996, however, the number of cocaine trafficking arrests made in 1996 actually increased by 58 percent.

Information provided by residents has helped the police to identify troublemakers, nuisances, and other problem areas. One Weed & Seed community police officer estimated that about 80 percent of his tips about drug activity comes from citizens. Resident complaints about rental properties that were being used as drug dens ultimately led to the city taking legal action

against the owners. Under a two-year old nuisance abatement statute, the city can petition Chancery Court to shut down problem businesses and dwellings in neighborhoods plagued by drug activity. Four properties in the Weed & Seed area were targeted by the city in 1996 because of the number of complaints that the police received about drug activity in the dwellings.

When Weed & Seed community policing started in July 1992, five officers were assigned to patrol the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City areas. In 1995, the Browntown/Hedgeville area was designated as a Weed & Seed target neighborhood because of concerns that drug dealers who usually worked in the adjacent Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods were starting to move south of Lancaster Avenue because increasing pressure by the police was forcing them out of the area. This expansion of the Weed & Seed area occurred towards the end of the program's second 18-month funding cycle, when funding for community policing officers was reduced. Consequently, the number of community policing officers assigned to the area was reduced from five to three, while the area that they were assigned to patrol increased because of the inclusion of Browntown/Hedgeville. In 1996, the number of Weed & Seed area dedicated community policing officers was further reduced to two.

In 1996, the number of shooting incidents in Wilmington more than doubled compared with the previous year. Of the 108 shootings that occurred citywide that year, 37 were in the Weed & Seed area. In one incident, two juveniles who lived in the Weed & Seed area were shot to death and their bodies dumped in a park in one of Wilmington's most affluent neighborhoods. In response to the escalating street violence, the Wilmington Police Department formed a ten officer Violent Crime Suppression Task Force in May 1996. The city also received assistance from State and Federal law enforcement agencies. In May 1996, a $75,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Justice was awarded to fund the Weapons Reduction, Interdiction, and Seizure Team (WRIST), a five officer surveillance unit of the police department that worked in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Another initiative to reduce street crime, Operation Joint Venture, began in August 1996. This project teamed the Delaware State Police K-9 and Aviation units with the Wilmington P.D. Vice unit.

Weed & Seed dedicated state level prosecution and post-trial supervision were discontinued in 1994. Initially, monies were used to hire a state Deputy Attorney General to deal exclusively with Weed & Seed cases. This position was not renewed after the first 18 months. Likewise, a Weed & Seed dedicated state Probation and Parole Officer position was not renewed. Neither of these positions were funded by their respective agencies (the state Departments of Justice and state Department of Corrections), so Weed & Seed cases that are prosecuted at the state level are treated essentially the same as other state prosecuted cases.

Measuring the Impact of Weeding Activities on Area Drug Markets

The primary goal of Operation Weed & Seed is to reduce illicit drug activity and crime within the target neighborhoods. The following section provides a detailed quantitative analysis of illicit drug and crime trends in Wilmington's Weed & Seed target area to assess how effective Weed & Seed narcotics enforcement efforts were at disrupting the area's open-air drug markets and reducing the incidence of violent crime.

The level of illicit drug activity will be measured using three indicators. The first indicator is the number of drug related calls for service that residents of the area made to the police department. Depending on the circumstances, a change in the volume of drug related calls that police receive from an area can be either positive or negative. An increase in drug related calls can be indicative of citizen's growing intolerance towards illicit drug activity and the disruption that it creates. It may also indicate that resident's are becoming more confident that the police will actually respond to their complaints. It can also reflect growing disillusionment with the police if their calls for service receive no response.

The second indicator used for this analysis is the number of drug related arrests that were made in the area. The number of arrests can be affected by the amount drug activity, intensity of policing or investigative activity, or changes in police staffing levels.

Factors that can cause an increase or decrease in the number of drug related calls for service and drug related arrests can vary and are subject to different interpretations, so using each indicator alone can be problematic. Therefore, the method used for this analysis takes into account the interrelationship between calls for service and arrests.

Drug trends for the Weed & Seed area are compared with trends in other Wilmington neighborhoods. Since displacement is a major concern for anti-drug initiatives like Weed & Seed, this analysis will also look at displacement of drug activity both within the target area and outside to other Wilmington neighborhoods.

The incidence of violent crime will be measured using calls for police service data for the following offenses: Assault, Homicide, Rape and Robbery. These five categories approximate the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) definition of Part I Crimes.

Topics to be discussed in this section include:

1. Illicit Drug Trends in the Weed & Seed Target Area
2. Weed & Seed Area Drug Hot Spots
3. Calls for Police Service in the Weed & Seed Area
4. Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests
5. Journey to Crime
6. Weed & Seed Area Shooting Incidents
7. Illicit Drug Trends in Wilmington

Summary of Research Findings

The Delaware Statistical Analysis Center has conducted yearly evaluations and crime analysis for Wilmington's Weed & Seed program since its inception in July 1992. The 18-month evaluation report, which looked at neighborhood crime trends from July 1992 through December 1994, found that the combined law enforcement and community policing effort had made significant progress towards reducing the number of drug related calls for service that were received from the area in 1993, although some problem areas still remained (DELSAC, 1994).

The 30-month report told a very different story. Citizen complaints concerning drug activity rose sharply in 1994, especially in the Westside/Hilltop area. Interviews with residents and community activists indicated that they were becoming discouraged by the areas escalating drug trade and continuing deterioration of their neighborhood (MJM Consulting, 1994). The 30-month report concluded that the re-entry of previously incarcerated drug offenders back into the community, reduced funding for community policing and undercover vice operations in the target area, and an overall reduction in police manpower resulting from the city's fiscal constraints led to a recurrence of the problems that were suppressed during the earlier phase of Weed & Seed (DELSAC, 1995).

The 1995 report found that the police had once again made some headway at reducing area drug sales, despite the fact that police manpower was still 48 officers below their authorized staffing level of 289. Drug related arrests in the Weed & Seed area rose by 42 percent in 1995, mostly as a result of increased enforcement in the Westside/Hilltop area and three new police initiatives—the Reactionary Drug Enforcement Team, the Warrant Execution Team (both funded with Weed & Seed asset forfeiture monies), and the Strategic Community Action Team, which was established as part of the city's Comprehensive Crime Prevention and Control Program (DELSAC, 1997).

In 1996, there was a substantial decrease in drug related calls for service and drug arrests in the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City areas while drug related calls and arrests increased in Browntown/Hedgeville. This may indicate that conditions in the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City areas had improved and conditions worsened in Browntown/Hedgeville because of displacement. However, a decrease in drug related calls for service doesn't necessarily mean that less drug activity is occurring. Many of those who participated in the 1997 panel interviews believed that drug related calls for service from the area were down in 1996 because police response was too slow. On the other hand, the decrease in drug related calls did not occur across the board since the number of calls concerning 4th & Franklin Streets nearly tripled in 1996.

The decrease in drug related arrests is also subject to different interpretations. Drug arrests in the Weed & Seed area fell by 13 percent overall in 1996, but cocaine trafficking arrests increased by 58 percent, from 67 in 1995 to 106 in 1996. Over half of the cocaine trafficking arrests were in the Westside/Hilltop area, which is also where the largest decrease in drug related calls for service occurred. Therefore, one could reasonably argue that at least part of the decrease in drug related calls in 1996 was related to an actual decrease in drug activity, since more drug traffickers were arrested during this period.

Illicit Drug Trends in the Weed & Seed Target Area

Table 2 shows drug related calls for police service and drug related arrests for the three Weed & Seed neighborhoods from 1991 through 1996. Reported drug activity was mostly restricted to Census Tracts 16, 22, and 23. Combined, the three census tracts accounted for 76 percent of all drug related calls for service that were received from Weed & Seed area in 1996.

Drug related calls for police service from the Westside/Hilltop area totaled 981 in 1996, a 26 percent decrease from the 1995 total of 1,333 calls. Drug related arrests in the area also fell by 22 percent, from 369 in 1995 to 288 in 1996. Reported drug activity in Westside/Hilltop peaked in 1995, when 1,333 drug related calls for service were made to the police. Drug related arrests were made in the area also peaked in 1995, after declining for two consecutive years. Most illicit drug calls for police service from the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood concerned areas located in Census Tract 22, which is bounded by W. 6th Street, Lancaster Avenue, N. Jackson Street, and N. Broom Street, and Census Tract 23, which is bounded by W. 6th Street, Lancaster Avenue, N. Broom Street, and N. Union Street. Some of the city's most active drug hot spots are located in within these two census tracts, including N. Franklin Street between W. 3rd & W. 4th Streets, and Delamore Place between W. 3rd & W. 4th Streets. Drug related calls for service from Census Tract 22 and 23 fell by 29 percent and 23 percent respectively in 1996. Drug related arrests in Census Tract 22 fell by 45 percent in 1996, while arrests in Census Tract 23 increased slightly, from 135 arrests in 1995 to 142 in 1996.

Drug related calls for service from West Center City fell by 21 percent in 1996, from 594 in 1995 to 468 in 1996. There was also a 32 percent decrease in drug related arrests made in the area, from 137 in 1995 to 93 in 1996. West Center City has reported decreasing numbers of drug related calls for service and drug related arrests for two consecutive years. West Center City's most active drug area lies in Census Tract 16, which is bounded by Pennsylvania Avenue, W. 6th Street, Tatnall Street, and N. Monroe Street. For years, the most troublesome drug hot spot within this area has been at 7th & Jefferson Streets. This corner alone has generated 442 drug related calls for service between 1992 and 1996, more than for any other single corner in the Weed & Seed area.

Far fewer drug related calls for service were received from Browntown/Hedgeville than from Westside/Hilltop or West Center City. In 1996, a total of 210 drug related calls for service were received from Browntown/Hedgeville. This represents an 88 percent increase over the 1995 total of 112 calls. Drug arrests in the Browntown/Hedgeville rose by 78 percent in 1996, from 58 arrests in 1995 to 103 in 1996. Drug activity in Browntown/Hedgeville is mostly limited to the area's northernmost boundary, particularly Read Street and the south side of Lancaster Avenue. Census Tract 26, which is the area bounded by Lancaster and Maryland Avenues, Maple and S. Broom Streets, was responsible for 150 of the 210 drug related calls for service received from Browntown/Hedgeville in 1996 (71 percent).

Charts 2 through 5 show drug related calls for police service and drug related arrests for the entire Weed & Seed target area and for each of the three Weed & Seed neighborhoods for 1991 through 1996. The charts show that both drug related calls for service and arrests decreased in the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods in 1992 and 1993. This period represents the initial 18 months of Weed & Seed. During this period, the Weed & Seed

community policing component was staffed with five walking patrol officers and undercover vice operations were fully funded.

In 1994, the charts show that drug related calls for service from the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods increased significantly, while drug related arrests decreased. Funding for the Weed & Seed community policing and vice components were substantially reduced in 1994, resulting in the loss of two walking patrol officers. In addition, the Wilmington Police Department lost about 20 percent of its officers 1994 because the city could not afford to replace positions that were vacated by officers who retired. At its low point in 1994, Wilmington's police force numbered 235 officers, down 54 officers from it's authorized staffing level of 289. Together these two occurrences had reduced the level of police presence in the area to a level where the area's drug trade was able to reestablish itself.

Increased drug enforcement efforts, including the formation of the Strategic Community Action Team (SCAT) and the Warrant Execution team (WET) fueled an increase in Westside/ Hilltop area drug arrests in 1995. Browntown/Hedgeville, which was designated as a Weed & Seed site in 1995, also saw an increase in drug arrests. Drug related calls for service and drug related arrests in West Center City decreased slightly in 1995.

Three additional policing initiatives aimed at reducing street crime—the Violent Crime Suppression Task Force, the Weapons Reduction and Interdiction, and Seizure Team (WRIST), and Operation Joint Venture—were implemented during the summer of 1996 in response to the increase in firearm related violence that occurred that year. In addition, regular patrol officers were required to work 12 hour shifts during this summer months to heighten police visibility during this difficult period. The number of drug related calls for police service from the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods in 1996 decreased by 26 and 21 percent respectively. Likewise, fewer drug arrests were made in both areas. Browntown/Hedgeville did not fare as well, however. Drug related calls for service from the area increased by 88 percent while drug arrests rose by 78 percent.

The Ertel-Fowlkes Spline Regression is a method for plotting trends over a period of time. This technique creates a series of best-fit trend lines based on historical data, the turning points of which represents periods when a statistically significant change occurs. Charts 6 through 9 show drug related calls for service that were received from the Weed & Seed area from January 1987 to December 1996 by quarter. Superimposed on each graph are spline regression plots for each time series. These plots are shown on the graphs as a solid line. The charts show that drug related calls for service from the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood increased during the 3rd quarter of 1992 (when Weed & Seed was implemented), and drug related calls from all three neighborhoods dropped significantly in the following quarter. This temporary increase was followed by a pronounced drop in drug related calls in the 4th quarter of 1992.

The graphs also show the impact that the reduced police presence in the Weed & Seed area had on drug related calls for service. Reported drug activity in the area rose sharply in 1994 when police department staffing levels were at their lowest. The spline regression plots show a significant reduction in the number of that drug related calls from the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods after the second quarter of 1995, when the police stepped up drug enforcement in the area.

Weed & Seed Area - Drug Related Calls and Arrests

Reporting Areas	1991		1992		1993		1994		1995		1996	
	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests
14-01	2	5	2	0	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
14-02	12	6	8	3	5	3	2	4	12	9	8	4
Census Tract 14 Total	**14**	**11**	**10**	**3**	**6**	**5**	**4**	**6**	**14**	**10**	**9**	**5**
15-01	3	4	3	4	1	4	0	2	3	4	3	1
15-02	69	16	31	6	16	12	52	12	90	12	67	26
Census Tract 15 Total	**72**	**20**	**34**	**10**	**17**	**16**	**52**	**14**	**93**	**16**	**70**	**27**
22-01	338	116	306	104	236	84	344	75	472	106	303	66
22-02	207	72	432	168	342	104	428	83	293	102	242	48
Census Tract 22 Total	**545**	**188**	**738**	**272**	**578**	**188**	**772**	**158**	**765**	**208**	**545**	**114**
23-01	171	71	103	26	107	29	228	33	212	51	169	59
23-02	186	50	101	40	180	48	233	48	249	84	188	83
Census Tract 23 Total	**357**	**121**	**204**	**66**	**287**	**77**	**461**	**81**	**461**	**135**	**357**	**142**
Westside/Hilltop Total	**988**	**340**	**986**	**351**	**888**	**286**	**1,289**	**259**	**1,333**	**369**	**981**	**288**
16-01	144	67	116	42	85	18	183	41	103	18	78	19
16-02	258	67	117	70	245	130	332	74	257	24	241	23
Census Tract 16 Total	**402**	**134**	**233**	**112**	**330**	**148**	**515**	**115**	**360**	**42**	**319**	**42**
21-01	56	46	84	40	37	27	70	11	71	18	64	16
21-02	317	115	214	113	51	45	39	36	163	77	85	35
Census Tract 21 Total	**373**	**161**	**298**	**153**	**88**	**72**	**109**	**47**	**234**	**95**	**149**	**51**
West Center City Total	**775**	**295**	**531**	**265**	**418**	**220**	**624**	**162**	**594**	**137**	**468**	**93**
25-01	2	6	5	3	0	2	1	1	1	6	3	5
25-02	6	7	2	2	2	1	1	2	4	5	9	11
25-03	3	3	0	2	1	0	4	0	2	0	3	5
25-04	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	4	1	2	4
Census Tract 25 Total	**11**	**16**	**9**	**7**	**4**	**3**	**7**	**3**	**11**	**12**	**17**	**25**
26-01	57	9	65	20	85	44	82	24	61	10	143	43
26-02	18	3	6	3	4	3	2	4	5	4	7	4
Census Tract 26 Total	**75**	**12**	**71**	**23**	**89**	**47**	**84**	**28**	**66**	**14**	**150**	**47**
27-01	21	2	12	1	9	1	18	3	25	7	30	9
27-02	9	24	20	11	9	32	6	8	10	25	13	22
Census Tract 27 Total	**30**	**26**	**32**	**12**	**18**	**33**	**24**	**11**	**35**	**32**	**43**	**31**
Browntown/Hedgeville Total	**116**	**54**	**112**	**42**	**111**	**83**	**115**	**42**	**112**	**58**	**210**	**103**
Weed & Seed Area Total	**1,879**	**689**	**1,629**	**658**	**1,417**	**589**	**2,028**	**463**	**2,039**	**564**	**1,659**	**484**

Chart 2

Weed & Seed Area - Drug Related Calls and Arrests



	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Calls	1,879	1,629	1,417	2,028	2,039	1,659
Arrests	689	658	589	463	564	484

Chart 3

Westside/Hilltop - Drug Related Calls and Arrests



	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Calls	988	986	888	1,289	1,333	981
Arrests	340	351	286	259	369	288

Chart 4

West Center City - Drug Related Calls and Arrests



	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Calls	775	531	418	624	594	468
Arrests	295	265	220	162	137	93

Chart 5

Browntown/Hedgeville - Drug Related Calls and Arrests



	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Calls	116	112	111	115	112	210
Arrests	54	42	83	42	58	103

Chart 6

Weed & Seed Area - Drug Related Calls for Police Service



Chart 7

Westside/Hilltop - Drug Related Calls for Police Service



Chart 8

West Center City - Drug Related Calls for Police Service



Chart 9

Browntown/Hedgeville - Drug Related Calls for Police Service



Weed & Seed Area Hot Spots

Table 3 displays the five most reported drug corners in the Weed & Seed area for each year from 1992 through 1996. Table 4 and Map 1 displays the 16 most reported drug corners in the Weed & Seed area from 1992 through 1996. The corners in Table 4 are ranked by the number of calls that were received about it during the entire four year period and in 1996. The bold numbers represent the year that a specific corner received more calls than any other and the underscored numbers represent the year that a particular corner peaked in terms of the number of drug related calls that were received about it.

Twelve of the 13 most reported corners are located in the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood, and the remaining four in West Center City. The corner of 7th & Jefferson Streets, which is located in West Center City, generated 442 drug related calls for service, more than any other corner in the Weed & Seed area during this period. It was also the most reported drug corner for three years of the five year period from 1992 to 1996. The corner of 4th & Franklin Streets, located in the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood, ranks second in drug related calls for service overall during this period, and was the most reported drug corner in 1992 and 1993. Calls concerning this corner decreased significantly in 1994 and 1995, but started to rise again in 1996.

The tables also show how drug activity has been displaced within the Weed & Seed area. In 1992, the most frequently reported corners in the Weed & Seed area were 4th & Franklin, 3rd & Franklin, 6th & Jefferson, 2nd & Franklin, and Conrad & Franklin Streets. In 1993, after Weed & Seed had been fully operational for 18 months, drug related calls for service from all of these areas dropped significantly, but at 7th & Jefferson, 3rd & Rodney, and 7th & Washington, reported drug activity was increasing.

In 1994, when funding for Weed & Seed community policing and drug enforcement was reduced, drug related calls for service concerning 4th & Franklin and 3rd & Franklin Streets continued to drop, while reported drug activity at 7th & Jefferson, 4th & Delamore, 3rd & Delamore, 3rd & Connell, 8th & Monroe, and 4th & Harrison Streets rose significantly. In 1995, 7th & Jefferson Streets continued to be the area's most reported drug corner. Drug activity in the Westside/Hilltop area began to migrate north of W. 4th Street, as drug related calls for service concerning 6th & Harrison and 6th & Van Buren Streets began to increase. In 1996, drug related calls for service decreased for 14 of the 16 corners listed in the table. The exceptions were 4th & Franklin and 2nd & Franklin Streets.

Weed & Seed Area Hot Spots - 1992 through 1996

Year	Location	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	Total
1996	7th & Jefferson Sts.	39	55	126	130	**92**	442
	4th & Franklin Sts.	133	85	34	25	**72**	349
	6th & Harrison Sts.	2	5	42	95	**43**	187
	6th & Vanburen Sts.	3	4	11	54	**34**	106
	3rd St. & Delamore Pl.	15	27	81	77	**32**	232
1995	7th & Jefferson Sts.	39	55	126	**130**	92	442
	6th & Harrison Sts.	2	5	42	**95**	43	187
	3rd St. & Delamore Pl.	15	27	81	**77**	32	232
	3rd & Clayton Sts.	15	14	27	**77**	22	155
	6th & Vanburen Sts.	3	4	11	**54**	34	106
1994	7th & Jefferson Sts.	39	55	**126**	130	92	442
	4th St. & Delamore Pl.	28	34	**106**	44	22	234
	3rd & Connell Sts.	29	23	**88**	48	6	194
	3rd St. & Delamore Pl.	15	27	**81**	77	32	232
	8th & Monroe Sts.	26	36	**79**	20	13	174
1993	4th & Franklin Sts.	133	**85**	34	25	72	349
	3rd & Rodney Sts.	27	**82**	46	36	6	197
	3rd & Franklin Sts.	124	**56**	24	34	16	254
	7th & Jefferson Sts.	39	**55**	126	130	92	442
	7th & Washington Sts.	12	**40**	23	18	15	108
1992	4th & Franklin Sts.	**133**	85	34	25	72	349
	3rd & Franklin Sts.	**124**	56	24	34	16	254
	6th & Jefferson Sts.	**99**	11	1	23	13	147
	2nd & Franklin Sts.	**84**	29	11	5	12	141
	Conrad & Franklin Sts.	**52**	34	12	4	1	103

Weed & Seed Area Hot Spots - 1992 through 1996

Hot Spot	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1992-96 Total	Historical Rank	Rank in 1996
7th & Jefferson Sts.	39	55	**126**	**130**	**92**	**442**	1	1
4th & Franklin Sts.	**133**	**85**	34	25	72	349	2	2
3rd & Franklin Sts.	124	56	24	34	16	254	3	8
4th St. & Delamore Pl.	28	34	106	44	22	234	4	7
3rd St. & Delamore Pl.	15	27	81	77	32	232	5	5
3rd & Rodney Sts.	27	82	46	36	6	197	6	14
3rd & Connell Sts.	29	23	88	48	6	194	7	15
6th & Harrison Sts.	2	5	42	95	43	187	8	3
8th & Monroe Sts.	26	36	79	20	13	174	9	11
4th & Harrison Sts.	25	25	57	50	7	164	10	13
3rd & Clayton Sts.	15	14	27	77	22	155	11	6
6th & Jefferson Sts.	99	11	1	23	13	147	12	10
2nd & Franklin Sts.	84	29	11	5	12	141	13	12
7th & Washington Sts.	12	40	23	18	15	108	14	9
6th & Vanburen Sts.	3	4	11	54	34	106	15	4
Conrad & Franklin Sts.	52	34	12	4	1	103	16	16

Map 1

Weed & Seed Area Hot Spots - 1992 through 1996

Calls for Police Service from the Weed & Seed Area

Weed & Seed area calls for police service for Assault, Burglary, Drug, and Robbery related incidents are shown in Tables 5 and 6 and Charts 10 through 13. More calls were received about drug offenses from the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City areas than for any of the other five categories. The most frequently reported offenses from the Browntown/Hedgeville area were assault related.

An increase in drug activity may fuel similar increases in reported assaults or robberies. Assault related calls for service fell in both the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City areas after three consecutive years of increases, but rose by 16 percent in Browntown/Hedgeville. This mirrors a similar the trend in reported drug activity from the three areas. Robbery and burglary related calls for service from West Center City both decreased in 1996 after increasing significantly the previous year. Burglary related calls also decreased in the Westside/Hilltop and Browntown/Hedgeville areas, but robbery related calls from both areas increased slightly.

Table 5

Weed & Seed Area - Calls for Police Service

Code	Offense	Weed & Seed Total			
		1993	1994	1995	1996
105	Assault in Progress	224	253	274	213
106	Assault in Progress w/Weapon	12	12	12	5
145	Assault Investigation	954	959	1,034	975
146	Cutting Investigation	52	56	59	43
147	Shooting Investigation	22	48	46	59
149	Offensive Touching	147	207	193	174
	Total Assault Related Calls	**1,411**	**1,535**	**1,618**	**1,469**
110	Burglary in Progress - Commercial	40	26	25	23
111	Burglary in Progress - Residential	171	191	201	186
170	Burglary Investigation	548	482	586	451
	Total Burglary Related Calls	**759**	**699**	**812**	**660**
117	Drug Sales in Progress	1,264	1,845	1,711	1,400
190	Drug Violation	153	183	329	259
	Total Drug Related Calls	**1,417**	**2,028**	**2,040**	**1,659**
157	**Homicide Investigation**	**3**	**4**	**4**	**4**
130	Rape in Progress	1	0	4	0
160	Rape Investigation	27	21	22	21
	Total Rape Related Calls	**28**	**21**	**26**	**21**
125	Robbery in Progress	24	34	29	36
126	Robbery in Progress w/Weapon	11	13	5	15
165	Robbery Investigation	191	146	246	223
	Total Robbery Related Calls	**226**	**193**	**280**	**274**
	Grand Total	**3,844**	**4,480**	**4,780**	**4,087**

Weed & Seed Area - Calls for Police Service

Code	Offense	Browntown/Hedgeville				West Center City				Westside/Hilltop			
		1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996	1993	1994	1995	1996
105	Assault in Progress	45	56	39	50	69	70	78	65	110	127	157	98
106	Assault in Progress w/Weapon	3	3	1	1	3	4	4	2	6	5	7	2
145	Assault Investigation	203	216	224	271	287	267	306	250	464	476	504	454
146	Cutting Investigation	6	11	13	4	19	20	16	16	27	25	30	23
147	Shooting Investigation	1	4	3	3	7	7	14	14	14	37	29	42
149	Offensive Touching	43	49	58	62	31	97	62	41	73	61	73	71
	Total Assault Related Calls	**301**	**339**	**338**	**391**	**416**	**465**	**480**	**388**	**694**	**731**	**800**	**690**
110	Burglary in Progress - Commercial	9	14	12	10	11	5	3	4	20	7	10	9
111	Burglary in Progress - Residential	33	53	54	43	54	51	60	37	84	87	87	106
170	Burglary Investigation	122	144	137	131	165	117	220	131	261	221	229	189
	Total Burglary Related Calls	**164**	**211**	**203**	**184**	**230**	**173**	**283**	**172**	**365**	**315**	**326**	**304**
117	Drug Sales in Progress	89	89	69	157	363	571	506	407	812	1,185	1,136	836
190	Drug Violation	22	26	43	53	55	53	88	61	76	104	198	145
	Total Drug Related Calls	**111**	**115**	**112**	**210**	**418**	**624**	**594**	**468**	**888**	**1,289**	**1,334**	**981**
157	**Homicide Investigation**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**4**	**3**	**1**
130	Rape in Progress	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
160	Rape Investigation	5	0	6	4	12	5	5	6	10	16	11	11
	Total Rape Related Calls	**6**	**0**	**6**	**4**	**12**	**5**	**9**	**6**	**10**	**16**	**11**	**11**
125	Robbery in Progress	8	7	7	7	11	11	8	9	5	16	14	20
126	Robbery in Progress w/Weapon	4	3	3	3	1	3	1	4	6	7	1	8
165	Robbery Investigation	26	41	51	53	78	21	84	63	87	84	111	107
	Total Robbery Related Calls	**38**	**51**	**61**	**63**	**90**	**35**	**93**	**76**	**98**	**107**	**126**	**135**
	Grand Total	**621**	**716**	**720**	**854**	**1,167**	**1,302**	**1,460**	**1,111**	**2,056**	**2,462**	**2,600**	**2,122**

Chart 10

Assault Related Calls for Police Service



Chart 11

Burglary Related Calls for Police Service



Chart 12

Drug Related Calls for Police Service



Chart 13

Robbery Related Calls for Police Service



Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests

Drug related arrests in the Weed & Seed area fell by 14 percent overall in 1996, from 564 in 1995 to 484 in 1996. Sixty percent of these arrests were made in the Westside/Hilltop area. Drug arrests in the Westside/Hilltop area fell by 22 percent overall, from 369 in 1995 to 288 in 1996, although arrests increased slightly in Reporting Areas 15-02 (bounded by W. 6th, N. Broom, W. 9th, and N. Adams Streets) and 23-01 (bounded by W. 3rd, N. Union, W. 6th, and N. Broom Streets). The number of drug arrests in West Center City were down 32 percent, from 137 in 1995 to 93 in 1996. Browntown/Hedgeville area drug arrests rose by 78 percent overall in 1996. Drug activity in Browntown/Hedgeville is mostly restricted to Reporting Area 26-01 (bounded by S. Broom Street, Lancaster Avenue, Maryland Avenue, and Maple Street). The number of drug arrests made within this area increased by 330 percent, from 10 in 1995 to 43 in 1996.

Table 7 displays Weed & Seed area drug arrests from 1990 to 1996 by charge, ethnicity, and gender. Most drug arrests in the area involved cocaine, mainly in crack form. Marijuana was the second most commonly sold and/or used drug, followed by heroin. Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine continues to be the most frequently charged offense lodged against Weed & Seed drug offenders. In 1996, 22 percent of Weed & Seed area drug arrests were for cocaine trafficking, compared with 12 percent of drug arrests in 1995. A total of 106 cocaine trafficking arrests were made in the Weed & Seed area in 1996, a 58 percent increase over the 1995 total of 67 arrests.

Eighty of the 489 Weed & Seed area drug arrests made in 1996 involved juvenile offenders. This represents 16 percent of all Weed & Seed area drug arrests. Of the 489 persons arrested in 1996, 283 were Black males (58 percent), 87 were White males (18 percent), 54 were Hispanic males (11 percent), 38 were Black females (8 percent), 23 were White females (5 percent), and 4 were Hispanic females (1 percent).

Sentences received by Weed & Seed drug offenders are shown in Table 8. The data presented in this table is based on 705 Weed & Seed area arrests that were made between 7/1/92 to 12/31/94. This represents approximately 37 percent of the 1,899 drug related arrests that were made in the Weed & Seed area during this period. The table only includes offenders who were prosecuted at the state level. The dispositions of the remaining 1,194 cases were not found because the cases were prosecuted at the Federal level, the cases are still pending, or offender disposition information wasn't found in the state courts system database.

In Delaware, convicted offenders can be sentenced to incarceration (Level 5), supervised custody, home confinement, or work release (Level 4), intensive probation (Level 3), regular probation (Level 2), or unsupervised probation (Level 1). Approximately 45 percent of the Weed & Seed cases in this sample were sentenced to incarceration. Cases resulting in Level 1 through 4 sentences typically received suspended Level 5 sentences.

Based on the available data, the most common conviction charge was Possession of a Schedule I-II Narcotic (199 cases), followed by Possession with Intent/Delivery of a Schedule I-II Narcotic (142 cases), Possession/Delivery of Drugs Within 1,000 ft. of a School (128 cases). In 99 cases, offenders were convicted for charges that were not drug related (15 percent).

There were 37 cocaine trafficking cases in the sample. Offenders convicted for trafficking were more likely to be sentenced to incarceration than those convicted for any other drug related charge—79 percent of those convicted of trafficking were sentenced to incarceration. The longest prison term was given to a major cocaine trafficker who was convicted for selling over 50 grams. This individual was sentenced to 10 years at Level 5, suspended after 5 years for probation. On average, cocaine traffickers convicted for selling less than 50 grams received prison sentences of 32.7 months.

Most street level cocaine dealers were convicted for Possession/Delivery of Drugs Within 1,000 ft. of a School, Possession with Intent/Delivery of a Schedule I-II Narcotic, or Possession of a Schedule I-II Narcotic. These three charges alone account for 66 percent of the sample cases. The 128 offenders convicted for Possession/Delivery of Drugs Within 1,000 ft. of a School had the second highest incarceration rate—67 percent of those convicted for this offense were sentenced to incarceration for an average of 30.3 months. There were 142 convictions for Possession with Intent/Delivery of a Schedule I-II Narcotic. Half of those convicted for this offense were sentenced to incarceration for an average of 19.6 months.

Possession of a Schedule I-II Narcotic was the most frequent conviction charge—199 offenders in the sample were convicted for cocaine or heroin possession. About one-third of those convicted for possession were sentenced to incarceration for an average of 14.7 months. Of the 199 convictions for Possession of a Schedule I-II Narcotic, 51 were originally charged at arrest with Delivery (7 cases), Possession with Intent to Deliver (42 cases), or Trafficking (2 cases).

Approximately 4 out of every 5 Weed & Seed offenders in the sample entered plea agreements where in most cases all but a single charge was nolle prossed or dismissed. A state prosecutor was hired to deal exclusively with Weed & Seed cases during the first 18 months of the program but the position was eliminated when federal funding was reduced. Currently there was no discernible difference in how Weed & Seed cases are handled compared with regular drug cases that are prosecuted at the state level.

Profile of Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
All Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests	**284**	**589**	**463**	**564**	**489**
Adult Arrests	256	492	386	476	411
Juvenile Arrests	28	97	77	88	78
% Juvenile	9.9%	16.5%	16.6%	15.6%	16.0%
Mean Age at Arrest	26.7	25.4	24.8	25.8	25.6
Black Male Arrests	187	410	320	373	283
% Black Male	65.8%	69.6%	69.1%	66.1%	57.9%
Black Female Arrests	35	65	40	57	38
% Black Female	12.3%	11.0%	8.6%	10.1%	7.8%
Hispanic Male Arrests	35	81	29	48	54
% Hispanic Male	12.3%	13.8%	6.3%	8.5%	11.0%
Hispanic Female Arrests	2	9	1	4	4
% Hispanic Female	0.7%	1.5%	0.2%	0.7%	0.8%
White Male Arrests	22	20	65	72	87
% White Male	7.7%	3.4%	14.0%	12.8%	17.8%
White Female Arrests	3	4	8	10	23
% White Female	1.1%	0.7%	1.7%	1.8%	4.7%
Total Charges	**932**	**2,085**	**1,666**	**1,856**	**1,696**
Drug Related Charges	**595**	**1,430**	**1,085**	**1,267**	**1,147**
Trafficking Cocaine	27	89	86	67	106
PWID/Delivery of Cocaine	163	373	246	299	221
Possession of Cocaine	81	128	95	129	113
Total Cocaine Related Charges	271	590	427	495	440
Trafficking Heroin	0	1	0	0	3
PWID/Delivery of Heroin	13	44	44	55	41
Possession of Heroin	13	17	33	34	25
Total Heroin Related Charges	26	62	77	89	69
Trafficking Marijuana	0	0	0	4	2
PWID/Delivery of Marijuana	19	90	51	67	70
Possession of Marijuana	21	77	65	83	67
Total Marijuana Related Charges	40	167	116	154	139
Trafficking Other Drugs	0	0	0	1	0
PWID/Delivery of Other Drugs	10	12	9	4	35
Possession of Other Drugs	5	5	2	5	10
Total for Other or Unspecified Drugs	15	17	11	10	45
Poss./Delivery of Drugs Within 1000' of School	134	344	209	184	106
Poss./Delivery of Drugs Within 300' of Park	0	0	66	132	118
PWID/Delivery of Fraudulent Substance	0	0	3	2	4
Maintain Dwelling for Use/Sale Drugs	21	69	54	55	2
Maintain Vehicle for Use/Sale Drugs	15	38	30	47	58
Poss. of Drug Paraphanalia	44	125	79	74	76
Poss. of Hypodermic Needle/Syringe	29	18	10	26	77
Loitering for Drug Activity	0	0	3	3	13
Total for Miscellaneous Drug Related Charges	243	594	454	523	454
Weapons Charges	**11**	**27**	**52**	**29**	**76**
Other Charges	**326**	**628**	**529**	**560**	**473**
Average No. of Charges at Arrest	**3.3**	**3.5**	**3.6**	**3.3**	**3.5**

1992 column only includes arrests made after 6/30/92

Sentences Received by Weed & Seed Offenders

Conviction Charge	Class	Total Cases	JDI	Level 5 Sentences				Level 1 - 4 Sentences	
				No. of Cases	Avg. L 5 Sentence	Avg. Susp. Sentence	Avg. Incarc. Sentence	No. of Cases	Avg. L 1-4 Sentence
PDWBPP	Felony B	3	0.0%	0	-	-	-	3	12.0
Robbery 1st	Felony B	2	100.0%	2	48.0	12.0	36.0	0	-
Trafficking Cocaine 5-50 Grams	Felony B	34	79.4%	27	56.7	24.0	32.7	7	62.6
Trafficking Cocaine 50-100 Grams	Felony B	1	100.0%	1	120.0	60.0	60.0	0	-
Assault 2nd	Felony D	3	33.3%	1	96.0	60.0	36.0	2	9.0
Burglary 2nd	Felony D	3	100.0%	3	36.0	15.7	20.3	0	-
PWID/Delivery of Fraudulent Substance	Felony E	1	0.0%	0	-	-	-	1	34.0
PWID/Delivery of Sch. I-II Narcotic	Felony E	142	50.0%	71	30.3	10.7	19.6	71	18.7
PWID/Delivery of Sch. I-V Non-Narcotic	Felony E	15	46.7%	7	21.4	3.9	17.6	8	21.0
Robbery 2nd	Felony E	2	100.0%	2	42.0	23.0	19.0	0	-
Burglary 3rd	Felony F	1	100.0%	1	15.0	-	15.0	0	-
Maintain Dwelling for Use/Sale of Drugs	Felony F	21	52.4%	11	19.1	4.4	14.7	10	6.6
Maintain Vehicle for Use/Sale of Drugs	Felony F	5	60.0%	3	16.0	2.0	14.0	2	6.0
Attempted Theft>$500	Felony G	1	0.0%	0	-	-	-	1	12.0
CCDW	Felony G	6	16.7%	1	24.0	-	24.0	5	13.2
Conspiracy 2nd	Felony G	28	17.9%	5	19.8	7.2	12.6	23	17.4
Forgery 2nd	Felony G	3	33.3%	1	24.0	12.0	12.0	2	12.0
Theft >$500	Felony G	1	0.0%	0	-	-	-	1	24.0
Poss./Del. Drugs W/I 1000' of a School	Felony	128	67.2%	86	45.6	15.4	30.3	42	23.0
Poss./Del./Dist. Drugs W/I 300' of a Park	Felony	13	15.4%	2	39.0	18.0	21.0	11	6.3
Assault 3rd	Misd.A	2	0.0%	0	-	-	-	2	6.0
CCDI	Misd.A	1	100.0%	1	12.0	-	12.0	0	-
Criminal Impersonation	Misd.A	17	35.3%	6	16.5	9.7	6.8	11	10.4
Forgery 3rd	Misd.A	1	0.0%	0	-	-	-	1	6.0
Hindering Prosecution	Misd.A	3	0.0%	0	-	-	-	3	4.0
Possession of Drug Paraphanalia	Misd.A	18	27.8%	5	26.4	9.6	16.8	13	6.0
Receiving Stolen Property	Misd.A	2	0.0%	0	-	-	-	2	12.0
Resisting Arrest	Misd.A	8	37.5%	3	10.0	2.0	8.0	5	7.2
Theft <$500	Misd.A	1	100.0%	1	24.0		24.0	0	-
Poss. of Sch. I-V Narcotic	Misd.B	199	33.2%	66	17.2	2.5	14.7	133	12.6
Possession of Sch. I-V Non-Narcotic	Misd.B	32	40.6%	13	14.8	2.5	12.3	19	10.3
Criminal Mischief	Misd.	1	0.0%	0	-	-	-	1	12.0
DUI	Violation	1	100.0%	1	6.0	-	6.0	0	-
Driving During Suspension	Violation	2	0.0%	0	-	-	-	2	9.0
Fail to Submit Fingerprints	Violation	1	0.0%	0	-	-	-	1	12.0
Violation of Probation	Violation	3	0.0%	0	-	-	-	3	14.3

All Cases	320 Level 5 Sentences	385 Level 1 - 4 Sentences

Source: Delaware Statistical Analysis Center Sentencing Database

Journey to Crime

Table 9 shows drug arrests made in the Weed & Seed area between 1993 and 1996 by neighborhood of arrest and offender home address. A total of 2,104 persons were arrested in the Weed & Seed area on drug related charges during the three year period. Of this total, 1,174 gave an address within the Weed & Seed area as their home address (56 percent). One out of every three persons arrested in the Weed & Seed area on drug charges during this period lived in the Westside/Hilltop area. West Center City residents accounted for 17 percent of Weed & Seed area drug arrests. Seven percent were from Browntown/Hedgeville.

Nineteen percent of those arrested in the Weed & Seed area lived in other parts of Wilmington, mainly from the Eastside, Boulevard, and Price's Run areas. West Center City had the largest proportion of drug arrests who lived in other parts of the city. About one out of every four West Center City drug offenders arrested during this period lived in neighborhoods outside of the Weed & Seed area.

About 23 percent of those arrested in the Weed & Seed area on drug related charges did not live in Wilmington. Residents of New Castle County (excluding Wilmington) accounted for 16 percent of Weed & Seed area drug arrests. Eleven residents of Kent County and five residents of Sussex County were arrested in the Weed & Seed area during this period. Combined, Kent and Sussex County residents accounted for less than one percent of all Weed & Seed area drug arrests. Just over 6 percent of those arrested in the Weed & Seed area were residents of other states. Most of those arrested from out of state were from New York City, Philadelphia, and northeastern Maryland.

Browntown/Hedgeville had the largest proportion of drug offenders who lived outside of Wilmington. Forty percent of Browntown/Hedgeville drug arrests were not residents of Wilmington; 16 percent were from another state. One explanation for the disproportionate number of out of state drug arrests in Browntown/Hedgeville is that the Wilmington Amtrak station is located there. Police often receive tips from informants about drug traffickers who arrive by train to deliver drugs in Wilmington. Thirty-three of the 47 Browntown/Hedgeville area arrests of out of state residents occurred as the offenders exited the Wilmington Amtrak station.

Journey to Crime: Weed & Seed Arrests from 1993 to 1996

Offender's Home Address	Neighborhood of Arrest							
	Westside/Hilltop		West Center City		Browntown/Hedgeville		Weed & Seed Area Total	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Grand Total	**1,204**	**100.0%**	**613**	**100.0%**	**287**	**100.0%**	**2,104**	**100.0%**
Weed & Seed Area	**721**	**59.9%**	**330**	**53.8%**	**123**	**42.9%**	**1,174**	**55.8%**
Westside/Hilltop	569	47.3%	65	10.6%	49	17.1%	683	32.5%
West Center City	83	6.9%	255	41.6%	12	4.2%	350	16.6%
Browntown/Hedgeville	69	5.7%	10	1.6%	62	21.6%	141	6.7%
Other Neighborhoods	**215**	**17.9%**	**150**	**24.5%**	**38**	**13.2%**	**403**	**19.2%**
Boulevard	50	4.2%	30	4.9%	6	2.1%	86	4.1%
Central	16	1.3%	19	3.1%	1	0.3%	36	1.7%
Delaware Avenue	5	0.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	5	0.2%
Eastside	54	4.5%	51	8.3%	11	3.8%	116	5.5%
Midtown Brandywine	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.0%
Northwest	10	0.8%	2	0.3%	4	1.4%	16	0.8%
Price's Run	25	2.1%	21	3.4%	7	2.4%	53	2.5%
Riverside	12	1.0%	16	2.6%	4	1.4%	32	1.5%
South Wilmington	15	1.2%	9	1.5%	1	0.3%	25	1.2%
Southwest	28	2.3%	2	0.3%	3	1.0%	33	1.6%
Outside Wilmington	**241**	**20.0%**	**120**	**19.6%**	**116**	**40.4%**	**477**	**22.7%**
New Castle County	183	15.2%	84	13.7%	59	20.6%	326	15.5%
Kent County	2	0.2%	0	0.0%	9	3.1%	11	0.5%
Sussex County	4	0.3%	0	0.0%	1	0.3%	5	0.2%
Out of State	52	4.3%	36	5.9%	47	16.4%	135	6.4%
No Address Available	**27**	**2.2%**	**13**	**2.1%**	**10**	**3.5%**	**50**	**2.4%**

Map 2

Journey to Crime - Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests from 1/1/93 to 12/31/96



Map 3

Journey to Crime
Weed & Seed Area Drug Arrests from 1/1/93 to 12/31/96



Weed & Seed Area Shootings Incidents

In 1996, the number of shooting incidents in Wilmington which resulted in injury or death rose by 130 percent compared with the previous year, from 47 in 1995 to 108 in 1996. A report released jointly by the Delaware Statistical Analysis Center and the Criminal Justice Council revealed that 56 percent of the shooting victims and 91 percent of the suspects had at least one violent felony arrest on their criminal record, and that 44 percent of the victims and 49 percent of the suspects were arrested at least once on drug related charges. Additionally, the police had determined that 22 percent of the shootings that occurred in 1996 were drug related and an additional 15 percent were possibly drug related. (DELSAC/CJC, 1997)

The shootings continued into 1997 at a pace which nearly equaled 1996's record total. 107 persons were killed or injured by firearms in Wilmington between 1/1/97 and 12/31/97. Chart 14 shows Weed & Seed area shooting incidents by quarter. The highest incidence of shootings occurred during the 3rd quarter of 1996, when there were 17 shootings in the area. The second highest incidence of shootings occurred during the second quarter of 1997, when 16 persons were shot.

Table 10 shows Wilmington shooting incidents in 1996 and 1997 broken out by neighborhood. Between 1/1/96 and 12/31/97, 215 persons were killed or injured by guns in Wilmington. Most of the city's shootings in 1996 and 1997 occurred in the Boulevard, Eastside, Price's Run, Riverside, West Center City and Westside/Hilltop neighborhoods. Seventy-five of the 215 shootings occurred in the Weed & Seed area. This represents 35 percent of all shootings citywide. Thirty-eight of the Weed & Seed area shootings occurred in the Westside/Hilltop

Chart 14



neighborhood (51 percent), 30 were in West Center City (40 percent), and seven were in Browntown/Hedgeville (9 percent). Map 4 shows the locations of Weed & Seed area shooting incidents and their proximity to the area's 16 most reported drug corners. Thirteen of the 67 Weed & Seed area shootings occurred within 100 ft. of a drug hot spot.

Table 11 and Charts 15 through 18 display the age, ethnicity, and gender distribution of shooting victims and suspects. Seventy-three percent of Weed & Seed area shooting victims and 82 percent of shooting suspects were 25 years old or younger. Compared with the city as a whole, juveniles accounted for a larger proportion of shooting victims in Weed & Seed area shooting incidents. Twenty-seven percent of Weed & Seed area shooting victims were under 18 compared with 21 percent of shooting victims citywide. Nineteen of the victims in Weed & Seed area shootings during this period were under 18, the youngest of whom was 7 years old. Four shootings in the Weed & Seed area resulted in death; two of the four victims in the fatal shootings were juveniles. All four fatal Weed & Seed area shootings occurred in the West Center City area.

Forty-eight of the 71 Weed & Seed area shooting victims were Black males (68 percent), 12 were Hispanic males (17 percent), eight were Black females (11 percent), and three were White males (4 percent). Ninety-two of the 109 Weed & Seed area shooting suspects were Black males (84 percent), 11 were Hispanic males (10 percent), four were White males (4 percent), and two were Black females (2 percent). Nearly all of the city's shooting incidents that involved Hispanic victims or suspects occurred in the Weed & Seed area.

Table 12 displays the race and ethnicity of Weed & Seed shooting suspects with that of their victims. Black males were both suspects and victims in about half of the Weed & Seed area shooting incidents. Sixty-one of the 92 Black male Weed & Seed area shooting suspects were involved in shooting incidents where another Black male was the victim. Eleven cases involved Black male suspects and Black female victims. In 13 cases Black males were suspects in shooting where Hispanic males were victims. Hispanic males were suspects in shootings involving Black male victims in six cases, Hispanic male victims in three cases, and Black female victims in two cases. White males were suspects in two cases which involved Black male victims, one case involving a Hispanic male victim, and one case involving a White male victim.

Table 13 shows the age distribution of Weed & Seed shooting suspects and victims. A smaller proportion of suspects in Weed & Seed shootings were juveniles compared with shooting suspects citywide. Twenty-three percent of Weed & Seed area shooting suspects were juveniles, compared with 31 percent of shooting suspects citywide. Eighty-two percent of Weed & Seed area shooting suspects were between the ages of 18 and 25. The most common suspect/victim age profile in Weed & Seed area shootings involved a suspect between the ages of 18 and 25 shooting a victim who was 25 years old or younger. The next most common suspect/victim age profile involved a juvenile suspect shooting a victim who was 25 years old or younger. These two profiles apply to 71 percent of all Weed & Seed area shooting incidents and 59 percent of all shooting incidents citywide.

Wilmington Shooting Incidents by Neighborhood/Quarter

Neighborhood	1996					1997					Grand Total
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Total	
Westside/Hilltop	1	6	8	7	22	3	6	2	5	16	38
West Center City	2	0	8	3	13	1	7	5	4	17	30
Browntown/Hedgeville	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	0	5	7
Weed & Seed Area Total	**3**	**6**	**17**	**11**	**37**	**5**	**16**	**8**	**9**	**38**	**75**
Bancroft Parkway	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Boulevard	2	5	1	4	12	4	4	7	2	17	29
Central	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Delaware Avenue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastside	4	3	5	1	13	1	2	1	0	4	17
Midtown Brandywine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northwest	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Price's Run	3	8	7	1	19	4	9	5	9	27	46
Riverside	3	4	7	6	20	3	7	1	4	15	35
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
South Wilmington	0	0	1	2	3	1	1	2	1	5	8
Citywide Total	**18**	**26**	**39**	**25**	**108**	**18**	**39**	**25**	**25**	**107**	**215**

Ages of Wilmington Shooting Victims and Suspects

	Weed & Seed Area						Wilmington					
	Victim			Suspect			Victim			Suspect		
Age	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.
Under 18	19	25.3%	26.8%	13	11.2%	23.2%	42	19.5%	20.6%	43	14.0%	30.9%
18 to 25	33	44.0%	46.5%	33	28.4%	58.9%	96	44.7%	47.1%	65	21.1%	46.8%
26 to 35	11	14.7%	15.5%	6	5.2%	10.7%	38	17.7%	18.6%	18	5.8%	12.9%
36 to 45	6	8.0%	8.5%	2	1.7%	3.6%	18	8.4%	8.8%	9	2.9%	6.5%
Over 45	2	2.7%	2.8%	2	1.7%	3.6%	10	4.7%	4.9%	4	1.3%	2.9%
Total Known	71	94.7%	100.0%	56	48.3%	100.0%	204	94.9%	100.0%	139	45.1%	100.0%
Unknown	4	5.3%		60	51.7%		11	5.1%		169	54.9%	
Grand Total	**75**	**100.0%**		**116**	**100.0%**		**215**	**100.0%**		**308**	**100.0%**	

Ethnicity/Gender of Wilmington Shooting Victims and Suspects

	Weed & Seed Area						Wilmington					
	Victim			Suspect			Victim			Suspect		
Ethnicity/Gender	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.
Black Male	48	64.0%	67.6%	92	79.3%	84.4%	158	73.5%	76.3%	246	79.9%	90.4%
Black Female	8	10.7%	11.3%	2	1.7%	1.8%	24	11.2%	11.6%	7	2.3%	2.6%
Hispanic Male	12	16.0%	16.9%	11	9.5%	10.1%	12	5.6%	5.8%	12	3.9%	4.4%
White Male	3	4.0%	4.2%	4	3.4%	3.7%	9	4.2%	4.3%	7	2.3%	2.6%
White Female	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.5%	0.5%	0	0.0%	0.0%
Asian Male	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.0%	2	0.9%	1.0%	0	0.0%	0.0%
Asian Female	0	0.0%	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.5%	0.5%	0	0.0%	0.0%
Total Known	71	94.7%	100.0%	109	94.0%	100.0%	207	96.3%	100.0%	272	88.3%	100.0%
Unknown	4	5.3%		7	6.0%		8	3.7%		36	11.7%	
Grand Total	**75**	**100.0%**		**116**	**100.0%**		**215**	**100.0%**		**308**	**100.0%**	

Map 4

Weed & Seed Area Shooting Incidents - January 1996 to December 1997



☆ Locations of Shootings ● Drug Hot Spots

Map 5

Wilmington Shooting Incidents - January 1996 to December 1997



☆ Locations of Shootings

Chart 15

Ethnicity/Gender of Weed & Seed Area Shooting Victims



N = 75

Chart 16

Ethnicity/Gender of Weed & Seed Area Shooting Suspects



N = 116

Chart 17

Ages of Weed & Seed Area Shooting Victims



N = 75

Chart 18

Ages of Weed & Seed Area Shooting Suspects



N = 116

Race/Ethnicity of Weed & Seed Area Shooting Suspects and Victims

Race/Ethnicity		Weed & Seed Area			Citywide		
Suspect	Victim	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.
Black Female	Black Male	0	0.0%	0.0%	5	1.6%	1.9%
	Hispanic Male	1	0.9%	1.0%	1	0.3%	0.4%
	Unknown	1	0.9%		1	0.3%	
Total Suspect Cases		**2**	**1.7%**	**1.9%**	**7**	**2.3%**	**2.7%**
Black Male	Asian Female	0	0.0%	0.0%	2	0.6%	0.8%
	Asian Male	0	0.0%	0.0%	8	2.6%	3.1%
	Black Female	11	9.5%	10.6%	29	9.4%	11.1%
	Black Male	61	52.6%	58.7%	179	58.1%	68.3%
	Hispanic Male	13	11.2%	12.5%	13	4.2%	5.0%
	White Female	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.3%	0.4%
	White Male	3	2.6%	2.9%	6	1.9%	2.3%
	Unknown	4	3.4%		8	2.6%	
Total Suspect Cases		**92**	**79.3%**	**88.5%**	**246**	**79.9%**	**93.9%**
Hispanic Male	Black Female	2	1.7%	1.9%	2	0.6%	0.8%
	Black Male	6	5.2%	5.8%	6	1.9%	2.3%
	Hispanic Male	3	2.6%	2.9%	3	1.0%	1.1%
	Unknown	0	0.0%		1	0.3%	
Total Suspect Cases		**11**	**9.5%**	**10.6%**	**12**	**3.9%**	**4.6%**
White Male	Black Male	2	1.7%	1.9%	2	0.6%	0.8%
	Hispanic Male	1	0.9%	1.0%	1	0.3%	0.4%
	White Male	1	0.9%	1.0%	4	1.3%	1.5%
	Unknown	0	0.0%		0	0.0%	
Total Suspect Cases		**4**	**3.4%**	**3.8%**	**7**	**2.3%**	**2.7%**
Unknown	Black Female	0	0.0%		3	1.0%	
	Black Male	6	5.2%		32	10.4%	
	Hispanic Male	1	0.9%		1	0.3%	
Total Suspect Cases		**7**	**6.0%**		**36**	**11.7%**	
Victim and Suspect Ethnicity/Gender Known		104	89.7%	100.0%	262	85.1%	100.0%
Victim and Suspect Ethnicity/Gender Unknown		12	10.3%		46	14.9%	
Grand Total		**116**	**100.0%**		**308**	**100.0%**	

Pct. - All cases are included in percent distribution including cases where victim or suspect information is unknown
Valid Pct. - Cases where either the victim or suspect information is unknown are excluded from percent distribution

Ages of Weed & Seed Area Shooting Suspects and Victims

Ages		Weed & Seed Area			Citywide		
Suspect	Victim	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.	No.	Pct.	Valid Pct.
Under 18	Under 18	5	4.3%	9.6%	14	4.5%	10.7%
	18 to 25	7	6.0%	13.5%	16	5.2%	12.2%
	26 to 35	1	0.9%	1.9%	6	1.9%	4.6%
	36 to 45	0	0.0%	0.0%	7	2.3%	5.3%
	Unknown	0	0.0%		0	0.0%	
Total Suspect Cases		**13**	**11.2%**	**25.0%**	**43**	**14.0%**	**32.8%**
18 to 25	Under 18	13	11.2%	25.0%	20	6.5%	15.3%
	18 to 25	12	10.3%	23.1%	27	8.8%	20.6%
	26 to 35	3	2.6%	5.8%	9	2.9%	6.9%
	36 to 45	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.3%	0.8%
	Over 45	2	1.7%	3.8%	2	0.6%	1.5%
	Unknown	3	2.6%		6	1.9%	
Total Suspect Cases		**33**	**28.4%**	**63.5%**	**65**	**21.1%**	**49.6%**
26 to 35	Under 18	3	2.6%	5.8%	3	1.0%	2.3%
	18 to 25	1	0.9%	1.9%	7	2.3%	5.3%
	26 to 35	1	0.9%	1.9%	4	1.3%	3.1%
	36 to 45	1	0.9%	1.9%	2	0.6%	1.5%
	Over 45	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.3%	0.8%
	Unknown	0	0.0%		1	0.3%	
Total Suspect Cases		**6**	**5.2%**	**11.5%**	**18**	**5.8%**	**13.7%**
36 to 45	18 to 25	0	0.0%	0.0%	2	0.6%	1.5%
	26 to 35	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.3%	0.8%
	36 to 45	2	1.7%	3.8%	5	1.6%	3.8%
	Over 45	0	0.0%	0.0%	1	0.3%	0.8%
	Unknown	0	0.0%		0	0.0%	
Total Suspect Cases		**2**	**1.7%**	**3.8%**	**9**	**2.9%**	**6.9%**
Over 45	18 to 25	1	0.9%	1.9%	1	0.3%	0.8%
	Over 45	0	0.0%	0.0%	2	0.6%	1.5%
	Unknown	1	0.9%		1	0.3%	
Total Suspect Cases		**2**	**1.7%**	**3.8%**	**4**	**1.3%**	**3.1%**
Unknown	Under 18	14	12.1%		32	10.4%	
	18 to 25	28	24.1%		81	26.3%	
	26 to 35	12	10.3%		34	11.0%	
	36 to 45	4	3.4%		9	2.9%	
	Over 45	1	0.9%		5	1.6%	
	Unknown	1	0.9%		8	2.6%	
Total Suspect Cases		**60**	**51.7%**		**169**	**54.9%**	
Victim and Suspect Ages Known		52	44.8%	100.0%	131	42.5%	100.0%
Victim and Suspect Ages Unknown		64	55.2%		177	57.5%	
Grand Total		**116**	**100.0%**		**308**	**100.0%**	

Pct. - All cases are included in percent distribution including cases where victim or suspect information is unknown
Valid Pct. - Cases where either the victim or suspect information is unknown are excluded from percent distribution

Illicit Drug Trends in Wilmington

Table 14 displays drug related calls for service and drug related arrests for each of Wilmington's 15 neighborhoods. Drug related calls throughout Wilmington rose by 282, from 3,656 in 1994 to 3,938 in 1995—an 8 percent increase. The Boulevard, Price's Run and Westside/Hilltop neighborhoods were responsible for most of this increase. The Westside/Hilltop area continues to surpass all other neighborhoods in Wilmington in drug related calls, accounting for one out of every three drug related calls that the police department received in 1995.

Maps 7 through 10 show the 90 Wilmington reporting areas color coded for each category for the years 1988 to 1995. The 1988 map shows that reported drug activity in Wilmington was mostly restricted to the Riverside, Eastside Westside/Hilltopand West Center City neighborhoods. In 1989, drug activity in northeast Wilmington began to spread from the Riverside area westward towards N. Market Street, into the Price's Run and Boulevard neighborhoods. Reported drug activity also escalated in the Eastside, Westside/Hilltop, West Center City and South Wilmington neighborhoods during this period.

The 1990 map shows that reported drug activity in Wilmington continued to spread into previously "Stable Areas", especially in the Westside and West Center City neighborhoods. It should be noted however that drug related calls for service from two Eastside reporting areas actually fell in 1990. The Eastside Substance Abuse Awareness Program (ESAAP), a precursor to Wilmington's Weed & Seed effort, was credited for the reduction in drug related calls that occurred in parts of the Eastside during this period. Like Weed & Seed, ESAAP combined narcotics enforcement with community policing, substance abuse prevention, treatment, and youth-oriented programming. Although some headway was made at quashing the drug trade in the Eastside area, conditions in the Boulevard, Price's Run, Westside/Hilltop, West Center City and South Wilmington neighborhoods continued to worsen. It was also during this period that drug activity from the Westside/Hilltop area began to spill over into the adjacent Browntown/Hedgeville neighborhood (DELSAC, 1994).

The 1991 map illustrates how drug activity throughout Wilmington escalated that year. Drug related calls for service increased in all but four Weed & Seed reporting areas. 1991 was the first year that "Saturated" reporting areas began to appear. The "Saturated" category refers to areas that experienced an increase in the number of drug related calls for service while drug related arrests were decreasing, a trend that could indicate that drug activity in the area had escalated to the point where the police were unable to curb the problem with existing resources.

Although most reporting areas in Wilmington saw illicit drug activity escalate in 1991, the number of drug related calls for service from reporting areas in the Riverside, South Wilmington, and the Eastside neighborhood decreased. Some form of community policing activities had been implemented in all three neighborhoods—a police mini-station was housed in the Riverside public housing development and walking patrols were deployed in the South Wilmington and Eastside neighborhoods. During this period, drug related calls for service and arrests stabilized or declined in the areas where the walking patrols were mobilized, while arrests and calls for service increased in the surrounding areas.

Many of the areas which were classified as "In Transition" in 1990 became "Hot Spots" in 1991, and some previously "Stable Areas" became "In Transition". This is especially true in the northeast Wilmington's Price's Run and Boulevard neighborhoods. Much of the increase in reported drug activity may have been due to displacement of out of the Riverside area into these nearby neighborhoods.

The 1992 map shows a considerable reduction in drug activity throughout Wilmington. Many of the reporting areas that were previously categorized a "Hot Spots", "In Transition", or "Saturated" saw reductions in both drug related calls for service and arrests. Wilmington's Weed & Seed effort began in July 1992. Drug related calls for service and arrests fell in most Weed & Seed reporting areas except those within and/or adjacent to Census Tract 22.

In 1993, drug related calls for service throughout Wilmington fell by 16 percent. Twelve reporting areas that were categorized as "In Transition" or "Good News" areas in 1992 had dropped below the two call per month threshold and became "Stable Areas". Most of these areas were located in the South Wilmington, Riverside, Price's Run, Eastside and Boulevard neighborhoods. Reported drug activity also declined in the Weed & Seed area overall, but areas where drug activity had been displaced to continued to experience problems. For example, drug related calls from Reporting Area 26-01 in Browntown/Hedgeville continued to increase in 1993. This was also the case for Census Tract 22 in the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood.

In 1994, drug activity escalated in many of Wilmington's neighborhoods. The number of reporting areas that were categorized as being "In Transition" increased from three in 1993 to six in 1994, while "Saturated" areas increased from one to five. All five "Saturated" areas were in the Weed & Seed neighborhoods—three in the Westside/Hilltop area and two in West Center City.

Reporting area 15-01 in the Westside/Hilltop area was categorized as "In Transition" in 1994, mainly resulting from an increase in drug related calls for service concerning the area surrounding 7th & Harrison Streets. Conditions in three Weed & Seed reporting areas that seemed to be making some progress in 1993 worsened considerably in 1994. Reporting areas 22-01, 22-02, and 16-02 were all categorized as "Good News" areas in 1993 because drug related calls and arrests were both on the decline. In 1994, all three areas were categorized as being "saturated", i.e., drug related calls were increasing while drug related arrests fell.

Illicit drug activity also escalated in the Eastside, Price's Run, Boulevard and Riverside neighborhoods in 1994. In the Eastside neighborhood, an area that was categorized as "Saturated" in 1993 (Reporting Area 17-02) saw a decline in both drug related calls for service and drug related arrests in 1994. However, an adjacent reporting area and two reporting areas in Census Tract 9 worsened in 1994, possibly a result of displacement from Reporting Area 17-02.

Conditions in the Boulevard neighborhood also deteriorated in 1994. Reporting Area 05-02 continued to be a problem area, especially near the park at 24th & Tatnall Streets and on N. Market Street between 23rd and 30th streets. Drug Related calls for service also rose in Reporting Area 03-02, which is located directly north of Reporting Area 05-02. In the Price's Run area, Reporting Area 06-02 became a "Hot Spot" in 1994. Drug related calls for service also increased in Reporting Area 06-04. There was a substantial increase in drug related

arrests in Reporting Area 06-03, which includes the open-air drug markets at 24th & Jessup Streets and E. 23rd Street between Market and Lamotte Streets.

In 1995, Wilmington police intensified their efforts at suppressing the city's drug trade. Drug related arrests rose in the Price's Run, Riverside, South Wilmington and Westside/Hilltop neighborhoods. Drug related calls for service from these areas also increased. The 1995 map shows that drug arrests increased in all but one of the Weed & Seed reporting areas categorized as "Saturated" in 1994. Drug related calls for service and arrests fell in West Center City's Census Tract 16 and in Browntown/Hedgeville's Reporting Area 26-01.

Reported drug activity continued to increase in Wilmington's Boulevard, Price's Run and South Wilmington neighborhoods. According to 1995 Wilmington Police Department records, major drug markets in these neighborhoods included 24th & Tatnall Streets (Boulevard), the area bounded by E. 22nd Street, E. 24th Street, N. Market and N. Pine Streets (Price's Run) and the 900 block of S. Claymont Street (South Wilmington). Although drug related calls for service from the Eastside neighborhood did not increase significantly in 1995, reported drug activity on E. 8th Street between Kirkwood and N. Pine Street continued to be a major problem for the area.

The 1996 map shows that drug related calls for police service and drug related arrests were down in three of the eight Westside/Hilltop reporting areas and in all four West Center City reporting areas. For the second consecutive year, the two reporting areas in West Center City north of W. 6th Street (16-01 and 16-02) were in the "Good News" category. Fewer calls for service were received concerning all of the major "Hot Spots" within these reporting areas, e.g. 6th & Jefferson, 7th & Jefferson, 7th & Washington, and 8th & Monroe Streets. Three Westside/Hilltop reporting areas—22-01, 22-02, and 23-02—were also in the "Good News" category in 1996. Twelve of the Weed & Seed area's 16 most frequently reported drug corners are located within these three areas. The "Hot Spots" at 2nd & Franklin and 4th & Franklin Streets were the only two corners where reported drug activity increased. Drug related calls decreased for each of the ten remaining hot spots.

Two Westside/Hilltop reporting areas—23-01 and 15-02, became the focus of intensified policing activity in 1996 to prevent displacement of drug activity from the known hot spots. Meanwhile, conditions in Browntown/Hedgeville worsened. Drug related calls for service and drug related arrests both increased in Reporting Area 26-01, placing it in the "Hot Spot" category. This area, which is bounded by Lancaster Avenue, Maryland Avenue, Maple Street, and N. Broom Street had been in the "Good News" category in 1994 and 1995. Read Street between Harrison and Franklin Streets continued to source of most of the complaints in this area.

In other parts of the city, some neighborhoods had made some gains at reducing illicit drug sales. Reported drug activity and drug related arrests were down in the Boulevard and South Wilmington neighborhoods. On a less positive note, drug activity continued to escalate in the Eastside and Price's Run areas. In particular, two reporting areas in Price's Run were "Saturated", meaning that drug related calls for service increased while arrests decreased. The boundaries of the "Saturated" area are N. Market Street, Vandever Avenue, E. 26th Street, and Northeast Boulevard.

City of Wilmington - Drug Related Calls and Arrests by Neighborhood

Neighborhood	1991		1992		1993		1994		1995		1996	
	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests	Calls	Arrests
Bancroft Parkway	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	0
Boulevard	386	103	232	34	184	50	426	77	512	60	413	44
Browntown/Hedgeville	116	54	112	42	111	83	115	42	113	58	210	104
Central	45	69	27	39	39	64	28	39	25	35	28	26
Cherry Island	3	4	0	5	0	1	2	2	0	0	3	0
Delaware Avenue	26	4	7	4	5	5	9	3	6	9	6	6
Eastside	731	216	430	185	542	123	600	110	607	73	646	113
Midtown Brandywine	5	5	1	1	4	1	10	6	7	0	0	6
Northwest	26	13	11	9	21	10	22	6	19	6	14	6
Price's Run	633	253	654	169	349	120	389	169	541	202	634	151
Riverside	272	207	178	77	42	59	57	39	64	58	84	48
South Wilmington	188	62	80	48	63	37	67	27	94	37	62	5
Southwest	26	11	10	3	5	5	16	3	22	7	19	11
West Center City	774	295	531	265	418	220	624	162	594	137	468	94
Westside/Hilltop	987	340	986	351	888	286	1,289	259	1,333	369	981	291
Citywide Total	**4,220**	**1,636**	**3,261**	**1,234**	**2,673**	**1,066**	**3,656**	**944**	**3,938**	**1,053**	**3,568**	**905**

Geographic Analysis of Wilmington's Illicit Drug Markets

The following color coded maps demonstrate how illicit drug markets have been affected by various drug enforcement efforts throughout Wilmington. Each of the city's 90 reporting areas (grids) have been assigned a color which represents a category that was derived by analyzing trend data on drug related calls and arrests for each reporting area and then comparing the most recent year's trend with the previous year. Trends described by each category are explained below.

- **Stable Areas (Blue):** This category refers to reporting areas that reported 25 or fewer drug related calls and/or arrests per year during the observation period. Many of the residential areas in this category have average household incomes that are well above the city average and tend to be located on the outer perimeter of the city.
- **Good News (Green):** Areas in this category experienced a simultaneous decline or stabilization in both the drug related calls for service and drug related arrests.
- **Intensive Policing (Green/Black):** These are areas where the number of drug related arrests are relatively high compared to the number of drug related calls from the area. This may indicate that proactive measures were taken by the police to prevent displacement of drug activity from nearby areas.
- **Hot Spots (Yellow):** Areas that fall in this category experienced a simultaneous rise in both drug related calls and arrests. The "hot spot" category also includes areas where the number of drug related calls exceeded 25 per month. Most of these areas are well known illicit drug markets where police, residents and customers know that illicit drug activity occurs on a regular basis.
- **In Transition (Red):** Reporting areas in this category are best described as being "in transition". The number of drug related calls received from these areas are rising while the number of arrests remain at roughly the same level. These neighborhoods tend to lie contiguous to areas with more severe drug related problems and frequently lie adjacent to relatively stable areas on the other side. The increasing number of calls may indicate that residents are aware that the character of their neighborhood is changing.
- **Saturated (Red/Black):** This category is similar to "hot spots" in that both refer to areas with extremely high levels of drug activity. What differentiates "saturated" areas from "hot spots" is that in saturated areas the number of drug related calls continue to increase while the number of arrests decline or remain at roughly the same level as the previous year.


1988
1989
STABLE AREAS
GOOD NEWS
INTENSIVE POLICING
HOT SPOTS
IN TRANSITION
SATURATED

Map 7


1990
1991
STABLE AREAS
GOOD NEWS
INTENSIVE POLICING
HOT SPOTS
IN TRANSITION
SATURATED


1992
1993
STABLE AREAS
GOOD NEWS
INTENSIVE POLICING
HOT SPOTS
IN TRANSITION
SATURATED

Map 9


1994
1995
STABLE AREAS
GOOD NEWS
INTENSIVE POLICING
HOT SPOTS
IN TRANSITION
SATURATED


1996
STABLE AREAS
GOOD NEWS
INTENSIVE POLICING
HOT SPOTS
IN TRANSITION
SATURATED

Map 10

Summary of Interviews with Key Weed & Seed Program Participants

The previous analysis looked at crime trends in the Weed & Seed area and the impact that different policing initiatives have had on illicit drug markets using calls for police service and arrest statistics as indicators. The analysis of quantitative data, while an important tool for measuring the effect of policing efforts on the prevalence, intensity, and spatial distribution of drug markets, tells only one side of the story. The perceptions of those who live and work in the community can also be an important indicator of Weed & Seed's success. Since 1992, MJM Associates has conducted yearly panel interviews as part of a longitudinal study of community policing in Wilmington and its impact on the city's drug trade, the most recent of which were held in Spring 1997. The resulting report has been integrated into this evaluation. Entitled "The Eight Year War Against Drugs in Wilmington, Delaware" this qualitative assessment of community policing in Wilmington details the responses of those who participated in the five panel interviews. Following is a summary of some of the report's key findings.

- Residents in the Weed & Seed area have been very receptive to community policing. Both police and residents felt that assigning foot patrols to an area on a long-term basis was the most effective community policing strategy, since officers who are familiar with the community are far more likely to be aware of neighborhood issues like who the troublemakers are, which house is frequented by drug users, which families allow their children roam the streets unsupervised at night, etc.

- In Wilmington's experience, the use of long-term walking patrols was realized only during periods when sufficient community policing dedicated funds were available and the regular patrol division was adequately staffed. Over the past few years, the Wilmington Police Department's Patrol Division has been understaffed because the city could not afford to replace officers as they retired. As a result, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the level of police visibility needed to keep the drug trade from escalating. In the Weed & Seed area, police visibility was further reduced by cutbacks in federal funds for community policing and vice operations.

- Reduced funding for Weed & Seed community policing officers, combined with insufficient staffing levels in the police department's patrol division has hindered efforts to suppress the area's drug trade. Those interviewed said that police visibility in the area is noticeably less since the number of dedicated Weed & Seed officers was reduced from five to two. Residents and community activists generally felt that the drug problem in the neighborhood had worsened in the past year. Police, on the other hand, felt that the area's drug problem is about the same as it was a year ago. The police's perception that the area was stabilizing was possibly influenced by the fact that they had made more and better quality drug arrests in the area.

- A common perception among those interviewed is that drug trade in Wilmington is becoming increasingly more violent, and that drug involved youths sporting handguns and "short fuses" are responsible for much of the increase in shooting incidents. Those involved in the drug trade have become more sophisticated, abandoning public pay phones in favor of portable cellular telephones to make transactions or shuttling their stash of drugs between different houses to make it more difficult for police to

raid them. In response to increasing police pressure, drug dealers have moved their operation indoors or to different locations. Dealers have become more cautious, hiding their cache of drugs in a nearby trash can or on someone's porch rather than carry it with them. Police report that they are having a more difficult time arresting dealers because many have moved their operations indoors to evade police.

- Some of those interviewed reported an increase in juvenile involvement in the street drug trade. In some instances, entire families are involved in selling drugs. For those households, the drug economy provides employment for household members who, because of their age, lack of marketable job skills, or lack of experience, feel that there are no other employment opportunities available. A lack of parental guidance in some households also creates problems for the neighborhood. Drug dealers often recruit local youths to sell drugs or act as lookouts for them. Parents may look the other way when their children come home with large amounts of cash, especially when the family is struggling financially. In some cases, the parents themselves may be addicted to drugs or alcohol.

- Over the past several years, the Wilmington Police Department has implemented two major community policing initiatives—the Eastside Substance Abuse Awareness Program and Operation Weed & Seed. The programs are similar in that they both targeted open air drug sales within a well defined geographic area; both programs had experienced a period of success initially; and in both cases, much of the problem resurfaced as funding for law enforcement and community policing diminished. When the level of police presence and visibility in the area's was sufficient, residents became less fearful of the drug dealers and street thugs, and life in the area became more bearable. As police presence decreased, the criminal element reclaimed the streets again. Thus, a common theme for both programs is that their outcomes were dependent on the availability of adequate police resources. Those interviewed agreed, however, that the police cannot do the job alone. One thing that was mentioned throughout the interviews was that residents need to make more of an effort to keep the neighborhood clean. Others suggested that Weed & Seed should place more emphasis on drug rehabilitation. A substance abuse treatment counselor who participated in the panel interviews said that there was shortage of treatment facilities in Wilmington, given the magnitude of the city's drug problem. Another issue is that many of those who need treatment are unemployed and do not have health insurance.

Assessment of Seeding Activities

The "seeding" component of Wilmington's Weed & Seed program offers programs in the areas of tutoring, recreation, parent training, and substance abuse education and counseling, and victim services. Since July 1992, Weed & Seed funds have been used to:

- augment existing tutoring programs at the area's community centers
- provide additional recreational opportunities for residents, including the development of a community fitness center
- establish parent training and support programs
- provide counseling and support to crime victims
- hire a substance abuse outreach worker
- provide financial assistance to a remedial reading, language arts, and mathematics program for students who fare poorly in traditional classroom settings

Evaluating each Weed & Seed funded program individually would be an extremely complex and time consuming task since measures of success vary by program. Ideally, evaluating programs of this nature would involve looking at how well performance measures for each program converge with the program's goals and objectives. This type of in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, this assessment will look at the impact of Operation Weed & Seed's "seeding" component on:

1. Juvenile Crime - Many of the Weed & Seed programs are geared towards children and adolescents, especially the recreation and tutoring programs. Since much of Weed & Seed's resources are used for delinquency prevention, one indicator of how effective "seeding" programs are is the degree that area youths become involved in criminal activity. Juvenile arrest rates will be used in this analysis as a measure of Weed & Seed's impact on juvenile crime.
2. Resident Attitudes - This assessment will also include the results of an opinion survey that was distributed to Weed & Seed residents in the summer of 1996. Respondents were asked about their perceptions of the Weed & Seed program and whether they felt that the program effectively addressed the problems facing their neighborhood. They were also asked to give their opinions on how the program could be improved.

A total of 25 "seeding" programs were established in Wilmington using Weed & Seed funds, with expenditures for seeding programs totaling $867,230 over the entire project period. Most of the Weed & Seed funded programs operate out of community centers—William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center, the Latin American Community Center, Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center, West End Neighborhood House, and the Jackson Street Boy's and Girl's Club. Ten programs were funded during the cycle that started in July 1996.

Westside/Hilltop Seeding Programs

- Since July 1992, $378,120 in Weed & Seed funds have been awarded to agencies in the Westside/Hilltop area to establish 12 "seeding" programs.
- Each of the area's three community centers—Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center, Latin American Community Center, and West End Neighborhood House—received funds for recreation and tutoring programs.
- Other Weed & Seed funded programs in the Westside/Hilltop area include parent training programs at Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center and West End Neighborhood House, summer prevention programming and remedial education classes at St. Paul's School.

Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center
Total amount awarded: $80,000

Program: Tutorial Program
Activities: Individual and group tutorials; group study sessions; college preparation assistance (financial aid information, S.A.T. preparation, college visits); career exploration activities (job fairs, job skills workshops, field trips).
Status: Active

Program: Parent Partnership
Activities: A series of parent training workshops.
Status: Closed

Program: Recreation Program
Activities: Allowed Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center to expand its recreational offerings to Hilltop area youths ages 6-18.
Status: Closed

Program: Summer Camp
Activities: A 7-week summer program for youths ages 5-13. Activities include arts and crafts, swimming, computer activities, and weekly field trips.
Status: Closed

Latin American Community Center:
Total amount awarded: $133,500

Program: Recreation Program
Activities: Organized recreation and socio-cultural activities for youths and adults.
Status: Active

Program: Tutorial Program
Activities: Tutoring and homework assistance for school age Hispanic youths.
Status: Active

St. Paul's School
Total amount awarded: $10,220

Program: St. Paul's Resource Room
Activities: Additional staff support to expand a remedial/special education class at St. Paul's School for students grades 2-6 who experience difficulties learning in a traditional classroom setting.
Status: Closed

Program: St. Paul's Summer Prevention Program
Activities: Summer remedial education classes for "at-risk" students in grades 2 - 5.
Status: Closed

West End Neighborhood House
Total amount awarded: $154,400

Program: Recreation Program
Activities: Recreational and cultural activities for youths, adult aerobics instruction, and self-defense classes.
Status: Closed

Program: Tutorial Program
Activities: Individualized Tutoring, homework assistance, and computer instruction for students grades 1-12.
Status: Closed

Program: Weed & Seed Parenting Project
Activities: parenting workshops and support groups for teen and adult parents.
Status: Closed

Program: Working Capital Delaware
Activities: The goal of this program is to provide small business development opportunities for the Weed & Seed area. The program involves establishing small business loan peer groups to provide capital, share ideas, and work on business skills.
Status: Closed

West Center City Seeding Programs

- Service agencies in West Center City have received a total of $206,000 for "seeding" programs since July 1992.
- About 80 percent of Weed & Seed funds awarded to West Center City agencies went to the William"Hicks" Anderson Community Center. A large portion of their award was used to develop health club style community fitness center.
- The other recipients of Weed & Seed funds were the West Center City Day Care Nursery and Tabernacle Baptist Church.

William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center
Total amount awarded: $165,500

Program: Tutorial Program
Activities: Individual tutoring and homework assistance; weekly sessions on drug prevention, health & fitness, parenting or career opportunities.
Status: Active

Program: Recreation Program
Activities: Nighttime basketball league; community fitness center
Status: Active

Program: UMOJA/UJIMA Homegirl Development Basketball League
Activities: Teaches female participants fundamental basketball skills; educational assistance; cultural field trips
Status: Closed

West Center City Day Care Nursery
Total amount awarded: $30,600

Program: Early Computer Whiz
Activities: Computer tutorial and instruction for youths ages 3 - 10.
Status: Active

Program: Parents for Success
Activities: Parent training workshops.
Status: Closed

Tabernacle Baptist Church
Total amount awarded: $9,900

Program: Youth Outreach Ministry
Activities: Tutoring in English, math, social studies, and science.
Status: Closed

Browntown/Hedgeville Seeding Programs

- The Browntown/Hedgeville area has received the least amount of Weed & Seed funds for "seeding" programs.
- The Jackson Street Boy's and Girl's Club was the only Browntown/Hedgeville agency to receive Weed & Seed funds.
- The $53,300 in Weed & Seed funds were used for community outreach, job skills preparation, and tutoring programs.

Jackson St. Boys and Girl's Club
Total amount awarded: $53,300

Program: Hedgeville Outreach
Activities: Recruitment of youth from the Hedgeville area to join the Jackson Street Boys and Girls Club.
Status: Active

Program: Job Skills Preparation Program
Activities: Offers instruction on interviewing skills and resume writing. Teams youths with mentors in the local business community.
Status: Active

Program: Educational Enhancement Program
Activities: Computer assisted instruction and tutoring.
Status: Closed

Programs Encompassing the Entire Target Area

- Four Weed & Seed funded programs—BCI Street Outreach, the Weed & Seed Victim Counselor, Community Organizational Training, and Weed & Seed Mini-Grants—served all three Weed & Seed target neighborhoods.

Brandywine Counseling, Inc.
Total amount awarded: $70,000

Program: BCI Street Outreach
Activities: Substance abuse education; referral to treatment programs; distribution of literature on substance abuse and HIV.
Status: Active

Criminal Justice Council
Total amount awarded: $159,810

Program: Victim Counselor
Activities: Assists victims at completing victims compensation applications, accompanies victims to the hospital or to court, and refers victims to social service agencies.
Status: Active

Program: Community Organizational Training
Activities: Youth prevention training seminars on the dangers of smoking, self-esteem, and domestic violence.
Status: Closed

Program: Weed & Seed Mini-Grant Program
Activities: Provides grants for up to $2,000 for drug prevention and neighborhood restoration activities.
Status: Closed

Weed & Seed area residents send a message to drug dealers and users during a "March Against Drugs" in Wilmington's Westside/Hilltop neighborhood.

Shown at the left are participants in the annual "Operation Clean Sweep", a city-sponsored initiative to clean up litter in neighborhoods throughout Wilmington. Community policing officers and the Wilmington Police Department's mobile mini-station are shown on the right.



Youths sharpen their computer skills at the William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center's computer tutorial program (left). A substance abuse outreach worker from Brandywine Counseling Inc. stands by a display during "Drug Information Day" (right).

Financial Summary of Seeding Programs

Neighborhood	Agency	Program	1/92 - 12/93	1/93 - 6/95	7/95 - 6/96	7/96 - 6/97	Grand Total
Browntown/Hedgeville	Jackson St. B/G Club	Hedgeville Outreach	$0	$0	$19,900	$9,000	$28,900
		Job Skills Preparation	$0	$0	$0	$10,000	$10,000
		Educational Enhancement	$0	$14,400	$0	$0	$14,400
	Jackson St. B/G Club Total		**$0**	**$14,400**	**$19,900**	**$19,000**	**$53,300**
Browntown/Hedgeville Total			**$0**	**$14,400**	**$19,900**	**$19,000**	**$53,300**
Westside/Hilltop	HLNC	HLNC Tutoring	$10,000	$12,400	$12,400	$4,500	$39,300
		HLNC Recreation	$0	$11,600	$11,600	$0	$23,200
		Parent Partnership	$0	$0	$10,000	$0	$10,000
		Summer Camp	$0	$0	$7,500	$0	$7,500
	HLNC Total		**$10,000**	**$24,000**	**$41,500**	**$4,500**	**$80,000**
	LACC	LACC Recreation	$32,300	$31,200	$20,900	$5,000	$89,400
		LACC Tutoring	$10,000	$15,600	$12,500	$6,000	$44,100
	LACC Total		**$42,300**	**$46,800**	**$33,400**	**$11,000**	**$133,500**
	St. Paul's School	Resource Room	$0	$0	$10,000	$0	$10,000
		Summer Prevention	$0	$0	$220	$0	$220
	St. Paul's Total		**$0**	**$0**	**$10,220**	**$0**	**$10,220**
	WENH	WENH Recreation	$30,600	$33,800	$17,700	$0	$82,100
		Parenting Project	$24,200	$0	$0	$0	$24,200
		WENH Tutoring	$11,300	$21,000	$10,800	$0	$43,100
		Working Capital Delaware	$0	$0	$5,000	$0	$5,000
	WENH Total		**$66,100**	**$54,800**	**$33,500**	**$0**	**$154,400**
Westside/Hilltop Total			**$118,400**	**$125,600**	**$118,620**	**$15,500**	**$378,120**
West Center City	Tabernacle Church	Youth Outreach Ministry	$0	$9,900	$0	$0	$9,900
	Tabernacle Church Total		**$0**	**$9,900**	**$0**	**$0**	**$9,900**
	WCCDCN	Early Computer Whiz	$7,200	$11,100	$6,600	$3,000	$27,900
		Parents for Success	$0	$2,700	$0	$0	$2,700
	WCCDCN Total		**$7,200**	**$13,800**	**$6,600**	**$3,000**	**$30,600**
	WHACC	WHACC Recreation	$33,700	$31,800	$28,800	$13,000	$107,300
		WHACC Tutoring	$10,000	$11,600	$11,600	$5,000	$38,200
		Homegirl Basketball Leauge	$0	$0	$20,000	$0	$20,000
	WHACC Total		**$43,700**	**$43,400**	**$60,400**	**$18,000**	**$165,500**
West Center City Total			**$50,900**	**$67,100**	**$67,000**	**$21,000**	**$206,000**
Total for Neighborhood Programs			**$169,300**	**$207,100**	**$205,520**	**$55,500**	**$637,420**
All Neighborhoods	Brandywine Counseling	Street Outreach	$10,000	$25,000	$20,000	$15,000	$70,000
	Criminal Justice Council	Victim Counselor	$30,700	$35,200	$16,600	$6,310	$88,810
	Criminal Justice Council	Community Organization	$22,500	$16,000	$7,300	$0	$45,800
	Criminal Justice Council	Mini-Grants	$0	$16,700	$8,500	$0	$25,200
Grand Total			**$232,500**	**$300,000**	**$257,920**	**$76,810**	**$867,230**

Chart 19

Summary of Seeding Programs

Program	1/92 - 12/93	1/94 - 6/95	7/95 - 6/96	7/96 - 6/97
Tutoring Program - HLNC	$10,000	$12,400	$12,400	$4,500
Tutoring Program - LACC	$10,000	$15,600	$12,500	$6,000
Tutoring Program - WENH	$11,300	$21,000	$10,800	
Tutoring Program - WHACC	$10,000	$11,600	$11,600	$5,000
Recreation Program - LACC	$32,300	$31,200	$20,900	$5,000
Recreation Program - WENH	$30,600	$33,800	$17,700	
Recreation Program - WHACC	$33,700	$31,800	$28,800	$13,000
Victim Counselor	$30,700	$35,200	$16,600	$6,310
BCI Street Anti-Drug Outreach	$10,000	$25,000	$20,000	$15,000
Early Computer Whiz Program	$7,200	$11,100	$6,600	$3,000
Community Organizational Training	$22,500	$16,000	$7,300	
Weed & Seed Parenting Project	$24,200			
Education Enhancement Program		$14,400		
Youth Outreach Ministry		$9,900		
Parents for Success		$2,700		
Recreation Program - HLNC		$11,600	$11,600	
Weed & Seed Mini-Grant Program		$16,700	$8,500	
St. Paul's Resource Room			$10,000	
Parent Partnership - HLNC			$10,000	
Summer Camp - HLNC			$7,500	
Homegirl Basketball Leauge			$20,000	
Hedgeville Outreach			$19,900	$9,000
Working Capital Delaware			$5,000	
St. Paul's Summer Prevention			$220	
Job Skills Preparation				$10,000

Juvenile Crime in the Weed & Seed Area

Table 15 and Charts 20 to 23 displays Weed & Seed area juvenile arrests for 1994, 1995, and 1996 by lead arrest charge. The chart shows that juvenile arrests made in the Weed & Seed area were down 8 percent overall in 1996. This is the second consecutive year that juvenile arrests in the area decreased overall. Broken out by neighborhood, juvenile arrests fell in the Westside/Hilltop and Browntown/Hedgeville areas by 17 percent 15 percent respectively, and increased by 17 percent in West Center City. Nearly half of all Weed & Seed juvenile arrests were in the Westside/Hilltop area.

Juvenile arrests with a violent or weapons offense as the lead charge were up in 1996. Arrests for drug offenses, which accounted for about 34 percent of all Weed & Seed area juvenile arrests made in 1996, were down by 9 percent overall. The Westside/Hilltop area was the only neighborhood that saw a decrease in juvenile drug arrests. The number of juveniles arrested for drugs in West Center City and Browntown/Hedgeville increased slightly in 1996.

Weed & Seed Area Juvenile Arrests

Charge	Westside/Hilltop			West Center City			Browntown/Hedgeville			Weed & Seed Area Total		
	1994	1995	1996	1994	1995	1996	1994	1995	1996	1994	1995	1996
Violent	10	15	19	14	8	5	9	9	11	33	32	35
Drugs	47	61	44	23	17	23	7	10	13	77	88	80
Weapons	3	6	10	2	4	8	1	1	1	6	11	19
Property	28	23	15	28	12	12	25	20	6	81	55	33
Traffic	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Other	43	27	28	20	9	16	20	21	21	83	57	65
Capias	6	7	0	7	9	5	2	1	1	15	17	6
Total	**138**	**140**	**116**	**94**	**59**	**69**	**64**	**62**	**53**	**296**	**261**	**238**

Chart 20

Weed & Seed Area Juvenile Arrests



Chart 21

Weed & Seed Area Juvenile Arrests - Violent Crime



Chart 22

Weed & Seed Area Juvenile Arrests - Drugs



Chart 23

Weed & Seed Area Juvenile Arrests - Property Crime



1996 Weed & Seed Opinion Survey

In the summer of 1996, an opinion survey was distributed to persons who either lived or worked in the Weed & Seed area via the community centers. The survey asked respondents about what they liked and disliked about their neighborhood, whether they felt that violent crime and drug activity in the neighborhood was increasing or decreasing, how they felt about Weed & Seed in general and their perceptions as to whether Weed & Seed was having an impact on the neighborhood's problems. A total of 240 persons returned the survey questionnaire.

A. Assessment of Weed & Seed

1. *How successful has the Weed & Seed program been in your neighborhood?*

Crime Reduction - 57 of the 183 respondents who answered this question thought that Weed & Seed was not successful at reducing crime (31 percent), 101 respondents thought that it was somewhat successful (55 percent), and 25 thought that it was very successful (14 percent).

Community Policing - 40 of the 183 respondents who answered this question thought that the Weed & Seed community policing effort was not successful (22 percent), 110 thought that it was somewhat successful (60 percent), and 33 thought that it was very successful (18 percent).

Community Center Youth Programs - 24 of the 180 persons who answered this question thought that the Weed & Seed youth programs were not successful (13 percent), 100 thought that they were somewhat successful (56 percent), and 56 thought that they were very successful (31 percent).

Street Anti-Drug Outreach - 44 of the 173 persons who answered this question thought that Weed & Seed anti-drug outreach efforts were not successful (25 percent), 98 thought that it was somewhat successful (57 percent), and 31 thought that it was very successful (18 percent).

Victim Services - 38 of the 162 persons who responded to this question thought that Weed & Seed victim services were not successful (24 percent), 112 thought that they were somewhat successful (69 percent), and 12 thought that they were very successful (7 percent).

Public Relations - 40 of the 174 respondents who answered this question thought that the Weed & Seed public relations effort was not successful (23 percent), 107 thought that it was somewhat successful (61 percent), and 27 thought that it was very successful (28 percent).

2. *Were you aware of Weed & Seed before reading this survey?*

164 of the 237 respondents who answered the question said that the had heard of Weed & Seed (69 percent), and 73 said that they had not heard of Weed & Seed (31 percent).

3. *What do you like about the Weed & Seed program?*

Community Police
Community Involvement
Helps to improve the community
Faster response to crime
Recreation Programs
Drug Information
Helps to reduce open-air drug sales
More police presence and visibility
Personable police officers
Tutoring programs

4. ***What don't you like about the Weed & Seed program?***

Led to an increase in abandoned and boarded properties
Police harass minority youths
Inconsistent funding
Not effective at reducing loitering and drug sales
More intervention needed
More police needed
Residents need to become more involved

6. ***What areas would you like Weed & Seed to focus on in the future?***

Community Policing (117 responses - 20 percent)
Recreation (105 responses - 18 percent)
Vice Operations (97 responses - 17 percent)
Neighborhood Beautification (69 responses - 12 percent)
Tutoring Programs (63 responses - 11 percent)
Victim Services (49 responses - 8 percent)
Housing (47 responses - 8 percent)
Social Services (32 responses - 6 percent)

B. Neighborhood Crime and Disorder

1. *How is your neighborhood today compared to how it was two years ago?*

Drug Activity - 31 of the 220 respondents who answered this question felt that the was less drug activity in the area compared with the previous year (14 percent), 73 felt that it was about the same (33 percent), and 116 felt that there was more (53 percent).

Violence - 36 of the 207 people who answered this question felt that violence in the area was less than it was a year ago (17 percent), 74 felt that it was about the same (36 percent), and 97 felt that there was more violence (47 percent).

Guns - 44 of the 199 persons who answered this question felt that there were less guns on the street compared with one year ago (22 percent), 60 felt that there was about the same amount (30 percent), and 95 felt that there were more (48 percent).

Gang Activity - 61 of the 196 respondents who answered this question felt that there was less gang activity in the area compared with one year ago (31 percent), 53 felt that it was a bout the same (27 percent), and 82 felt that there was more (42 percent).

Loitering - 37 of the 213 people who answered this question felt that there was less loitering compared with one year ago (17 percent), 71 felt that it was about the same (33 percent) and 105 felt that there was more loitering (49 percent).

Noise - 34 of the 212 people who answered this question said that there was less noise in the neighborhood compared with a year ago (16 percent), 77 said that noise was about the same (36 percent), and 101 said that there was more noise (48 percent).

2. *What do you think are the biggest problems facing the neighborhood?*

Crime	Loitering
Drug activity	Joblessness
Vacant houses	Gangs
Guns on the street	Violence
Not enough police presence	Not enough community involvement
Lack of parental guidance	Idle youths

3. *Was anyone in your home a victim of a serious crime in the past two years?*

46 of the 210 persons who answered this question said that someone in their household was a victim of a serious crime in the past two years (22 percent) and 164 said that no one in their household was a victim of a serious crime in the past two years (78 percent).

4. *Did the victim receive any victim assistance?*

12 of the 37 respondents who answered this question reported that they received some form of victim assistance (32 percent) and 25 reported that they did not (68 percent).

C. Community Involvement

1. *Have you ever called the police regarding a "hot spot"?*

83 of the 232 respondents who answered this question reported that they have called the police to report drug activity (36 percent), and 149 reported that they had never called the police concerning drug activity (64 percent).

2. *Have you spoken with any of the Weed & Seed community police officers within the past year?*

87 of the 232 respondents who answered this question said that they spoke with a Weed & Seed community police officer within the past year (38 percent) and 145 said that they did not (62 percent).

3. *Does your neighborhood have a block watch program?*

76 of the 207 persons who answered this question said that their neighborhood had a block watch (63 percent), and 131 said that their neighborhood did not have block watch (37 percent).

4. *Do you participate in the block watch?*

39 of the 70 persons who answered this question said that they did not participate (56 percent), and 31 said that they did participate (44 percent).

5. *Do you know when and where community meetings are held?*

100 of the 230 people who answered this question said that they knew when and where community meetings were held (44 percent) and 130 said that they did not know (56 percent).

6. *How many community meetings did you attend in 1995?*

88 of the 157 persons who answered this question did not attend any meetings (56 percent), 36 attended between 1 - 5 meetings (23 percent), 16 attended between 6 - 10 meetings (10 percent), and 17 attended more than 10 meetings (11 percent).

8. *Are you willing to volunteer your time to help the community?*

78 of the 223 persons who answered the question said that they would be very willing to volunteer (35 percent), 114 said that they would be somewhat willing (51 percent), and 31 said that they would not be willing to volunteer (14 percent).

D. Demographic and Household Characteristics of Survey Respondents

1. How old are you?

40 of the 231 persons who answered this question were under 18 years old (17 percent), 50 were between 18 and 24 years old (22 percent), 96 were between 25 and 44 years old (41 percent), and 45 were 45 years old or older.

2. Are you male or female?

110 of the 235 respondents who answered this question were male (47 percent), and 125 were female (53 percent).

3. What is your race/ethnicity?

107 of the 235 respondents who answered this question were African-American (45 percent), 79 were Hispanic/Latino (34 percent), and 49 were White (21 percent).

4. What neighborhood do you live in?

77 of the 226 respondents who answered this question reported that they lived in the Westside neighborhood (34 percent), 73 lived in the Hilltop section (32 percent), 36 lived in Hedgeville (16 percent), 14 lived in West Center City (6 percent), 7 lived in West End, Browntown, and Quaker Hill (3 percent), 4 lived in Cool Springs (2 percent), and 1 lived in Trinity Vicinity (1 percent).

5. How long have you lived in the neighborhood?

18 of the 273 persons who answered the question said that they lived in their neighborhood for less than one year (8 percent), 66 had lived there between 1 and 3 years (30 percent), 40 had lived there between 3 and 5 years (18 percent), 36 had lived there between 5 and 10 years (17 percent), and the remaining 57 had lived there more than 10 years (26 percent).

6. Do you own or rent your home?

92 of the 214 persons who answered this question owned their dwelling (38 percent) and 122 were renting their dwelling (57 percent).

7. Are you employed? If so, do you work full-time or part-time?

104 of the 237 respondents who answered this question reported that they were employed full-time (44 percent), 35 were employed part-time (15 percent), and 98 were unemployed (41 percent).

8. What is your annual household income?

67 of the 214 persons who answered this question reported that their annual household income was under $10,000 (31 percent), 68 reported their household income at between $10,000 and 20,000 (32 percent), and 79 reported their household at over $20,000 per year (37 percent).

9. *How many people live with you?*

26 of the 233 persons who answered this question lived alone (11 percent), 21 lived with 1 other person (9 percent), 90 lived with 2 or 3 other people (39 percent), 74 lived with 4 or 5 other people (32 percent), and 22 lived with more than 5 people (9 percent).

10. *How many people under 18 live in your household?*

80 of the 233 persons who answered the question had no one under 18 living with them (34 percent), 96 had 1 or 2 persons under 18 living with them (41 percent), 50 had 3 to 5 persons under 18 living with them (21 percent), and 7 had more than 5 persons under 18 living with them (3 percent).

11. *How many people over 65 live in your household?*

206 of the 233 persons who answered this question had no persons in their household who were 65 years or older (88 percent), 21 had 1 person living with them who was 65 years or older (9 percent), 5 had 2 persons living with them who were 65 years old or older (2 percent) and 1 person had 4 persons living with them who were 65 years old or older (1 percent).

The Eight Year War Against Drugs in Wilmington, Delaware

Mary J. Mande, Ph.D.
MJM Consulting

Introduction

Wilmington, Delaware, a small city of 70,000 people, is a crossroads in the local, national, and international drug business. It is located on I-95, a primary route for drug distributors along the 1,342-mile route between Miami and New York City. Drug traffickers from Philadelphia and New York have infiltrated Wilmington, and vie with the local dealers for business. Open-air drug markets, dealing primarily in crack cocaine, are a common sight in some of Wilmington s neighborhoods. Violence has also become an ordinary event in several communities: last year, 1996, shootings more than doubled the prior year: there were 108 shooting victims, nine were fatally wounded, and 1997 is maintaining the pace.

The people who live in the drug-devastated neighborhoods of Wilmington have gone through cycles of hope and despair as efforts have intensified or diminished to rid their streets of the open-air drug markets and the activities which surround it. Most of the components of the Weed and Seed approach to combating open air drug markets and illicit drug use were implemented more than seven years ago, in February 1989, with a Bureau of Justice Assistance grant for $90,000 awarded to the Wilmington Police Department to implement community policing in the Eastside.

In July 1992, in West Center City and Hilltop, a much larger federal initiative, called the Weed and Seed Program, was implemented here. A total of $1,100,000 was awarded in eight program areas: Law Enforcement, Community Policing, Corrections, Prosecution, Substance Abuse Treatment, Victims, Recreation, Tutoring, and Parenting Skills Training. The project is now in its fourth year of operation, although funding is currently at $175,000, a substantially lower level.

This is the eighth year of the evaluation of community policing and Weed and Seed. The evaluation is based on a triangulated methodology which includes:

1. Quantitative data, using a quasi-experimental design, to
   a. analyze trends in calls for service and drug-related arrests in the target areas, and
   b. map Weed & Seed areas by level of drug activity;
2. Documentary and observational data obtained from study of agency documents, newspaper clippings, and participant observation to collect performance data, and
3. Qualitative data based on interviews with a panel of participants from communities and agencies involved in Weed & Seed.

This report presents the fifth round of the panel interviews. The report begins with a brief history of Wilmington's efforts to eradicate the illicit drug business. Next, the methods used for the panel interviews are described. This will be followed by a summary of findings from the previous reports. Fourth, the 1997 panel interviews will be summarized and findings and conclusions will be presented.

Background: Growth in the Sale and Use of Illicit Drugs:

The panel interviews described later in this report will be most appreciated in the context of the short history of the development of Wilmington s drug trade. The following is excerpted from the Statistical Analysis Center Report (Evaluation of the Wilmington Weed & Seed Project, pages 28-29, April 1, 1997).

> The widespread sale and use of illicit drugs in Wilmington is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to 1989, drug related calls for service figures for Wilmington were very low compared with today s figures, even in neighborhoods that are typically associated with illicit drug sales---the Eastside, Westside/Hilltop, Riverside, Price s Run, Boulevard, South Wilmington, and West Center City. In 1989, drug related calls to the police department rose sharply in these seven neighborhoods. The Eastside in particular experienced a tremendous increase in reported drug activity, especially in the area surrounding the intersection of 8th & Bennett Streets. Historically, this area became associated with drugs because of a seedy bar that was formerly located a block away at 8th & Church Streets. This bar, which was well known for drug sales and other illegal activity, was destroyed by a fire in the mid-1980's. Illicit drug sales in the surrounding area continued to escalate, however, even though the bar was no longer there.
>
> In response to the escalating drug problem on the Eastside, the police department stepped up drug enforcement efforts and deployed two walking patrol officers in the area as part of the Eastside Substance Abuse Awareness Program. This strategy managed to prevent conditions on the Eastside from escalating out of control. Meanwhile, drug related calls for service from the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods continued to rise.
>
> In 1990 and 1991, conditions in the West Center City and Westside/Hilltop neighborhoods deteriorated rapidly, as areas like 4th & Franklin Streets, Conrad Street between Vanburen and Franklin Streets, Madison Street between 5th and 6th Streets, 6th & Jefferson Streets, and 3rd & Rodney Streets began to develop into some of Wilmington s most active open-air drug markets. There were also concerns that Eastside drug dealers were moving into the West Center City and Westside/Hilltop areas because Eastside had become "too hot." In addition, an influx of New York City crack dealers exacerbated the area's decline. Their product was typically less adulterated than the local dealer s offerings, which led to an increase in customer traffic. They were also more willing to use violence in their dealings. As a result, drug related shootings and other violent crime in the West Center City and Westside/Hilltop areas also rose during this period.

Panel Interviews: The Research Design

This report continues the process evaluation which began with the Eastside Substance Abuse Awareness Project (ESAAP). For community policing and Weed and Seed, the following subjects were the focus of the panel interviews:

- Community Police Officer s (CPO) role in the community—acceptance, cooperation, respect
- CPO s role in the police department—status, respect, support, reward
- Police Department law enforcement activities—undercover work, arrests, prosecution, convictions
- The drug market---Drugs, market strategies
- Community characteristics—leadership, resources, community organizations
- Community attitudes—fear, attitudes toward drugs and drug dealers
- Community activities—neighborhood watch, marches, vigils, demand for service
- Resources/funding--federal, state, and community.

Approach of the Fifth Panel Study

Previous panel study reports have emphasized the descriptions, perceptions, and words of the panel members. The themes of the project listed in the paragraph above emerged from the narrative provided by the panel members. At this point in the longitudinal study, history has begun to repeat itself in some of the themes articulated in earlier reports. This fifth report will also make extensive use of the interview material, but it will be organized to trace the history of the major themes of community policing and the weed and seed program.

The Wilmington Police Department and the War on Drugs

Several times, the Wilmington Police Department (WPD) has reorganized its efforts to fight illicit drug dealing in response to the policies of the Chief and/or other influential department leaders, city administration, federal and state funding initiatives, and community support and pressure. The major changes and some of the events leading to them are summarized below.

Illicit Drug Markets and the "Pure" Community Policing Approach

Community policing as it was implemented on the Eastside in the ESAAP Project is looked back upon by interviewees as the "ideal" model to be sought and emulated. Frustration is increased as it appears that is impossible to achieve as a routine police strategy. It was initiated by two of Wilmington Police Department's (WPD) earliest advocates of community policing, the police chief and the Captain of the Community Services Division. As described earlier, the drug market in Wilmington apparently gained a toehold in a "seedy" bar in the Eastside community. The market was established at 8th and Bennett Streets, a block away from the bar which was known as a place to buy and sell drugs as well as other illegal activity. Although the bar was destroyed in a mid-80's fire, the drug market had been established and continued to thrive (Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, 1995: 28). In response to the growing problem of open air drug markets, the police department used funds from a federal anti-drug program to increase drug enforcement activities. A part of this first effort included two walking patrol officers.

Just as the drug trade migrated to Wilmington from surrounding metropolitan areas, so did the concept of community policing. The Police Chief and the Division Chief initiated the concept of community policing in 1985-86, borrowing from the development of the approach in Philadelphia which was one of the earliest sites for its implementation. They started with the strategy called "park and patrol," which called for the patrol officer to park the car and walk the street. This approach was tried for a year without success because the calls for service continued to come in, and when the officer returned to the patrol car, calls were usually stacked and waiting to be responded to:

> ...there was little effort to engage community members. The officers seemed uneasy without the shell of the patrol car. They did not know the area, and the residents did not trust them. Honest citizens hid behind doors, and they were afraid to say anything--legitimately so. And I think we found that throughout the city if someone wanted to get involved and called the police, the drug dealers would threaten to burn them out or beat them up, and so they were afraid to call, and they had every right to be. We could not guarantee them any protection. I remember working down there in uniform when there were street shootings right in front of the police. The dealers would shoot it out just like in the old West. (Mande, 1993: 23-24).

When "park and patrol" failed, the Wilmington Police Department tried the "G-squad," a unit of six or seven officers who were assigned to walking patrols across the city, but the success

of the early walking patrols was limited because responding to calls was still the top priority, and the G-squad officers were seen as a pool of officers available for other purposes.

Eventually, in 1990, the police chief who was a strong proponent of community policing and a walking patrol, created a Community Services Division and reassigned seven walking patrol officers from traffic to Community Service. They also acquired a mobile mini-station that met with good success. By July of 1991, the Division had a captain and 17 walking patrol officers, and spreading and intensifying illicit drug markets with which to contend. The model of community policing implemented on the Eastside was based on the following principles:

- Direct engagement with the community to give the officer more immediate information about problems unique to a neighborhood and insights into their solutions.
- Freedom from response to 911 calls to permit the officer to engage more in proactive crime prevention.
- Make operations more visible to the public to increase police accountability to the public.
- Decentralize operations to allow officers to develop a greater familiarity with the specific workings and needs of the neighborhood and people in the community, and to modify procedures accordingly.
- Encourage officers to view citizens as partners.
- Move decision making and discretion downward to the officer to given them the authority needed to use their knowledge of the community to solve community problems.
- Through the relationship developed between the police and the community, encourage people in the neighborhood to take more initiative in preventing and solving crimes.

The New Hot Spots: Westside/Hilltop and West Center City Neighborhoods

As the Eastside became "too hot" for the drug dealers, they moved into the Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods of Wilmington. Drug related calls for service increased dramatically in the area designated in 1992 as the "Weed and Seed" area as part of a new federally-funded program designed to weed out the criminal elements and seed with social programs to help rebuild the community. Community policing was an integral part of "Weed and Seed" just as it had been with the Eastside project. Eventually, illicit drug activity spread from this area into the Browntown/Hedgeville area, and police resources were spread thin as the Department tried to cover the entire area with existing resources. One indicator of this was that arrests actually decreased in two of the reporting areas even as drug activity increased.

The pattern of displaced drug markets in response to community policing and strong narcotics enforcement continued. However, changes in the City Administration and police department brought changes in police resources and tactics for fighting illicit drug dealers.

The "Quadrant" System (1993-1995)

The neighborhoods deteriorated significantly during this period. An air of disappointment and resignation was evident. On the Eastside, hard won gains were lost as the drug markets thrived in the absence of the community police officers, the disintegration of the neighborhood coalitions, and the lack of focused attention from the WPD. The telephone wires were again observed to be festooned with dozens of sneakers indicating open drug markets. A block away from the telephone wires, a large cluster of people, mostly males, loitered on the street in the middle of the day. More buildings were defaced by graffiti, and the streets were again littered with debris. Community members reported increased drug activity, deterioration in the physical appearance of the neighborhood, and a less direct relationship with the police and other service agencies. More children appear to be working as runners. The trusting relationship between the people and the police that developed with the walking patrol is lost. The feeling was that now the Department is back to day one.

Between December 1993 and March 1995, the police department lost positions because of changes in the city administration and reduced or untimely federal funding. The police department reorganized the communities into "quadrants," or sections of the city which would be served by a vertically organized staffing arrangement. The purpose of the reorganization was similar to that of community policing: to assign officers to a bounded area in which they could become "specialists" in the people, problems, needs, solutions for that area. This reorganization was driven by a police department reduction in force from 290 to 230 imposed by the new city administration. The police began using the "hot spot" response strategy, based on crime analysis data, to concentrate attention to the worst trouble spots in the quadrant. All but three (3), of the ten (the three being the federal grant-funded) community police officers were transferred back to regular patrol. With the increasing pressure of responding to 911 calls with a reduction in force, the concept of community policing became a training segment rather than a strategy for solving community problems. The data indicates that the drug dealers continued to move their markets away from the "hot spots" targeted by police to safer streets:

> ...The data suggests that the combination of community policing and increased narcotics enforcement was effective at reducing drug related calls for service in areas when the police concentrated their efforts. The downside was that displacement to other parts of the target area was the rule rather than the exception, and drug dealers would typically relocate to other parts of West Center City or Westside/Hilltop after an area was cleared by police. During the initial 18 months of the Weed & Seed community policing/law enforcement effort (July 1992 to December 1993), reported drug activity in most parts of the target area fell, and drug related calls for service were down for the area as a whole. However, in areas where the drug activity resurfaced, the number of drug related calls increased tremendously (Delaware SAC, 1995: 29-32).

A bike patrol unit was created as a way to be more directly involved in the community while covering more territory. The bike patrol officers dressed in uniforms with shorts went through a mild hazing similar to that experienced by the original community police officers. Catcalls and whistles greeted them as they entered the building to report to their division. This soon diminished as the bike patrols became more popular and integrated into the police force. Former community police officers reported feeling stressed out when they cannot serve

the community as they would like to. With three officers assigned to three neighborhoods, one is walking, one is on a bike, and one staffs the community center, so there is not much walking. Once the familiarity and the relationship with the community is lost, the officers do not feel as safe walking or riding alone.

The WPD chief noted the institutionalization of the drug trade in Wilmington. He called it a "family" business that includes the extended family (grandpa and grandma, parents, children, uncles, aunts, and cousins). He said the dealers are becoming more sophisticated in evading police intervention. The chief also talked about the changing character of the community with the influx of Dominicans and Jamaicans--immigrants who have not been socialized into the U.S. system of justice with its limits on the exercise of police authority, and they exhibit an attitude of disrespect toward police officers.

Unpredictable and uneven federal funding for community programs and walking patrols, and reduced police manpower as a result of City budget problems, led to losses in the fight against illicit drugs. Some results of earlier victories remained in a few areas. People were observed sitting on their porches, walking to the shopping center or store, and some of the streets had not reverted to earlier deteriorated conditions.

The Era of "Shootings," (1996-1997)

During 1996, there were 108 shooting victims, nine mortally wounded, in Wilmington, Delaware (Delaware SAC, 1997: 1). Many of the Wilmington's drug-infested neighborhoods are in a state of crisis to the point that people in the community are calling for outside police assistance and help from the state police or national guard. The community police, however, seemed puzzled. From their point of view, open air dealing was down a little in West Center City, and not as bad as before at 7th and Jefferson. Although the community police recognized that open air drug dealing was still going on, they were keeping them on the move so they could not establish permanent markets.

Another officer noted that it was harder to make a street arrest in the Weed and Seed areas, but much easier to do so on the Eastside which was no longer the focus of police attention. The officers explained the shootings as an influx of dealers from New York and Philadelphia battling for territory, while study showed this to be a small influence.

Community members reported that street dealing was becoming more blatant, with dealers openly hawking their wares to a steady stream of buyers. A drug treatment center director reported that marijuana and heroin were becoming more popular as well as crack cocaine, with dozens of crack houses operating in the city. The ATF was actively investigating "straw purchases" of firearms, and the word on the street was that possession of a gun was seen as a necessary tool of the trade, or was needed for personal protection--even for school children.

Some landlords rented to drug dealers who gave the landlord a cut of the profits, so the police were pressuring landlords to be responsible for their tenants. In response, the dealers would rent several apartments, and constantly move their supplies from one location to another, and they barricade themselves inside so that evidence often can be destroyed before the police gain entry.

Police and drug dealer strategies change, one in response to the other. Open air drug markets, once established in a community, proliferate with the demand for drugs and the absence of police response. Neighborhood residents demands for police protection and response then escalate until they become a higher priority for the Department. As the police respond and pressure on the street increases, drug dealers move to another street or move inside.

The Fight Against Drugs 1997

Before community policing was introduced in 1989, open-air drug markets were virtually unaffected by the "response to 911 calls" method of traditional policing. The problems were most severe on the Eastside, where many gains were made by the "pure" community policing approach. However, the problems were soon displaced to other neighborhoods, particularly on the Westside, West Center City, and Hilltop. The advent of community policing and the Weed & Seed Program helped a great deal; unfortunately, funding was curtailed for these programs, and a cutback in community policing officers resulted. When the community policeman left or became less visible, the drug markets and the crime and public order problems it brings reappeared and, in some neighborhoods, became a crisis.

In response to the crisis, and demands from the communities that something be done, the mayor and the police chief asked for and received support from the state police. Another interest group became very active: the Wilmington Interfaith Network set forth demands for the police department to assign walking patrol officers to the neighborhoods. These demands pitted the Chief who was managing the police force according to his best professional judgment against the Mayor who was sensitive to political pressure, especially in an election year. Ultimately, the conflict between the Mayor and the police chief led to the Chief's resignation, appointment of an acting Chief, and an increase in the police force. Representatives of the police department, including the acting Chief, the Sergeant in charge of the walking patrols, and walking patrol officers talked about the changes and their effect in the interviews conducted in January 1997.

Wilmington Police Department: A New Regime and Reorganization

When asked about the status of Weed and Seed and the community policing operation, the officers talked about the newest organization for deploying police resources:

> We now have a sector model. The quadrant system didn't conform to a lot of the districts. We're trying to find some uniformity. We need a holistic approach, so we did it through census tracking to try to eliminate some of the overlapping groups in the quadrants. Through the sector system, we're going back to what we used to call district integrity...now called sector integrity...where a person is assigned to a particular area to work there day in and out and get familiar with the community. Also, through the sector system, we took advantage of the Crime Bill where officers were specifically designated for community policing activities. We expanded on that and put those officers along with others back on walking districts. The primary means of patrolling is foot, secondary is bicycle, and they are assigned to a specific area. There are 23 different sectors, with 23 designated walking area..

> Another reason is that we do want to get back into contact with the community...back to that one-on-one contact. These officers are the first step. We always move to a community where everyone had been trained in the community for problem solving. Before, when the patrolling officers had to do a lot of that, they didn't have time to stop and get in touch with the people. With the walking officers, they're out there day in and day out. They're there for long-term solutions. They're there to try to resolve the issues with a holistic approach. They view what's going on, then go about forming a plan. That's why they're there.

It is apparent that the WPD's community policing operation has changed. It is now more of a philosophical rather than an operational approach. It is considered to be an attitude practiced by every member of the department, regardless of their specific assignments. When asked about the organizational structure of the sectors, the officers discussed some of the new terms and purposes of the sector approach:

> There's a three phase program going on. One is to advise the community about the new project. The sector specialists are the ones responsible for resolving the issues in the long term solution, and the other officers are the ones assigned to specific geographical areas. In some of the areas, we do a crime analysis--look at the calls, the nature of the crimes. We have 33 new officers in training. After they're trained, we'll try to use more of the manpower from motorized units and assign them to additional walking districts.

> We don't call the officers community policing officers any longer. We try to stay away from the distinction, but want to incorporate that philosophy into our efforts. Because a lot of times, when you think of community policing officers, you think of a unit, of a limited amount of manpower set aside to do this. But we don't want people thinking like that. We're doing it as a philosophy that the whole force is trying to practice. We would like to say everyone is practicing it, but we know those people assigned to the motorized units truly do not have enough time to stop and interact. But the least we can do with them is to assign them to the same district day in and day out so even if there's not contact, at least they become familiar with the community.

> The problem was that when we went into the computerized age, we were depending on a computer to say who was available, and where to send them, and it took out the human side. We've gone away from the computers a bit. With computers, you didn't have a district; everyone was city-wide. So we went back to sector integrity, then you don't have ten different people going into a place. You have people that know the area. If you have someone in the area that knows it, and you have a couple of different thefts he responded to, then he could make the connection that it could be the same person, whereas if two different people responded, they would never know and could not make the connection.

The officers also talked about the apparent contradiction in decreased drug-related calls for service in 1996 and the community perception of a crisis situation related to open-air drug markets and the sudden escalation of shooting incidents:

> There's one of two things happening here. One is that we are resolving some of those issues in the communities. The solutions are working. The other thing is that we had a teleserve unit, and we had a task force going on. The teleserve would take some of the 911 calls, but it would still register. The decrease could really be attributed to the task force that identified and detained those who were more apt to commit violent crimes. That expanded to the joint operation between the state police and the City of Wilmington. We

also had the warrant team out taking people that were wanted off the streets. We had a force out that targeted corner drug activity, and one that targeted gambling. So that diminished the calls for service as we were taking a proactive stance. Plus, we're involved in the FBI task force, the drug enforcement task force, and the firearm task force. The firearm task force was involved in identifying the people that were purchasing guns and distributing them throughout the city. If you put that all together, and ask what the impact was, well, there had been a dramatic impact. In any study, you will find that with a sufficient amount of manpower, you will see an impact on crime.

When questioned on whether the drug problem was less serious in the hot spots such as the Eastside and the Westside/Hilltop areas, the officers talked about the continuing viability of the drug markets:

No, no--there are still hotspots, and a lot of the problems in the city of Wilmington revolve around the drug trade, whether or not it's the sale, use, or distribution. We know there's a direct correlation between drugs and violent crimes.

The question of gang infiltration into Wilmington was answered with a "yes, but not really:"

Well, the gangs were here before we noticed them, but I would say that because of the federal definition of gangs...I think there was resistance to that because no one wanted to say that 'Yes, Wilmington has a gang problem.' But in my mind, we always had a gang problem, but we don't have the defined gangs. There is some speculation that the Latin Kings are trying to form a gang, but I think they're pretty much wanna-bes...not the real territorial type. I think you have people that are congregating for identifiable reasons to further their trade...drug trade..that's the kind of thing we're seeing. But if you go by the federal definition of gangs, yes we do have gangs. We've always had gangs. These groups have been here; we were dealing with them before.

The officers also talked about gains and losses in the war on drugs, especially on the Eastside where dramatic changes in the community were achieved, compared to the current conditions there, and what it takes to clean up a community and keep it that way:

We have reassigned walking patrols down there, but when you refer to Burns and Wells (two of the first walking patrol officers) what you had was two highly motivated individuals. They took pride in what they were doing, and they were truly interested in the communities they were working on. I think those are two of the reasons why. One, because of the relationships they formed with the people in the community, and two, because of the program which drew interest. You had to have the support of the community along with law enforcement for success. Through law enforcement alone, we do not promote change in any community. I have statistics as far as arrests, as far as how we attack the problem, but if the community is not behind us, as soon as we leave, as we do not have the funds to maintain the law enforcement there, it goes back to the way it was. In all of those cases where we went in cooperation with the community, and we worked with them and came up with plans as to what we would do when it was no longer possible for us to keep maintaining the high level of visibility that we start out with, and it stayed on a stable level. What we need is true partnerships, but we need the community to be organized to assist themselves. What we have been hearing is that the good people in the community are afraid to show their support of the programs because of fear of retaliation from the criminal element.

In response to a comment that community residents were being told by drug dealers, during the periods when dealing is most prevalent (usually between 3 p.m. and into the early morning hours), residents were being threatened and told to stay inside their houses or risk being hurt, the acting Chief described the difficulties of 24 hour policing of the whole city:

> The drug dealers are intimidating them. But the fact is, we have effected change in the communities while the officers are still there. But because of resources, we can't maintain that level. The mayor is trying to get the funds for 23 new officers, and we know that will have an immediate impact on what we do here in the city of Wilmington. We'll have more walking patrols. When you have the officers there, it's less likely to have problems occur than when they're not there. Motorized officers are not as effective as the walking patrols because the walking patrols are always present whereas motorized patrols are there, but then they have to leave for something else, so the problem just migrates back. That has been the biggest complaint. The motorized patrols can't just sit there making sure the problem doesn't come back. I think with the increased manpower, that will impact that kind of situation where they say that the community people are afraid to come out. Also what we have been doing, which is kind of tough with our lack of manpower, is that when we have a shooting occurring, we immediately turn around and put officers in that area for as much time as funds will allow, maybe 18-26 hours, and have them there in the community to show the members their support and that they will try to prevent anything else from happening. But it's kind of hard because now everyone in our force is already designated to a duty, and there's a limited number of officers that we can pull to do that kind of thing. So we're trying to deal with those issues. We're also trying innovative techniques...surveillance, photographs, trying to identify some of these people. The task forces are coming back.
>
> The second component of that identification process is to identify those that are on probation or parole, and we're taking a proactive stance on identifying those that are in violation of their parole...because we know that the habitual criminal is the one that's giving us the most problems. It was shown in the shootings study that 56 percent of the victims have violent felony arrests in their past, and if we can maintain a closer watch on them and get them off of the streets, then I think that the statistics for violent crime in the city of Wilmington will go down. The other issue with drugs is that we have a lot of people coming in from the surrounding area, and our biggest problems is with violent crimes and drugs. A lot of times when we get to a scene, the victims are giving us less cooperation than anyone, they don't want to give you any information..so it's obvious that there is more going on than a person just being there and being attacked. So that's what we're trying to overcome. We need that information. A lot of times we find the person because of retaliation..that's how we found this guy last night. Then we get information and put two and two together. That's what's going on. I think we also have to look more into increasing our intelligence capability. Right now, we in the city of Wilmington, we have no type of intelligence system that allows us to identify groups of people. To identify associations. The only way we can so it now is that if an officer is particularly familiar with the area, or if he knows someone out in the vice squad and they figure it out. They look at the records, and see if a person is repeatedly involved in crime and see who he's with, and if the person at the time isn't sharp enough to write down who he's with, then that information gets lost. So we're looking at trying to obtain some type of computer program and the capabilities of networking so that we can get this information to everyone..because that type of information is important. It's been shown that there's a correlation between the profiles of

> the victims and suspects, and we need that on our end. If we could put that into some kind of program to make the associations it would make it a lot quicker to get some of this stuff than we do now. We're looking at trying to get that, but there's the problem of funding. We're also looking into upgrading our CADS (computer aided dispatch system) with the new system and the capabilities of networking throughout the community, it's just a matter of finding the money.

The Community: People, Problems and Solutions

Early in Wilmington's war against drugs, the Eastside community and the Wilmington Police Department (WPD) turned the community around. The Eastside Model included walking patrol officers, proactive crime prevention, police visibility and familiarity with a neighborhood, citizens as partners, and police autonomy for street-level problem solving decisions. This approach was successful as long as all the components were present. In the words of a community member interviewed in 1993:

> This used to be a safe neighborhood. But three or four years ago, there were certain 'hot spots' that were just crazy. What happens is the whole area gets crazy. We need to get away from the idea that everyone here in Eastside is a drug addict and shooting people. What has happened as this program evolved are those areas are a lot calmer than it was five to seven years ago. That is what is the amazing part. The community said enough is enough. We are going to get you out of here one by one. That is the difference from six years ago to now. Between 50 sneakers up on the wires, and now you can't see any, or maybe a pair at most. That is the reason this has been successful here. The Weed and Seed program on the Westside has come out from what has happened here on the Eastside. Now the Northeast side has a community policing program. The holistic approach we took here has made this all happen.

By 1995, when police and neighborhood activities in the fight against illicit drug markets had expanded to the West Side and West Center City/Hilltop areas, many of the components that had a positive impact on the Eastside were absent or diminished. Resources to support the walking patrol were greatly reduced. Some of the neighborhood coalitions were affected by personal politics which diminished their effectiveness. Community members became somewhat disillusioned as changes made by a new city administration brought yet another layer of community oversight groups, and as government funds were reduced. Changes in the neighborhood population mix and culture affected the relationship between the police officer and community members. Immigrants from different countries, especially young male immigrants, interpreted police restraint as a sign of weakness. People became "burned-out" as they realized that the fight against drugs was an on-going battle as drug dealers moved from street to street or community to community in response to police pressure.

The Eastside deteriorated significantly during this time period. The drug markets thrived; the telephone wires were festooned with dozens of sneakers at 8th and Bennett, and clusters of males loiters on the street in the middle of the day. Buildings were again badly defaced by graffiti, and the streets littered with debris.

On the Westside, except for sneakers on telephone wires, similar conditions were observed. However, in all four neighborhoods, some results of earlier victories were apparent. There

were still people, here and there, sitting on their porches, and some of the streets had not reverted to their pre-project conditions. The community organizations continued to work in the neighborhoods, even though conflict with the city and between community leaders had lessened their effectiveness.

The Communities in 1997

Community leaders talked about the resignation of Chief Pratcher, the shootings, the change in policing areas from "quadrants" to "sectors," police visibility, and drug market activity. It almost seems, from the vantage point of the neighborhoods, that the "war on drugs" story has been told. The themes continue from year to year: police strategies for combating illicit drugs and controlling crime (walking patrol officers), drug dealer tactics, community support, federal support for programs, city administration policies, and community and law enforcement needs.

Some of the neighborhood leaders talked about the continuing friction between community groups as well as between community groups and the City. They also reacted to the news that drug sales arrests were down in West Center City by 20 percent, and drug violations down 30 percent:

> They [the police} don't have officers out there to watch them, and the dealers are getting a lot smarter. They always know where the cops are. They use kids, lots of kids all over the place. And what are they going to do with a kid if they get caught? Spank 'em on the hand. Send 'em out to Ferris, and after 30 days they're out. What's the deal? They're sharp! Our system is so screwed up, it's insane. But the reason, I believe, we are seeing more activity is because we don't have the Weed and Seed officers there. Remember how plentiful they were, and there was that white car out there, and they would sneak up on them. That is the funniest thing!
>
> And it's not just the police. It's the whole package, even the programs. You take out one element and it's just going to deteriorate, and that's what's going on now. You could have five million officers out there, and still have problems. You need the different programs to help the kids, keep them off the street. You need the community centers to really make a difference.
>
> Cause when you live there, you see what's going on out there, and you go to the meetings and hear the complaints of people, and it's a shame to see an elderly couple afraid to go out of their house after four in the afternoon. Dealers tell them, "get back in your house."
>
> We went through a situation last week. There was the old fellow, always had a comment at the meeting-- and they started threatening him, so we had to take that up. And these guys are like 15, 17, 17. They say "go back in your house! Get your old *** in there!" So he gets upset and calls me, and says he's starting to pack the piece, and I say, "No way, that's not the way to go....maybe you end up killing some kids.
>
> You can't really blame the police completely. They're finding out a lot of things after the fact. You know, their hands are tied. They can only do so much. We talk about why Weed and Seed has been cut back. These guys are trying to cover the Hilltop area, and cross coverage to West Center City. That's rough when you only have two Weed and Seed officers total, compared to the six or seven we used to have. We even had patrol at one point, and you could see a difference. They [community members] got to know the officers. They got to know the stashes. They got to know the hangouts. They had informants who were telling them things...people come up to me and hand me a piece of paper with

a drug drop-off site, or a tag number if there's a shooting. They're scared, so they're not going to go to the cops!

Community members also talked about some of the conflict between community groups. A Hispanic group was funded to carry out a drug march, and according to some of the other community members, did not include everyone in the activity:

...so it's creating a separatism between blacks, whites, and Hispanics. ...Instead of bring everybody together for a common cause. There are hidden agendas and when that starts arising, it just breaks down what you really want to accomplish.

Another discussion about friction between community groups involved the Wilmington Interfaith Network which has been very active in recent and very specific demands that the police department increase walking patrols. Some of the community members reaction to WIN tactics are very negative:

I also think the Administration is catering to a certain group. I really have a problem with this. It's really a militant group. They're out there hiding behind the cloth saying they're a religious group. ...they're using the churches to get their message out. They're putting people on Boards when they shouldn't be. You know the whole country is based on separation of church and state, but we're doing the complete opposite. We're having a religious group own everything, and they're a militant group!

Other agency and community people talked about additional efforts to reclaim the community. There are several agencies involved in programs to restore economic viability to the neighborhoods affected by the illicit drug business:

We have a small program called Working Capital of Delaware to provide loans to people who are trying to start small businesses. We have a sister grant with West End Neighborhood House to try and develop an affiliate [a community organization to carry out the Working Capital of Delaware strategy] where they could provide loans to people who are trying to start small businesses. In terms of what to do about crime, I think economic development is very important, and a holistic approach is needed. When I listen to the resources that are available and how they are draining everything, then I do think the emphasis should be placed on the criminal and the Weed part of Weed and Seed. I hate to say that, but if you don't clean up the neighborhood, whatever you start is going to be torn down.

As I mentioned, we have affiliates, and the affiliates hire enterprise agents to go out and find business people so they can form peer groups. Peer groups make decisions about whether they should receive loans, then First State funds those loans. West End Neighborhood House was supposed to be one of those affiliates that was supposed to hire an enterprise agent to form peer groups. Other affiliates in the Weed and Seed area are the YWCA and the Neighborhood House.

The West End Neighborhood House was not successful in terms of forming peer groups. And, in terms of the reasons, I don't think that was a high priority compared to the other programs. Working Capital Delaware has been a successful program, though, in other areas of Wilmington. Our program has been successful, but it has just not been successful in the Weed and Seed areas as we had hoped.

> We received about $5000 from the Weed and Seed program. I have to say that in terms of the amount, the reporting requirements were onerous. If there is some way it could be reduced...I know evaluation is very important, but if something could be streamlined, it would really help.

When asked about changes in the Weed and Seed community, an agency representative responded that she was reluctant to go out into the community as she used to do, particularly in the West End...

> I have a child, and it just doesn't seem like it's getting better. I just think you have to take a holistic approach. Having the police, and doing something with the kids. Drugs are too easy to get, and everyone in the community can see who the drug dealers are except the people that can arrest them, and I can't understand that. So short of having secret police or undercover cops, someone to really stop the sales, I don't think it's going to make much difference. But it's sad to see the communities. I mean you hear the shooting every day. I'm glad I'm not going to school now, because it's such a struggle. I mean, I hear that kids can get drugs in school now, can get them anywhere, and it's no big deal...guns...I don't want to hear that. I've got a small child.

A treatment provider, who said the number of methadone clients increased 300 percent since 1990-1991, talked about his view of the drug problem in the community. He sees the neighborhood addicts as front-line market workers for drug dealers, and "corporate America" as the major customer base which supports the Wilmington drug market:

> Well, I get the sense that there is still a market for crack cocaine primarily in West Center City area. Now I think the customer has changed. If I compared it to the streets of the 80's, we saw mostly heroin, and we did not see the compulsive behavior associated with crack cocaine. My experience is that you have people that are at all different levels in their addiction, so you may have someone that just comes by on Fridays and gets a little hit for the weekend...weekend warriors we call them. Then you have the person that maybe started off selling, and is now addicted and traffics just to keep his or her addiction. So in Wilmington, if I got in the car and drove around, I would see primarily single black females, anywhere between the ages of 25 to 40, and occasionally males that are just strung out. They're the folks that fuel the drug traffic for folks that don't really know where to buy, who to buy from, how good it is. They're more like what we see in the business world as market strategists or market reps. As we go around, they'll show you how nice it is, the ins and outs of it, tell you how to get it, so they actually serve as that for most of the dealers.
>
> Like, if I came to 6th and Madison, and I had some cocaine, and I wanted to get it out there and let folks know that I have it, and it's good stuff, the first thing I would do is find key people that know the community, and are strung out, and give them samples of the product. You tell them that for every fifth person you bring me, I'll give you two or three. So that's their sole function, to stand there and say that so-and-so has crack cocaine, I had it, it's the best, better than Johnny's or Brian's and this is the one you want today.

The treatment provider also discussed the changing character of the community residents as well as treatment population, and gave some further details on the operation of the illicit drug business:

In the community, at any given time, even at our clinic, I could look at a client and say, 'Oh, so-and-so is your father,' or 'You're from the Smith family,' but now, I'd say that out of 400 people, I might know 200 of them personally, and the other 200, I've never seen before, and I'm a native Wilmingtonian, and was actually a part of the street for years before I got clean. And now, on the other side, I see folks that I've never seen before. What's different is that a lot of them are called 'Philly' or 'New York,' nicknames for where they're from. So you still have that strong New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore influence. Whoever can figure out how to get it here and get it sold quickly will actually come. We have of course the issue around 95 and the Northeast corridor of the drug traffic, and how it's fueled through vehicles, Trailways, Amtrak, I-95...so now a person may not have to go all the way to New York to get the package. They call the people in New York and the people in New York will meet them in New Jersey if there's enough money involved, or meet them in Trenton or any of those little metropolitan cities on the way to Delaware. So I think that when you look at drug traffic, it's a little bit more sophisticated. You have your cell phones and your beepers, as opposed to a person just getting their money together, jumping on a train, going to New York, purchasing, and coming back. Back then you had the element of getting arrested anywhere along the lines, whereas now you have people actually bringing it right to them.

The treatment provider said the drug business is 'alive and well' although there may be 4500 people incarcerated that would normally be in the drug market. He says that old customers that are not on the street because they are incarcerated are replaced by youth experimenting with drugs and by out-of-town employed individuals, and by prostitutes:

Now, who's the customer? I think, whether we want to admit it or not, probably corporate America...guys that just got their act together enough to get in, and now sporadically he gets high, but maintains his functional job. Then, many of the prostitutes because of the lifestyle they live, they have become hooked on cocaine and crack cocaine. So when you look at the customer again, it's the prostitute who is less likely to commit a property crime or a violent crime to get the cash, and more careful about how she purchases.

Police activity has increased, especially in the areas of heavy drug trafficking, and with the SCAT squad, and you see their presence. Now what I've just said may be contrary to what the officers are seeing every single day, I'm basically out there on the treatment side, but I'm making it my personal business to speak with drug dealers, drug users, wanna-be drug dealers and users, and get a feel from them about what's going on, and what's the latest trend. So you hear things just from the street side, and I think that those folks usually tell me, because I'm not advertising that I'm doing any research, so it's no real desire to please me or to sway a research project one way or another.

The treatment provider talked also of the effectiveness of treatment for drug addiction. He said that treatment works, and that treatment programs and methods continually improve:

Yes, treatment works. We have staff members, about four that I know of, that were actually addicted to heroin, then addicted to methadone, but now they're in college and in recovery. I myself have over ten years in recovery. I'm in a Master's program. Years ago, they said one out of 100 heroin addicts will go on to recovery, but now it's more likely to be 30 in 100 which is significant.

One reason is that many recovering people are seeing recovering people succeed, and these recovering folks have formed treatment pieces now. We've been accused of not

being competent because we don't have master's degrees and certifications, but that's changed now. Now we have Master's degrees and certifications, and we also have street knowledge as well. So when you see a guy that comes in that you used to shoot dope with, do crimes with, that you participated in all those risk-taking behaviors with, and he sees that you're not doing that, that motivates that guy.

The other factor is the existing treatment community that worked with us for over ten years. When you've done something for over ten years, you're quite naturally going to learn some new skills. So I think the existing treatment community has gotten better in their treatment efforts. The other thing is a major move by corrections to start therapeutic communities, then you can mainstream them into traditional therapy when they come out, and then highlight folks for outreach.

People from the Jackson Street Boys and Girls Club talked about their efforts to prevent youth from using drugs or participate in the drug trade. They have almost tripled the number of youth who are served by the organization, many of whom are younger than the typical teen, They have also changed the racial/ethnic distribution to include more whites.

The clients coming in to treatment are younger, different types, and there are more ways of administering drugs. It used to be intravenous. Now it has shifted to snorting. I think the younger people are more aware of HIV, and they realize that by snorting, they don't have to share needles.

....people from the white areas wouldn't send their kids over to the Club because of the area being high in drugs and crime, so one of my goals was to try to get these kids there. Our population of Hispanic has gone up about 30 percent, and the Caucasian families have come up from zero to about 80. One of the problems I have is that we consider ourselves to be a safe haven. The funds are not there! A safe haven should be there when those kids need it, at eleven or twelve o'clock at night when they're on the streets. They need somewhere to come at night so they don't get into trouble. The police officers are trying the best that they can, but there's a shortage of them.

Since our funding ended, the police department kept an officer out there because we were promised. These officers are there occasionally, but will be pulled for any other thing that is needed. It comes down to needing someone in the community that's there and that really cares...talking to kids all of the time. He'll see a group of kids on the corner, and they'll all talk to him out of respect, even if they didn't like him. Once [the community police officer] was taken out of the community, a lot of kids started hanging on the corners. It really makes a difference. The community center and outreach programs working together make a difference, but when you have 15 different people going 15 different ways, it's chaos.

The subject of the reported decrease in calls for service came up, several opinions about the validity of calls for service as a measure of criminal activity were expressed:

These people have no hope anymore. They just feel so betrayed. They had something that was working [the community police/walking patrol], then it was yanked, and no matter how loud they scream for help, they are being totally ignored. That's why the calls stopped. All of the people don't see the point in calling. One woman had property broken into by kids, and I told her that she needed to call the police. 'Why call'? She said. 'They don't come out. But I told her that she still needed to call. They stopped calling.

> Before, they wouldn't even call the police department; they would just page the officer, and he would come out. They knew it was taken care of. The new officer doesn't even have a pager, so they have to call and leave a message on voice mail, and maybe you'll get called back....it could be three days later. What good does that do these people?

Another participant added that the police can't do it without the help of the community:

> The cops can't do everything, though. If the community is not willing to work with the cop, then the problem will always be there. It's like a basketball team. If you have one guy that's shooting all the time, it's not going to do any good if he's not working with the rest of the team...they'll just give up on him. So you've got to work as a team out there and if you don't feel that you have confidence in who is there, then you'll have problems.
>
> I personally do not believe that there's fewer incidents. It might be the same thing that's happening in the downtown area as on Franklin or Harrison...that the people have lost hope. The presence, even though it's there, might not be quick enough. Why call? And if it doesn't affect the person personally, they're less likely to call.

There seemed to be agreement on this issue, as someone else added their view:

> I think they pumped community policing so much. They came out and told people that they needed them to be the eyes and ears of the community, and that you need to call. People called and called and called, but they never showed up, so they got discouraged and stopped calling. I think that's why you see a big drop in calls. It's not because there's less crimes, it's just that people have lost the confidence.

Two other possibilities were mentioned that might have affected the number of calls. One is that a new number was added in lieu of 911 for anything less than a life or death situation. People don't remember the new number so they probably just don't call. Two, many of the pay telephones in the Weed and Seed areas have been removed, and because there is a relatively high percent of residents in this area without phones in their homes, this may lead to a reduction in calls.

Someone from another community center was very candid about measuring the level of drug activity. He said the activity is obviously there, but that it is impossible to detect changes just from observation:

> I think that the drug activity...we never had a way of measuring its levels of increase or decrease unless we get the statistics from the police department. But in reference to the way the police work is affecting us...it really has deteriorated. The responding time has become poor, even no response at all. It makes it a little inconvenient that every time we meet as a whole to achieve goals together...they need our help badly, but we also need their help. Because we're not meeting halfway, we probably cannot achieve the goals that we want. They've been going through a lot of changes, and every time there's a change, there's a lapse that takes time, and we have to stop and reconnect. That has happened in the last year. Hopefully , it will get better.
>
> We don't have their schedules [the walking patrol officers]...we don't know when they're working. When we call 911, we try to get their attention first, because they're our officers, but we don't know when they're on duty. The call takers usually don't know what we're talking about. Its become an issue where you have to go to the supervisor in order to get something done.

> Once again, we have no way of measuring [drug activity], but we see the signs of it. If it's visible then it's bad. I do have experience, and I know what we're seeing is true. Kids are using marijuana; they're drinking; and they're doing it publicly. I understand they cannot be there all of the time, but when we have an incident, we have already considered that these elements are pressing, and that's why we need them to expedite. I don't think they have taken this into consideration, because they have all the priorities in the city and unless you hear shots, they don't really put that as a priority.

The conversation then turned to the shootings, and the problems behind the shootings as seen by the people working in the community centers:

> My observation is that the weapons are now in the hands of kids who have less tolerance, less feelings, peer pressure, versus the adult criminals that would think more about it....when to do it and the timing. Kids don't hesitate. I think it shows their peers that they are in control when they do this more often. We already have incidents where we know for a fact that the teens had weapons, and we have found discharged bullets [in the youth center], so we know there was gunfire. But in this program, we're trying to bring people in and keep them occupied, so the police don't have to deal with them. But in the meantime, you have all of these elements, and when we try to keep control of the program, you have to be aware of the limits, and we need their [police] support.

The question of gangs and guns was discussed, and as others had said, the signs of gangs are there, but most people believe they are gang pretenders or perhaps the beginning organization of gangs. Also, some of the racial tension talked about by several people in the community could explain the appearance of gang-like behavior:

> The signs of a gang are present. The membership is present, and the activity is present, although it is misdemeanor activity. Thank God it hasn't escalated to felonies. I think there is a gang. They may not have the leadership that it takes to be an organized gang, but that's what we don't want to happen. If it gets to that point, then it's already late.
>
> I think that for them to become members, certain people will want to obtain key positions in the gang and will obtain a gun because you can't be a driver without a car. As much as they are portrayed as wanting to be a family, and just trying to do good, none of them work. None of them have jobs. They have to support their habits somehow, and it has to be through criminal activity. Maybe they haven't openly displayed it, but we know that they do have guns because we've seen and heard them.
>
> I think it also has to do with racial status. Hispanics try to contain themselves in one area as one group. It's hard to say. I know they have some affiliation with others in the city that are not Hispanic, but it seems to be the lower element of crime is just among Hispanics only. What we have is that ethnic groups move around a lot. And every year we don't have the same crowd, and we might have new and old people mixed, and some that don't speak the language very well. Because they don't speak the language very well, they stay together because they face the same issues and problems. So they have a group, and then new teens with the same problems come along, and they connect. It goes on and on. I have seen culture that is different, but we're trying to keep them together as a group.
>
> But we do have a problem with the weather. In Puerto Rico, you can play baseball year-round, but you can't here. So we need to force them to learn something that they're not used to and maybe don't like. It's hard when you put them indoors; they feel like they're

in a cage, and different behavior comes out. I was reading about kids that came here and said they felt like they were living in trash. I think that if you come from a beautiful island like Puerto Rico, they don't take any pride in what they have because they don't see it as theirs, so they don't care. That's how they treat their community.

I think that making a long-term project is probably the solution, but everything we face is short-term, and by the time we get something going on, it gets changed or readjusted. When you come up with a plan, they cut the funds so dramatically that you can't come up with the same results.

Another perspective from the community's view on the changes in the community and in police organization sheds more light on some of the comments regarding reduced calls for service and complaints about police visibility:

I'd say that in my area, the Weed and Seed area was expanded, I believe, in '96 or so to include just about all of my district. What happened there was the area was expanded, but the police were not. The community policing is working fine in the Weed and Seed area where there is a smaller area to take care of. In my area, the funding ran out, and the officer that was working that area was fired and re-hired, and ever since he left there has been no stabilization in that area. What happened was that the new officer that was brought into the area was given three times the area, so it's unfair to compare the two officers.

The quadrant system was eliminated, you know, and we went to a 'sector' system. There are three sectors. I don't know the exact geographical boundaries, but I think there's a southwest, an east side, and a northwest sector. They have a COPS program now. That is Community Oriented Problem Solving where they have officers assigned to certain calls for service. They patrol on bicycles and on foot. No cars. They are the first ones called if a call for service comes in from their district. But what happens is they're usually already out taking care of problems and they can't answer all of the calls.

This community leader thinks the drug problem is worse than last year, primarily in marijuana. He also sees an increase in heroin. He again emphasized the shortage of resources to deal with the drug problem:

...you just move them around. Drug related calls are down, but I think it's just that people don't call because there is no response.

A youth worked from another Center talked about the shootings, the community rivalries that lead to fights, and some of the youth center's efforts to keep youth busy during the high risk hours:

Shootings have increased. There have been random shootings in the streets. We're currently going into summer activities late in the evenings hoping to curtail some of this. I'm afraid for people that will have to participate in these night activities. We're going to need officers almost stationed there until we can at least minimize the levels of shootings. We had a shooting where two of the four guys in a park got shot. It stemmed from daytime basketball activity. It appears that when we get the geographical areas together, we have those types of incidents. Now when the Eastside comes to the West Side, you have problems. They fight all of the time. When they come to the west Side to play basketball, they always get into heated arguments.

We can combat this by trying to make sure everyone is involved in these type of activities. We just had a meeting where we brought in all of the guys to find out what the problems are. It was well attended. We are trying to reach out, to minimize all of these shootings. I don't know what the whole answer is, but I'm trying to reach out to them and find out what they want to do. They mentioned that they want some late evening activities.

A lot of them dropped out [of school]. A lot of them don't have jobs...probably sell drugs. I don't know. We need to do a little more and reach out. [I've noticed] increasing late night activities. They're out there at one or two in the morning; they're out there at nine in the morning, and even when I go home from work. We need to look at reaching them at those hours. They're out there constantly.

According to this youth center worker, there are two or three different gangs in the hilltop area, and in the Westside area there are

...family members, cousins...if you can call that a gang, yes. They seem to be very close-knit on the West Side. They protect their territory.

But it's not like the Bloods and Crips. I haven't seen any Latin Kings. But there don't seem to be any real gangs. ...Our only form of gangs are guys that have come down from other cities and are identified as a group....I look at it as gypsy groups. You have a 17 year old from New York that got in trouble coming here for a safe haven, and they make money off of drugs, and the minute you arrest them they make bail, and they move on. It eventually catches up with them, but there's always new people coming in.

The youth worker went on to talk about his efforts to reach influential people (the 'kingpins') within the family networks. He has learned that if he can reach the kingpin, the members of that group will participate in Center activities:

We were to start the meeting at 7:00 p.m., but at 7:10 no one was there. We went out with some of the guys that have good relationships with the corner guys, and got about eight or 10 of them, then 40 more people came because those ten came first. They were out there, but were on the corner, and wouldn't come, but when we got a few key guys in, the rest followed suit.

If we can get to the kingpin, if we can reach out and get inside a person's head and show them self-respect...that's the key to me. So they can respect others. Drugs, shootings...this has been going on for a long time. At least in the previous years, they had respect for someone, but now they don't have any respect for anyone. They may sell drugs in front of anyone. An example of it is last night, a policeman was patrolling, and there were ten guys on the corner, possibly making a deal. I don't know if he saw that or not. Maybe that's the way of showing force by riding through, but they have no respect for them.

They did a big bust yesterday. I don't know how big it was, but they came to main street. It's getting out of hand. That's what I'm talking about. Until you learn to respect yourself, you can't respect anyone else. I think that's one of the biggest problems.

Prospects for the Future: WPD and Community Leaders

Expectations for the future include both tongue-in-cheek optimistic declarations of total victory and resigned-to-reality expectations of a continuing struggle against illicit drug sales. We asked each of the panel members to predict how they will answer the question, "What are the conditions in your community"?, in one year. Their answers follow:

Community Leaders

Do we agree that without Weed and Seed here, this summer if going to be bad. Big Time!! Absolutely!! Remember last summer. After last summer, it's not going to get better. It's just going to get worse. I'd love to say it's going to get better, but I don't think it will. It's one of those things you'd like to feel good about, but you can't. We see a difference from when we started five or six years ago, but people have to work together.

So short of having secret police or undercover cops, someone to really stop the sales, I don't think it's going to make much difference. But it's sad to see the communities. I mean you hear the shootings every day.

A year from now? Our streets are going to become very volatile if we don't mainstream the welfare population into jobs...real viable jobs. If I had not worked in 20 years, and all of a sudden you wake me up and tell me I have to go to work, don't get mad if I'm late eight times, because I'm not used to it. And the other piece to it is, if I was getting a check for $250-$300, plus some food stamps plus subsidized rent, then you take my food from me, my subsidized rent, and my cash, and tell me that I have to go to work, when I have no marketable skills because I've been home all these years, and now I have to feed my children.....but in your transition, I miss a couple of appointments, so you slap me on the wrist and tell me to get in here next month, and now you cut off a little each time, and eventually if you miss three, you're totally off. Now you have a person with children, no food, no place to live, no food stamps because I've lost it all. Many of these individuals now have to survive from what they know from the streets.... This is the worst case scenario. I think that most of the folks I know couldn't handle the $280 they got in stamps each month because they sold them for something else. The guys they sell it to loan them money because they know they'll be back next month, and it turns into a vicious cycle of loans every month. They start to commit crimes..stealing, check fraud, forgery, any kind of scam...they'll try it. So a year from now, you'll see a wave of those people. There'll be a lot of resorting back to what you did to survive. Some of the women will go back to prostitution to bring some money home for their addiction and to feed their children.

Hopefully, I won't be saying that all the people I gave loans to defaulted on their loans. I hope to be able to say that there are a lot more small businesses out there up and running, and there will be a sufficient amount of new jobs, and fewer unoccupied buildings throughout the city. I think that's reasonable, and could very well be the case.

Maybe we'll save the city for our grandkids.

I think next year will be better if we can hire the additional officers. If we get another 12 or 13 on the street, we can cut them down into smaller more manageable sectors. So next

year it will hopefully come down. We want the cigarette tax doubled to get more money. Someone has to pick up the extra funding.

...It's an ongoing thing. We can put a dent in the problem. It all starts at home. We're trying to get the family involved. We're trying to reach everyone and get them involved.

A year from now, all the programs will be up, and I hope that violent crime will have decreased anywhere from 10 to 20 percent. I hope to say that community policing has made an impact and caused the civic association to expand and see the long-term effect. Whether we'll change the world...no...that's up to the area, trying to change rental to ownership.

Hopefully, it will look rosier than it does now. I would still like to see the program that was down at Eastside. I would like to see every neighborhood have walking officers.

We'll still be talking about the same issues, but hopeful we can say that we made it through the summer, that most of the kids had jobs, and we made it to the school year. But I think the same issues will be here.

Police Department

Next year I hope I can tell you that with the increase in manpower that we have deterred a lot of violence and a lot of the drug problem. The surrounding areas might be saying that the city has been so effective that the problem has moved out of here. Hopefully, I can tell you that we have at least another 1/3 of the city covered by walking areas, because those officers now in our training programs have gotten to the point where they can go out on their own. Then we can take the more seasoned officers out of those patrol cars and put them in the community walking. They have more skills, and they have more experience in the community. Hopefully, again what's happening now is that we are in the midst of providing officers in their verbal skills training so that they can de-escalate a lot of the situations they get involved in prior to moving on the use of force or any authoritative stance.

Wilmington will be a community policing department and that philosophy will extend from those walking their patrols to those in their cars.

By the time you come back next year, the officers and the program will be out there on their own. They will be functioning as an independent entity. Of course, we will still have the two-man vehicles, but we will have more specialized operations going on, and that should have a positive impact.

We walk...but you can't cover as much of your area. On a bike you can get to problem areas much quicker, also, they don't see you coming as well. A lot of the criminals don't realize we're on bikes yet, but they'll adapt. It really put them on edge. Time are changing. We want to try to change the world. If you give us enough guys, we'll change the world. They can go to New York and deal the drugs.

When the number of officers went down, it was bad. If we get cut, we'll have to start all over...all the work right out the window. The more guys you have out there, the less crime. High visibility is the only way.

Findings and Conclusions

Quantitative data is critically important and necessary to evaluate the impact of the Weed and Seed program, but the numbers tell the story of the program in a much different way than the interview data. That data consists of the perceptions, observations, feelings, judgments, beliefs, and experiences of the people involved in the neighborhoods and in the program to save them from the devastation of the illicit drug trade.

This report has attempted to bring the five panel studies together to tell the story of Community Policing and Weed and Seed over the eight year period of its existence. The people, and the police to some extent, tell us the community police (walking patrol) is one of the most important elements in cleaning up a neighborhood and keeping it clean. We've heard over and over, that the dealers can be displaced to another corner, inside a house, or to another neighborhood, but that they return when the pressure is reduced or removed. Availability of resources to put officers in the neighborhoods in areas they can cover on bikes or walking has affected the efforts of the communities and the WPD, and led to gains when more resources are available and losses when they are cut back.

Quantitative and qualitative measures of crime levels, as well as program success in ridding the neighborhoods of drug dealers and the illicit drug trade, often carry different meanings. People in the neighborhoods and as well as some of the walking patrol officers count a visibly "cleaned off corner" as a sign of success; and, similarly, a corner that was clear of loiterers for a while, then followed by a return of the clusters of loitering men is a sign of failure.

Calls for service and drug-related arrests provide quantitative measures of neighborhood disorder and drug activity. A reduction in drug-related calls for service or arrests could, therefore, be interpreted as a reduction in drug dealing. Some of the panel members from the neighborhoods, however, had a different interpretation of the data. They said the numbers were down because police presence was greatly reduced, and because calls reporting drug activity were not responded to fast enough to do any good. Another interpretation offered by a community leader is that the drug dealers are getting smarter, making greater use of sophisticated technology, and becoming less visible by using cell phones and setting up business inside rented houses.

Other panel members mentioned that pay telephones had been taken out in some of the neighborhoods because they were used by drug dealers, which left residents without phones no means of calling. Yet another factor is the new non-emergency phone number implemented in Wilmington last year to relieve some of the pressure on 911. With the new system, calls are prioritized for response in terms of the seriousness of the problem. Thus, some of the signs of drug dealing activity may receive a low priority for response.

Evaluation Questions: Community Members Definition of the Problem

The evaluation questions are concerned with the definition of the problem and the solutions implied from the definition. The quantitative data rely on drug-related calls for service and drug-related arrests as the primary indicators of the problem. Community residents, however, rely on other measures:

> The biggest drug problem is in front of the high school. There are a lot of complaints that adults are selling from a bar near the school after school hours.
>
> They have no life. Usually the parents are subsidized. They dropped out of school. It's a shame. The drug business is one of the last resorts to have a nice car, nice clothes, and be wanted by women. To be looked up to.
>
> [The drug dealers] use some little kids from the neighborhood, which is a shame. That's our next society. ...We have a 12 year old boy who is on drugs. His mom is an alcoholic and his dad just got out of jail.
>
> Open-air dealing in West Center City is down a little. At 7th and Jefferson, its not as bad as when I first went out there....maybe about the same. We took that corner...I call it my corner. We still have open air drug dealing, but they know they can't establish a market there. They're coming in and leaving or going into their houses.
>
> It's the influx from New York and Philadelphia. If the crossfire gets worse, we may have to go to cars. I don't think it's going to get worse. I don't think there are more handguns. I mean, kids take them to school every day. ...Good kids are carrying guns because they know other kids are carrying guns, and they're scared. That's what we're dealing with now. A lot of kids have them because they feel like they have to in order to survive.
>
> When you look on the corner, you can see kids from this neighborhood who are participating. You can also see a lot of folks who don't live here. The Weed and Seed Program is helpful, but two main pieces are missing: first, nobody is watching the store. I don't know who or what is surveying the port, the airport, the bus station and the train station to find out what is coming in.
>
> ...there are clearly a lot of addicted people in this town. Somebody walks into my facility right now and says, 'I'm a substance abuser, I have a problem. I'm unemployed. I don't have medical insurance. I want help.' I don't know where to send them. And until the outside influences are addressed, until what's coming into the city is addressed, and until rehabilitation is addressed, we'll continue to have crime at an unprecedented level. It takes all hands working together, and I just don't see that.
>
> Loitering, graffiti, tennis shoes, litter. I've been living here all my life and I've never seen it any worse that it is now. Businesses are not removing graffiti. Open-air drug dealing is at an unprecedented level. I was, at one time, a person who would walk the streets any time. Now when I leave at 10 p.m., there are certain streets I'm not going up. You never know when you're going to get caught in a crossfire. You look on the corner and some of the folks are friendly and some of them are not. Then you can look around and see tags coming in from New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. In the case of Weed and Seed areas, some gains from previous work remain. Some people still sit on the front porches, and during the day, some older women feel safe enough to walk to the store.

Several houses have one owner who rents to Dominican drug dealers. He knows--he has been warned, but he still does it. The houses are just shacks he is getting money from. It takes several agencies to deal with it.

The Dominicans are renting apartments, then taking kickbacks for running their operations, selling drugs. They constantly move packages from one location to another, so it's difficult to make an impact in a short period of time. Lots of times we're hitting houses and not getting anything: they barricade themselves so well that by the time we do get in there, they've flushing the package on us.

If we are not there on the street, illegal activities increase. It's not so bad we need to call out the national guard, but we are in a state of emergency with kids. We need to do more outreach. The community and family need to work with their kids and say, 'Look, this is the way a family ought to be structured. What do you need help with"? ...before it becomes a police problem.

Senior citizens watch the news, and they think everything is miserable. They make themselves prisoners in their own home. But it is not as bad as some people are saying.

I've been in this community all my life, and I find myself locking doors. I used to laugh when white people rode up the street, and before they get to the corner you hear 'click,click,click, click.' And now I find myself riding down the street, and I lock my door, scared!

Those of us who are active have been threatened with guns, gotten our car windows busted, that kind of stuff. It's awful scary to be on the streets at night. I just think that given the size of this town, given the magnitude of the problem, if you need to put the national guard on the streets to break this up, then so be it. I think the police department needs help--whether it comes from the state, from ATF, the FBI, or whoever, this town needs help. I think the Chief is absolutely correct that we can't do it with two officers, given the magnitude of the problem.

Drugs and money. I don't totally agree that it's turf wars. There is some involvement, yes, but we have problems with some individuals who are robbing drug dealers, and there is some retaliation. You have people working on individuals working with a dealer and shorting them on the packages or not returning all the money, so they are being shot. It's a warning type thing...One individual was shot in the back, then checked himself out of the hospital and refused to cooperate with the police.

You gotta look at it this way, too: You're a big drug dealer in the projects, making $19,000-$20,000 a day. Are you actually going to call the police and say, 'Hey, someone just robbed me of $20,000.'?

If you're too high, you're not going to overly concerned about what your kid is doing. If you have a part-time job and are having difficulty keeping a roof over your head, and a 14-year old is bring in the rent money, you're going to turn your head and try to deny it. It happens every day.

We don't call them gangs. They're groups. You got the Cuban influence, the Dominican influence, the Jamaican influence. You got a turf war. Folks are getting shot. You've got unsolved murders. You got folks that get short who won't tell you who shot them. What does that tell you?

> The whole gang thing is something I think needs to be revisited. I don't think there's any organized society...it's more territorial as it relates to the drug traffic. There has been a re-establishment of gangs associated with drug cartels. Not the Godfather, Sicilian connection, none of that. We're talking about certain groups that call themselves certain things and it might be the 28th Street Boys, or the 6th and Madison Boys.
>
> Wilmington has become a safe haven for the guy that wants to make a quick dollar, doesn't want to get his feet dirty or wet. He can come down, drop his package off. His only risk is the northeast corridor, getting jammed up coming in....I see kids here--the vice squad doesn't like to admit this--with empty pockets. A few days later, their pockets are full...a kid can make $2000 between 10 p.m. to 9 a.m.
>
> A lot of bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo. It takes so long to get simple things done. Something so simple that it could be done with two phone calls, but they have to have a meeting to plan how they're going to do this. We had a gentleman who funded the Christmas Party, used his own credit card for the $500. It took months to get him reimbursed. Just for that. Just for $500. There is money sitting out there in a non-interest bearing account for three years because you can't make money on grant money.

Thus the problem in qualitative measures is defined as clusters of men, usually young men, standing on street corners, near bars, or near schools, engaged in some kind of interaction with people on the street or driving by in cars. They have learned, because they live in the community, that the activity they observe is open-air drug marketing. They see indicators of an open drug market such as sneakers tied together and thrown over utility wires.

They see signs of a deteriorating neighborhood: graffiti; empty, sometimes boarded up, buildings, trash, a loss of neighborhood businesses; loitering, unoccupied labor-force age men and women; kids on the street rather than in school; strangers who have no respect for neighborhood people, as well as some of the neighborhood youth who have no respect for the community or its people; a community that offers few opportunities for employment; few opportunities for job training or treatment for drug/alcohol dependency or addiction. They see the signs of disorder which accompany the drug trade--prostitution, late night noise and commotion, public intoxication, untended children, fights, and sometimes shootings and other violence.

Community members see their neighbors move out of the city whenever they can; they see older people, many of whom have lived in the neighborhood for years, afraid to leave their homes except for a short period between late morning and early afternoon. They see the activity beginning when the school buses bring the kids home from school.

The treatment providers in the community see families with no father and a mother who is dependent on drugs or alcohol and who lives on public assistance. They see the neglected children, many of whom are vulnerable to the easy money offered by the drug dealers for simple tasks such as delivery of a package or as a lookout for the police. They know of the parents who ask no questions when the children bring in money to pay the rent.

Community members also see the effects of a ruined economy, effects that weaken community efforts to band together to fight the illicit drug traders. There are people in the community who work with the drug traders, who depend on them for their drugs and for their income.

The drug traders may be family members. In some cases, the business is a family business. As the community deteriorates, other "storefront" type businesses spring up which depend on the illicit-drug, poverty-ridden economy.

Solutions

The community defined problems described above are some of the most important indicators of the illicit-drug problem in Wilmington neighborhoods. From the community's point of view, the solutions are similar to those proposed in the ESAAP and Weed and Seed Programs. Those were:

- Deploy walking patrols in the neighborhood.
- Increase narcotic enforcement efforts.
- Ensure the prosecution and conviction of drug offenders.
- Provide intensive supervision to drug offenders after they are released back into the community.
- Increase availability of services for victims of violent crime.
- Create additional programming for neighborhood youths.
- Provide substance abuse education and counseling for youths and adults.
- Establish additional support programs for parents.

According to the people as well as many police officers, the most critical component of a solution is a community policing program including walking patrol officers assigned to the community. This comes from members of the police department, community activists, and others involved in community activities. According to community residents, the walking patrol officers get to know the residents, the legitimate and not so legitimate business people. They learn the sounds, routines, and rhythm of the neighborhood. They know the strangers; they befriend the kids; refer the addicted to treatment; pick up intelligence about the illicit drug trade; see developing problems and take preventive action; train and help community members organize; coordinate city services to deal with absentee landlords, board up vacant houses, clean up graffiti, participate in community activities such as ball games; move open-air drug dealers off the street, teach respect, and provide a visible and rapid response to community problems.

Another key to solving the problems is community organization. Everyone interviewed says that cleaning up and maintaining a clean community requires a united community effort. When this is combined with a concentrated police effort, the community can be reclaimed and maintained as long as that effort is continued.

Panel members also talked about the need to rebuild the community by providing treatment programs for the addicted; education and recreational programs for the children; job training and employment opportunities for the adults; and parenting programs for teenage mothers and

fathers. One panel member recommended that child labor laws be waived to allow 12 year olds to work in legitimate jobs.

Other solutions recommended by panel members include close collaboration between city, county and federal agencies, local businesses, and the community, and reducing/simplifying the bureaucratic requirements for allocating and monitoring government money--even the smallest sums.

Successes

The quantitative data reflects the successes and failures of the war on drugs using tables and maps of "hot spots" in Wilmington. Both police officers and people in the communities describe wins and losses in another way. From the Eastside study, we learned that successes included planning and conducting a well-attended community meeting; getting landlords to attend a community meeting; a basketball game for neighborhood kids and the cops; older people walking on the streets; support and information given to the police; a friendly greeting. Other successes mentioned included:

- A flower garden where weeds used to grow;
- A corner free of drug dealers;
- A well-attended community "march;"
- Community buildings cleaned of graffiti;
- A house occupied by drug-dealers and addicts closed down through collaboration with many government agencies;
- Buildings with broken windows which have been boarded up;
- Streets clear of broken glass, debris, and trash;
- Making 75 arrests in a three-month period and totally cleaning an area;
- On the Eastside, no sneakers on the utility lines.

Failures

According to the walking patrol officers, "there is no permanent solution that is within our reach:"

> We take what we have in this division and a lot of ingenuity. We work with other divisions, contact vice, and they will come down and give us assistance. Drug trafficking is a big problem. There is only so much we can address. We really are the liaison between the community and the police. That is our main function: to go out and talk to these people, find out their problems, and try to come up with a solution to fix it. We just do what needs to be done day by day. But we get so many complaints from the neighbors about drug dealers. We can't give it all to vice.

Thus, the war on drugs consists of battles won then lost when pressure applied to the illicit drug markets and dealers is weakened: Funding runs out and the police are moved to another

location; community treatment programs are cut; community leadership is flawed, and residents tire of the necessity for constant vigilance; drug dealers move back into the neighborhood and the calls for service increase for a time, then may decrease, perhaps because the residents have learned that the police no longer respond quickly to such calls, or because the drug dealers have become more sophisticated in evading arrest; kids are recruited into the drug business; the prostitutes return to ply their trade, often leaving the dregs of doing business in the doorways and on the streets in plain view of the children, women and men of the neighborhood. On the Eastside, the sneakers stack up on the utility wires.

Summary of Findings

This report has attempted to bring the five panel studies together to tell the story of Community Policing and Weed and Seed over the eight year period of its existence. The people, and the police to some extent, tell us the community police walking patrol is one of the most important elements in cleaning up a neighborhood and keeping it clean. We've heard over and over, that the dealers can be displaced to another corner, inside a house, or to another neighborhood, but that they return when the pressure is reduced or removed. Availability of resources to put officers in the neighborhoods in areas they can cover on bikes or walking has affected the efforts of the communities and the WPD wage the war on drugs, and led to gains when more resources are available and losses when they are cut back.

We've heard, too, about community strengths and weakness' to do battle against drugs. Everyone agrees that the battle requires the efforts of community members, the police, and federal, state and local government support. Thus, when a community is reduced to a certain level of devastation, it may not be recoverable. If the drug economy is the only business in town, if the neighborhood depends on drugs physically due to addiction and economically to produce income, if the police do not have resources to patrol the streets 24 hours a day, every day, if the treatment centers do not have enough treatment slots to meet the need, if the stronger members of the community cannot work together and/or with other community leaders to consolidate the efforts, then perhaps the neighborhood is lost.

But there is still hope in the worst of the neighborhoods. Efforts continue to rid the neighborhoods of the criminal cast of characters. Gains have been made and some have been retained, although people tend to gauge the seriousness of the problem from the vantage point of the improved condition rather than the beginning situation. Community leaders have learned much about organizing the neighborhoods; the city is doing a better job of maintaining some of the services to the drug-infested neighborhoods, such as street sweeping and trash removal. Federal agencies continue their efforts to control the drug trafficking, and occasionally, a kingpin is taken out of business for a while. The Wilmington Police Department is learning how to do community policing when resources are limited. They have not reached the ideal that was achieved on the Eastside, but the current strategies are much, much better than when the ESAAP and Weed and Seed Projects began.

So what are the evaluation results? From a quantitative point of view, the evaluation design is specified for a certain period of time with a pre and post measurement of the indicators. Typically, it is then concluded either that the strategy works or does not work. Qualitatively,

however, we can say it both works and does not work. If all the elements of the solution are brought to bear on the problem, communities can be reclaimed. Drug dealers can be cleared out; residents return to the streets without fear; children go to school; people with addictions can get treatment. But that does not mean that the police can then go elsewhere; the treatment slots can be moved to other communities; and neighborhood leaders can relax and go on to other concerns. When that happens, the drug dealers return. The war goes on. It cannot be concluded that winning a battle in the war against drugs equals winning the war. We do not know how long these efforts must continue to win the war.

APPENDIX

Data Sources

Data on the number of drug related arrests, drug related calls for service, and violent crime related calls for service were obtained from Wilmington Police Department records. All arrests with drug related charges were used, including those where the drug offense was not the lead charge. Information used in the drug related arrest database was compiled directly from Wilmington Police Department arrest logs, and includes the name, age, race and sex of the offender, date and location of arrest, descriptions of all charges involved in the arrest and the names of the arresting officers.

Information in the drug related calls for police service database include the type of call involved, location of the call, and the time that the call was received by police. Data on 911 calls for service were obtained from Wilmington Police Department's computer assisted dispatch (CAD) system records. Two types of calls were categorized as "drug related"—Drug Sales In Progress and Drug Violations.

A third database of Weed & Seed arrests includes indictment and sentencing dates, disposition of arrest charges, and sentences received for convictions. The fourth database used in this analysis consists of all CAD system calls for service that relate to violent crime (offensive touching, assault, robbery, rape, homicide), incidents involving weapons (shootings, knifings), and burglaries.

In 1991, the Wilmington Police Department replaced the computerized dispatch system that was used to record data on calls for police service. CAD system data for the first four months of 1991 were lost as a result of this change. Consequently, the 1991 drug related calls for police service figures presented in this report are estimates based on weighed calculations that were derived from the eight months of data that were available (May to December 1991).

All of the CAD system and arrest data used in this analysis was geocoded by location. A map provided by the Wilmington Police Department that divides the city into 90 reporting areas (grids) was used for this purpose. These reporting *areas,* which are essentially census tract sub-units, are not the same as police department reporting *districts,* which tend to cover a much larger area and are subject to periodic changes.

Weed & Seed Reporting Areas



City of Wilmington Reporting Areas



Physical and Demographic Characteristics of Wilmington's Weed & Seed Neighborhoods.

Wilmington's three Weed & Seed neighborhoods—West Center City, Westside/Hilltop, and Browntown/Hedgeville—are located west of Wilmington's central business district. The approximate boundaries of the target area are N. Union Street to the west, Tatnall Street to the east, Pennsylvania Avenue to the north and the Wilmington city line to the south. West Center City is located at the western edge downtown Wilmington. The Westside/Hilltop area lies adjacent to West Center City on the west side of the Adams/Jackson Street I-95 corridor which extends from Lancaster Avenue north to Pennsylvania Avenue. Browntown/Hedgeville is located directly south of these two neighborhoods on the south side of Lancaster Avenue.

Westside/Hilltop is located west of the West Center City area and is bounded by Adams Street/I-95, Pennsylvania Avenue, N. Union Street, and Lancaster Avenue. This area is one of the most ethnically diverse neighborhoods in Wilmington. According to the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, approximately 11,843 persons live in the area. Although a majority of the Westside's population are African-American (52 percent), over half of the city's Hispanic population live there, thereby making the Westside home to Delaware's largest Hispanic community. Nearly one-quarter of area's residents are Hispanic. The Westside/Hilltop area also has a substantial Italian-American community, who are concentrated in the northwestern section of the area north of W. 4th Street between N. Dupont and N. Union Streets.

Within the boundaries of the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood are three community centers (West End Neighborhood House, the Latin American Community Center, and Hilltop Lutheran Neighborhood Center), four parochial schools (St. Anthony's, Padua Academy, St. Paul's, and Ursuline Academy), a public Elementary school (Cool Springs) and a hospital (St. Francis). The far western edge of the Westside/Hilltop area on N. Union Street is heavily commercialized and has a large concentration of restaurants, convenience stores, and other small businesses.

The median household income in 1989 for Westside/Hilltop households was nearly equal to the citywide median ($24,486 versus $26,389). Median family income for Westside/Hilltop families was also slightly less than the citywide median ($29,523 versus $31,140). Median household and family incomes for Census Tracts 14 and 15 were approximately equal to or above comparable citywide figures. These two census tracts represent the more affluent areas of the Westside/ Hilltop area.

Most of the area's low-income households are located in Census Tracts 22 and 23. Approximately 18 percent of Westside/Hilltop families had incomes below the poverty level. Eighty-one percent of Westside/Hilltop families with incomes below the poverty level lived in Census Tracts 22 and 23. Over 25 percent of the families living in Census Tract 22 had incomes that were below the poverty level in 1989, and 25 percent of the households in that area received public assistance income. Similarly, 22 percent of the families in Census Tract 23 had incomes below the poverty level, with 13 percent of the households receiving public assistance income.

The housing stock in the area reflects this wide range of income levels. In general, the quality of housing is much better north of W. 8th Street, especially in Census Tract 15. In the northernmost part of Census Tract 15, it is not uncommon to find single family detached homes that cost $300,000 or more. Traveling south towards Census Tracts 22 and 23, signs of physical decay become more apparent as the number of vacant, neglected, and poorly maintained properties gradually increases.

The section of the Westside/Hilltop neighborhood where most of area's open air drug sales occur consists mainly of small row houses and corner businesses. Many of the area's narrow streets are strewn with litter, and graffiti covered walls are commonplace. According to Wilmington Police Department dispatch system records, major Westside/Hilltop drug hot spots in 1996 were the corner of 4th & Franklin Streets, 3rd Street & Delamore Place, and W. 6th Street between Harrison and Vanburen Streets.

Westside/Hilltop Weed & Seed Target Area

Community Centers

Demographic Profile of Westside/Hilltop

Race	CT 14.00		CT 15.00		CT 22.00		CT 23.00		Westside Total	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Black	394	18.4%	1,275	48.9%	1,906	77.7%	1,997	57.3%	5,572	52.1%
White	1,602	74.8%	1,244	47.8%	546	22.3%	700	20.1%	4,092	38.3%
Other	147	6.9%	86	3.3%	0	0.0%	789	22.6%	1,022	9.6%
Hispanic	127	5.9%	176	6.8%	1,557	63.5%	925	26.5%	2,785	26.1%
Total	2,143	100.0%	2,605	100.0%	2,452	100.0%	3,486	100.0%	10,686	100.0%
Sex										
Male	852	39.8%	1,239	47.6%	1,787	72.9%	1,757	50.4%	5,635	52.7%
Female	1,291	60.2%	1,366	52.4%	1,822	74.3%	1,729	49.6%	6,208	58.1%
Total	2,143	100.0%	2,605	100.0%	3,609	147.2%	3,486	100.0%	11,843	110.8%
Economic Status										
All Households	980	100.0%	1,088	100.0%	945	100.0%	1,069	100.0%	4,082	100.0%
Households Receiving Public Assistance Income	64	6.5%	108	9.9%	234	24.8%	139	13.0%	545	13.4%
Median Household Income	$25,455	--	$24,760	--	$22,863	--	$24,864	--	$24,486	--
Mean Household Income	$33,329	--	$33,817	--	$25,128	--	$27,414	--	$29,922	--
All Families	506	100.0%	488	100.0%	782	100.0%	768	100.0%	2,544	100.0%
Families With Income Below Poverty Level	22	4.3%	61	12.5%	199	25.4%	168	21.9%	450	17.7%
Female Head Families With Income Below Poverty Level	7	1.4%	27	5.5%	131	16.8%	126	16.4%	291	11.4%
Median Family Income	$36,179	--	$33,542	--	$21,528	--	$26,842	--	$29,523	--
Mean Family Income	$42,741	--	$39,553	--	$24,259	--	$28,812	--	$33,841	--
Per Capita Income	$15,861	--	$14,575	--	$6,846	--	$8,666	--	$11,487	--

Source: 1990 Census of Population and Housing

West Center City is located directly west of Wilmington's central business district. The approximate boundaries of West Center City are Tatnall Street, Martin Luther King Boulevard, N. Adams Street/I-95, and Pennsylvania Avenue. The area is comprised mainly of two and three story row houses and apartment buildings. Located within the boundaries of the West Center City area is a city operated community center (William "Hicks" Anderson Community Center), a state owned social service facility (Porter State Service Center), a shopping center (Adam's Four Shopping Center), and a parochial school (St. Peter's).

According to the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, approximately 4,588 persons live in West Center City. About 70 percent of the area's residents are African-American. The median household income in 1989 for West Center City households was $23,830, which is just slightly less than the citywide median household income ($26,389). However, the median income for families living in the West Center City area was only $20,839, which is substantially less than the citywide median family income of $31,140. West Center City has the highest rate of poverty of the three target neighborhoods, with approximately one out of four families having incomes below the poverty level.

Most illicit drug activity in West Center City occurs in the area bounded by W. 9th Street, West Street, W. 5th Street, and Monroe Street. This area is often referred to by longtime Wilmington residents as "The Valley" because much of the area lies at the crevasse between two hills that rise to the west and east. Many of the homes in this area are federally subsidized rental units (Section 8) and Wilmington Housing Authority scattered site housing. Located directly north and south of "The Valley" are two relatively stable, middle-class areas, Quaker Hill and the Trinity area. Very few drug related calls for service are received from these two areas. According to Wilmington Police Department dispatch system records, major West Center City drug hot spots in 1996 were Jefferson Street between W. 6th & W. 8th Streets, and Monroe Street between W. 7th & W. 8th Streets.

West Center City Weed & Seed Target Area

Demographic Profile of West Center City

Race	CT 16.00		CT 21.00		West Center City Total	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Black	1,714	69.1%	1,563	74.1%	3,277	71.4%
White	566	22.8%	384	18.2%	950	20.7%
Other	200	8.1%	161	7.6%	361	7.9%
Hispanic	224	9.0%	244	11.6%	468	10.2%
Total	2,480	100.0%	2,108	100.0%	4,588	100.0%
Sex						
Male	1,204	48.5%	940	44.6%	2,144	46.7%
Female	1,276	51.5%	1,168	55.4%	2,444	53.3%
Total	2,480	100.0%	2,108	100.0%	4,588	100.0%
Economic Status						
All Households	991	100.0%	856	100.0%	1,847	100.0%
Households Receiving Public Assistance Income	152	15.3%	155	18.1%	307	16.6%
Median Household Income	$26,902	--	$20,758	--	$23,830	--
Mean Household Income	$32,192	--	$27,797	--	$29,995	--
All Families	558	100.0%	451	100.0%	1,009	100.0%
Families With Income Below Poverty Level	138	24.7%	117	25.9%	255	25.3%
Female Head Families With Income Below Poverty Level	125	22.4%	81	18.0%	206	20.4%
Median Family Income	$22,240	--	$19,437	--	$20,839	--
Mean Family Income	$31,366	--	$29,755	--	$30,561	--
Per Capita Income	$12,716	--	$11,470	--	$12,093	--

Source: 1990 Census of Population and Housing

Browntown/Hedgeville is located directly south of Wilmington's Westside/Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods and central business district. The boundaries for Browntown/Hedge- ville are Lancaster Avenue, S. Union Street, the city line, and the Christina River. Hedgeville, which is located on the north side of Maryland Avenue (Census Tracts 25 and 26), lies adjacent to the Westside and West Center City neighborhoods. This area contains a mix of single family detached homes, semi-detached units, row houses, and apartments. Browntown lies on the south side of Maryland Avenue (Census Tract 27). A large part of Browntown is occupied by factories, warehouses, and other industrial uses. The residential section consists mostly of older two story row houses mixed intermittently with newer residential construction. Within the boundaries of the Browntown/Hedgeville area are two parochial schools (St. Elizabeth's and St. Hedwig's) three public schools (Pulaski Elementary School, Bayard Elementary School, and the Douglass Kindergarten Center), the Dennison Girls Club, and the Jackson Street Boys and Girls Club.

According to the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, 7,723 persons live in Browntown/ Hedgeville. Eighty-three percent of Browntown/Hedgeville's residents are white. In the past, most of the area's residents were of Polish descent, however, the neighborhood has since become more ethnically diverse. The median household income in 1989 for Browntown/Hedgeville was $26,563, which was slightly higher than the median household income for Wilmington ($26,389). Median family income in 1989 for Browntown/Hedgeville was also higher than the citywide median ($33,729 versus $31,140).

Most of the drug related calls for service that were received from Hedgeville in 1996 concerned areas on or near Lancaster Avenue, especially Read Street between S. Franklin and S. Harrison Streets (Census Tract 26). Few drug related calls for service were received from the Browntown area (south of Maryland Avenue). Those that were received from Browntown mostly concerned the area near Cedar and Brown Streets.

Browntown/Hedgeville Weed & Seed Target Area



Community Centers

Demographic Profile of Browntown/Hedgeville

Race	CT 25.00		CT 26.00		CT 27.00		Browntown/Hedgeville Total	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Black	366	13.0%	429	13.2%	119	7.3%	914	11.8%
White	2,344	83.0%	2,674	82.0%	1,426	87.1%	6,444	83.4%
Other	114	4.0%	159	4.9%	92	5.6%	365	4.7%
Hispanic	164	5.8%	184	5.6%	126	7.7%	474	6.1%
Total	2,824	100.0%	3,262	100.0%	1,637	100.0%	7,723	100.0%
Sex								
Male	1,361	48.2%	1,544	47.3%	774	47.3%	3,679	47.6%
Female	1,463	51.8%	1,718	52.7%	863	52.7%	4,044	52.4%
Total	2,824	100.0%	3,262	100.0%	1,637	100.0%	7,723	100.0%
Economic Status								
All Households	1,152	100.0%	1,327	100.0%	678	100.0%	3,157	100.0%
Households Receiving Public Assistance Income	75	6.5%	111	8.4%	35	5.2%	221	7.0%
Median Household Income	$32,061	--	$24,788	--	$22,841	--	$26,563	--
Mean Household Income	$35,928	--	$28,673	--	$29,192	--	$31,264	--
All Families	732	100.0%	802	100.0%	397	100.0%	1,931	100.0%
Families With Income Below Poverty Level	37	5.1%	75	9.4%	42	10.6%	154	8.0%
Female Head Families With Income Below Poverty Level	16	2.2%	15	1.9%	42	10.6%	73	3.8%
Median Family Income	$36,750	--	$35,776	--	$28,661	--	$33,729	--
Mean Family Income	$42,679	--	$35,647	--	$32,652	--	$36,993	--
Per Capita Income	$14,805	--	$11,941	--	$12,301	--	$13,016	--

Source: 1990 Census of Population and Housing

References

Le'verne Cecere, Richard J. Harris, Charles Huenke, and Evelyn Scocas, *Wilmington Shootings 1996 - A Comparative Study of Victims and Offenders in Wilmington, Delaware.* Delaware Statistical Analysis Center and the Criminal Justice Council, March 1997.

Richard J. Harris and John P. O'Connell, *City of Wilmington Weed & Seed Program Evaluation 18 Month Report.* Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, June 1994.

Richard J. Harris and John P. O'Connell, *Evaluation of the Wilmington Weed & Seed Program 30 Month Report.* Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, August 1995.

Richard J. Harris and John P. O'Connell, *Evaluation of the Wilmington Weed & Seed Program - January to December 1995.* Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, April 1997.

Mary J. Mande. *The War on Drugs in Wilmington, Delaware - February 1989 to June 1996.* Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, August 1996.

Mary J. Mande. *The Effectiveness of Community Policing in Disrupting Open Air Drug Markets in Wilmington, Delaware.* Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, December 1994.

Chris Barrish. *Neighbors cheer as vice squad nets drugs, cash, suspects during raid.* The News Journal, May 16, 1996.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. *1990 Census of Population and Housing - Wilmington, Delaware.* U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993.

U.S. Department of Justice. *Operation Weed & Seed Implementation Manual.* U.S. Department of Justice, 1992.